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This research focuses on civil works projects at the intersection of metropolitan 
development, risk management, and changing engineering practices. Today climate 
change is causing oceans around the world to rise. Flooding from higher tides and 
tropical storms increasingly threatens major coastal cities. This dissertation focuses on 
three southeastern cities – Houston, Miami, and Tampa – that are particularly vulnerable 
to the repercussions of climate change because of their successful development on coastal 
plains. Although hurricanes did bring flooding to southeastern Texas and South Florida in 
the past, it was fresh water overflowing from rivers, bayous, and wetlands that was the 
primary concern of city boosters in the twentieth century. 
I argue that the rapid development of Houston, Miami, and Tampa – from small 
cities into major regional centers in the decades after World War Two – depended on 
federally-sponsored systems of canals, dams, and reservoirs for controlling floods and 
supplying fresh water. These three metropolitan areas are representative of the kind of 
sprawling development that happened to major cities across the Sunbelt, but Houston, 
Miami, and Tampa uniquely required systems of water management to grow in 
hazardous, low-lying regions that otherwise would have constrained their development. 
Dams, water retention areas, canals, and hydraulic control structures are all components 
of civil works infrastructure that were implemented to achieve these goals of regional 
development. In all three cities this infrastructure partially solved the problem of acute 
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urban flooding, but, by helping to protect large areas for future development, it also 
heightened the vulnerability of these coastal regions to water shortages and more intense 
storms today. By looking at the motivations for flood control in Houston, Miami, and 
Tampa in the past, this research helps better define the questions we should be asking for 
how to prepare these kinds of low-lying regions for an even more hazardous future. 
As southeastern cities, Houston, Miami, and Tampa represent both different 
geographies and politics from cases such as Phoenix and Los Angeles in the arid Sunbelt 
West.1 In those cities, controlling flash floods and supplying water for irrigation and 
human consumption were critical barriers to suburban growth, but the federal role in 
developing the West was institutionalized much earlier through resource extraction 
followed by reclamation efforts of varying degrees of success.2 In the case of Houston, 
Miami, and Tampa, state and local sponsors had to put up significant percentages of the 
construction costs. They also had to pay for all the maintenance and operation, so there 
was a constant struggle to justify this form of intervention in regional water resources.  
In contrast to New Orleans, where a highly visible flood hazard was constantly 
being managed, after repeated failures, Houston, Miami, and Tampa went through 
periods of successful infrastructure development that then faded into the background for 
most residents.3 In these coastal cities, disaster response was institutionalized by the 
                                               
1 Andrew Needham, Power Lines: Phoenix and the Making of the Modern Southwest, Politics and 
Society in Twentieth-Century America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 32. 
2 Donald J. Pisani, Water and American Government: The Reclamation Bureau, National Water 
Policy, and the West, 1902-1935 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 6. 
3 C. L. Mohr and L. N. Powell, “Through the Eye of Katrina: The Past as Prologue? An Introduction,” 
Journal of American History 94, no. 3 (December 1, 2007): 693–94, 
https://doi.org/10.2307/25095129. New Orleans was a city in a perilous location. Its levees, 
floodgates, and pumps were always a prominent part of the landscape of the city. Flood control 
infrastructure in Houston, Miami and Tampa is also visible, but you have to travel out to the suburbs 
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relationship between local flood control districts and on-going U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers civil works projects. Flood control became an invisible presence until quite 
recently when the consequence of unregulated development, combined with higher tides 
and more intense precipitation events, led to increasing calls for new infrastructure 
projects. 
 
Figure 1.1 Comparative timeline of the lifecycle of flood control projects in Houston, Miami, and Tampa 
At mid-century the development of large flood control projects, and the 
repercussions of that development, followed a pattern. Each city experienced a similar 
sequence of events: Flood control began with determination to prevent another 
catastrophe, and over the next 15 years, major infrastructure was put in place 
                                               
to see it. About once a decade, a spectacularly intense downpour, or a tropical storm traveling on just 
the right path, would cause suburban flooding, and local water managers would have to remind 
citizens of the systems that had protected them from even more catastrophic damage. This revealing of 
the system through stress on its limits was a key part of the local media coverage of the aftermath of 
Hurricane Harvey in Houston in August, 2017. 
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successfully. But, ultimately, the protective systems imagined at the time of the original 
disaster were never completed. In Houston, for example, a particularly catastrophic flood 
in 1935 galvanized civic leaders to seek federal funding for a comprehensive project of 
flood control and improved navigation that would secure downtown areas from flooding 
and prevent damage to the critical Ship Channel for the Port of Houston.4 A state-
sponsored flood control district was created for Houston’s Harris County to provide local 
financial contributions to the federal Corps of Engineers projects and to maintain the 
flood control infrastructure after its completion.  By the late 1940s two large dams with 
water retention areas and outlet channels were nearing completion well outside of 
Houston’s growing suburbs.5  
The success of this infrastructure in preventing major floods had a complex 
relationship with the suburban sprawl that dominated the Sunbelt energy capital into the 
1980s.6 Downtown Houston never saw flooding again like it did in 1935, and the Port of 
Houston was never again forced to cease operations because of debris and silt filling up 
the Ship Channel. But suburban flooding became a perennial problem as new 
subdivisions sprawled across Harris County in the 1950s. As land values increased the 
costs of obtaining rights-of-way for new infrastructure, construction became prohibitively 
                                               
4 K. N. White, S. D. Fitzgerald, and J. Rogers, “Inundation, District Creation, and Urbanization: The 
History of Flood Control in Harris County, Texas” (American Society of Civil Engineers, 2008), 1–
10, https://doi.org/10.1061/40976(316)148. 
5 Lauren Caruba, “Houston Dams Are Old, Beat up and a Vital Line of Defense,” Houston Chronicle, 
September 2, 2016, http://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/Houston-
dams-are-old-beat-up-and-a-vital-line-of-9199908.php. 
6 Barry J Kaplan, “Houston: The Golden Buckle of the Sunbelt,” in Sunbelt Cities: Politics and 
Growth since World War II, ed. R. M. Bernard and B. R. Rice (University of Texas Press, 1983), 200. 
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expensive.7 Starting in the late 1960s, pressure from grassroots environmental groups, 
taxpayer resistance to approving bonds, and federal budget tightening forced the 
suspension of drainage projects meant to prevent suburban flooding.  
A variation on this sequence of events occurred in the greater Miami area 
following extensive flooding in the spring of 1947, and a similar pattern repeated again in 
the Tampa Bay area after major spring storms and Hurricane Donna flooded much of 
southwest Florida in 1960. In both of these postwar Florida cases the infrastructure 
designed by the Corps of Engineers to protect the cities took over a decade to complete, 
rapid growth coincided with the completion of the works, and environmental concerns 
became more prominent in each location, ultimately leading to critical modifications of 
the flood control systems.  
In Miami, the destruction of the rich ecological diversity and beauty of the 
Everglades ecosystem became a rallying point for criticism of the flood control projects 
and unregulated suburban growth in South Florida.8 In Tampa, federal projects were still 
in the planning stages as an era of increased environmental awareness began in the late 
1960s. Because of resistance at the local level and federal spending cut backs in the 
1970s, most of the reservoirs designed to provide structural flood control and manage 
                                               
7 Harris County Flood Control District, “Wild River: A Pictorial Petition as Presented to the Sub-
Committee on Civil Functions, Senate Appropriations Committee,” July 28, 1951, Auditors Papers, 
Harris County Archives; Mihir Zaveri, “Officials Patched and Prayed While Pressure Built on 
Houston’s Dams,” Houston Chronicle, December 17, 2017, sec. Developing Storm Part 5, 
https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/Officials-patched-and-prayed-
while-pressure-built-12425719.php. 
8 Arthur R. Marshall, “A Critique of Water Management,” in Handbook on the Biscayne Aquifer: 
Water Management, Water Conservation, Health and Cost of Drinking Water, ed. Brian Blackwelder, 
Brenda Marineace, and Joseph E. Podgor (Environmental Coalition of Broward County, Inc., 1981); 
US GAO, “Report to the Secretary of the Army: Improved Planning and Management of the Central 
and Southern Florida Flood Control Project Is Needed,” May 14, 1982, 5, Box 9, Accession No. 077-
02-0045, RG 77, National Archives at Atlanta. 
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water supplies in southwest Florida were never built.9 Instead large areas of swamp and 
river basin were set aside to provide these services naturally. While the Miami case 
demonstrates the most severe failure to anticipate the consequences of transforming a 
region’s water regime, flood control in Tampa shows the evolution of the Corps of 
Engineers as they learned to work with local water management institutions to anticipate 
and mitigate environmental impacts.  
The Corps could not follow through on the initial plans for the Tampa Bay area’s 
“Four River Basins” project for two main reasons. First, they ran out of money. Starting 
in 1969, local representatives had to repeatedly go back to Congress for larger 
appropriations to begin work on local reservoirs and an emergency bypass canal 
protecting the city of Tampa from flooding on the Hillsborough River.10 With a 
deepening recession in the early 1970s, and subsequent administrations’ determination to 
curtail large civil works projects, it was hard to get even a tenth of the requested budget 
for the multi-purpose system of reservoirs, canals, and levees that was planned to protect 
agricultural areas in southwest Florida, provide abundant fresh water supplies, and 
encourage suburban development.11 Funds for flood control projects were also competing 
with the need to deepen the channel through Tampa Bay into the Port of Tampa. These 
constraints forced the Corps and the Southwest Florida Water Management District to 
                                               
9 US Army Corps of Engineers Jacksonville District, “Four River Basins Project Inactive Status,” 
April 1986, Box 9, Accession No. 077-02-0045, RG 77, National Archives at Atlanta. 
10 Sam M. Gibbons, “Statement of Congressman Sam M. Gibbons Before Public Works 
Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee,” June 4, 1969, Sam Gibbons Papers, 1971-1, 
University of South Florida Libraries. 
11 Sam M. Gibbons, “Statement of Congressman Sam M. Gibbons Before Public Works 
Subcommittee, Appropriations Committee,” May 15, 1973, Sam Gibbons Papers, 1978-9, University 
of South Florida Libraries. 
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focus on the single purpose that was absolutely essential in the system: providing 
emergency flood relief to the city of Tampa. The Tampa Bypass Canal became the one 
remaining non-negotiable piece of the Four River Basins project, completed in 1981.12 
Second, grassroots environmental concerns were forcing a shift in the way in 
which water supply and flood control projects were designed. In the late 1960s University 
of South Florida biologists and local Tampa environmental groups stopped Old Tampa 
Bay from being transformed into a fresh water lake.13 State-wide environmental activism 
and distrust of large-scale projects put a stop to plans for the Cross-Florida Barge Canal – 
an essential outlet for several Four River Basins reservoirs. Meanwhile, air and water 
quality concerns merged into a national movement that would result in legislation for 
federal regulation.14 The Corps of Engineers put most of the remaining Four River Basins 
projects on “inactive” status. But the local coordinating organization for the projects, the  
Southwest Florida Water Management District, captured the new approach to 
environmental engineering by purchasing and protecting lands that could alternately 
flood and supply fresh water.15 Federal and state environmental regulations affected flood 
control projects in all three cities, but the Tampa case especially shows dramatic changes 
to the process of designing infrastructure in the 1970s. This dissertation seeks to probe 
                                               
12 Southwest Florida Water Management District, “A Plan for the Use and Management of the Tampa 
Bypass/Harney Canal,” 1990, 4, http://www15.swfwmd.state.fl.us/LibraryImages/00595.pdf. 
13 William Taft, “Editorial: Fresh Water Lake Answer,” June 2, 1965, Sam Gibbons Papers, 
University of South Florida Libraries. 
14 Carolyn Merchant, The Columbia Guide to American Environmental History (Columbia University 
Press, 2005), 177. 
15 Southwest Florida Water Management District, “A Plan for the Use and Management of the Lower 
Hillsborough Flood Detention Area,” August 30, 2005, 11, 
https://www.swfwmd.state.fl.us/recreation/pdf/2005_Lower_Hillsborough_FDA_LU-Mgmt_Plan.pdf. 
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these tensions between precaution and development that shaped infrastructure to protect 
vulnerable coastal areas from the kind of flooding they faced in the past. 
How comparable are Houston, Miami, and Tampa? 
Houston, Miami, and Tampa are strong sites for a comparative case study. They 
are southeastern sunbelt cities that grew rapidly after World War Two to similar 
metropolitan population levels. Between 1940 and 1980, Houston more than quadrupled 
its population, from just below 400,000 to nearly 1.6 million residents.16 During that 
same period Miami-Dade County’s population increased by more than five times, also to 
just over 1.6 million residents.17 The Tampa Bay area was slower to take off but saw 
nearly 50 percent growth during the 1970s. Migration, cheap housing, highways, service 
jobs, and, of course, air-conditioning, were factors in this staggering growth which was 
part of a national demographic and political realignment.18 This research addresses the 
role of flood control in this postwar expansion by focusing on large Sunbelt cities that 
were not generally considered vulnerable to disaster during the period of their most rapid 
growth.  
Despite their similar size and geography, Houston, Miami, and Tampa had very 
different regional economies. This distinction was most reflected in their different 
                                               
16 City of Houston, “Historical Population 1900-2013,” 2013, 
http://www.houstontx.gov/planning/Demographics/docs_pdfs/Cy/coh_hist_pop.pdf.   
17 US Census Bureau, “Census of Population and Housing,” 2015, 
http://www.census.gov/prod/www/decennial.html.   
18 Gary R. Mormino, Land of Sunshine, State of Dreams: A Social History of Modern Florida, 1. 
paperback print, The Florida History and Culture Series (Gainesville, Fla.: University Press of Florida, 
2008); Elizabeth Tandy Shermer, Sunbelt Capitalism: Phoenix and the Transformation of American 
Politics (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013); Robert S Thompson, “‘The Air-
Conditioning Capital of the World’: Houston and Climate Control,” in Energy Metropolis: An 
Environmental History of Houston and the Gulf Coast, ed. Martin V. Melosi and Joseph A. Pratt, 
History of the Urban Environment (Pittsburgh, Pa: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2007).   
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histories as port cities. In Texas, the Corps of Engineers dredged the fifty-mile-long 
Houston Ship Channel from Galveston Bay on the Gulf of Mexico. When the ship 
channel was completed in 1914, oceangoing vessels could load goods directly in 
downtown Houston.19 After the destruction of the Port of Galveston by a major hurricane 
in 1900, this protected, inland location was one selling point for attracting large oil and 
gas infrastructure investments to the ship channel region.20 Miami also encountered 
strong storms early on – most famously suffering extensive hurricane damage in 1926 
and again in 1928. Miami, however, persistently focused on real estate and tourist-
oriented development, especially along its beaches and bay front.21 Due to its location 
and changing demographics, international finance and logistical services were a 
secondary economic niche. The Port of Miami became the country’s largest cruise port 
and a transshipment center for goods coming from Latin America. Meanwhile, the Port of 
Tampa served an agricultural hinterland, with a long history of direct trade with Cuba and 
the Caribbean, especially in its key exports of cigars, cattle, and citrus. 
A regional framework for analysis 
Local economic differences aside, flood control in all of these cases was 
intimately connected with a common push for regional development. Houston’s dams on 
Buffalo Bayou, for example, were designed to maintain the Houston Ship Channel as a 
                                               
19 Marilyn McAdams Sibley, The Port of Houston: A History (University of Texas Press, 1968), 150. 
20 Martin V. Melosi and Joseph A. Pratt, “The Energy Capital of the World? Oil-Led Development in 
Twentieth-Century Houston,” in Energy Capitals: Local Impact, Global Influence, ed. Joseph A. 
Pratt, Martin V. Melosi, and Kathleen A. Brosnan, History of the Urban Environment (Pittsburgh, Pa: 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 2014), 37. 
21 Raymond A. Mohl, “Miami: The Ethnic Cauldron,” in Sunbelt Cities: Politics and Growth since 
World War II, ed. R. M. Bernard and B. R. Rice (University of Texas Press, 1983), 60. 
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stable deep water port and petrochemical corridor. Flood control in Houston was about 
preventing urban flooding so that both the port and the city could continue rapidly 
expanding. Raymond Mohl initially called for historians to look at metropolitan 
development within this regional framework, and his work on Miami pointed to its 
growing role in the movement of goods and people from Latin America and the greater 
Caribbean during the 1960s.22 During the same period, much of the Tampa Bay area was 
still rural and aligned with key agricultural interests, such as citrus growers and ranchers 
in Hillsborough and Pasco Counties, while Pinellas County’s urban population boomed 
around St. Petersburg.23 
Kevin Kruse and Thomas Sugrue note that suburbs took many different forms 
depending on the local political economy and became more diverse over time.24 Andrew 
Needham points to the case of electric power utilities in Phoenix to show that a regional 
focus can illustrate the hidden impacts of infrastructure development beyond the city it 
directly serves.25 Foundational studies of mid-century suburban expansion have cited the 
importance of federal housing subsidies, rural decline, and highway development in 
shifting the balance of political power away from core cities.26 This research contributes 
                                               
22 Raymond A. Mohl, “City and Region: The Missing Dimension in US Urban History,” Journal of 
Urban History 25, no. 1 (1998): 3–22.   
23 Pinellas County Planning Department, “Pinellas County Historical Background,” December 2008, 
7–9, http://www.pinellascounty.org/Plan/pdf_files/PCHB.pdf; Editorial, “When the Rain Barrel Goes 
Dry...,” Tampa Tribune, June 10, 1973, Sam Gibbons Papers, University of South Florida Libraries. 
24 Kevin Michael Kruse and Thomas J. Sugrue, eds., The New Suburban History, Historical Studies of 
Urban America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), 7. 
25 Needham, Power Lines, 6. 
26 Kenneth Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1987); Adam Ward Rome, The Bulldozer in the Countryside: Suburban Sprawl and 
the Rise of American Environmentalism, Studies in Environment and History (Cambridge ; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001).   
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to scholarship in urban history by showing the role of flood control in creating the 
conditions for sprawl along with other well-established factors in these particular coastal 
cities.  
Connections to other studies of civil works   
Flood control projects in Houston, Miami, and Tampa fit into three broad periods 
of historical scholarship on civil works, natural hazards, and water resources 
management. Houston’s dams represented an extension of New Deal flood control that 
had already been active on the Mississippi, in the Tennessee Valley, and the Colorado 
River in Texas.27 Miami’s extensive levees, canals, and water conservation areas 
represented a regional push for immediate postwar suburban development.28 And the 
complex designs for Tampa’s infrastructure were initially planned for agricultural 
development in a part of the state that was slowly moving away from that way of life in 
the 1960s.29  These contrasting goals show how flood control served multiple interests at 
different times in different places. While past scholarship has focused on flood control for 
both industrial and agricultural development, the connection to suburban sprawl and 
regional development has been less discussed.  
In the twentieth century, transforming nature to serve development became a 
national project from the arid deserts of the West to southern swamps. Civil works for 
flood control and water supply were often interrelated in a variety of environments where 
                                               
27 C. Herman Pritchett, Tennessee Valley Authority: A Study in Public Administration (The University 
of North Carolina Press, 2014), 47; Sarah T. Phillips, This Land, This Nation: Conservation, Rural 
America, and the New Deal (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 158. 
28 N. D. B. Connolly, A World More Concrete: Real Estate and the Remaking of Jim Crow South 
Florida (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 2014), 143. 
29 William B. Stronge, The Sunshine Economy: An Economic History of Florida since the Civil War 
(Gainesville, Fla.: Univ. Press of Florida, 2008), 19. 
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seasonal changes made agriculture difficult. “The values of easterners and westerners 
showed remarkable consistency through time,” Donald Pisani writes. “Those who drained 
wetlands and those who built dams for irrigation both believed that the landscape was 
infinitely malleable. Human beings could at least ‘finish’ nature, if not redesign it.”30 
Pisani notes that water and development projects have always had a governmental and a 
private component. Railroads were champions of the Reclamation Act of 1902 and 
railroads, timber companies, and land agents pushed states to pass drainage laws. There 
were impressive early successes, such as the Salt River Project in southern Arizona, 
alongside less transformative projects. The entrepreneurial, and often hopelessly 
indebted, drainage districts in South Florida and East Texas were the legacy of this early 
period of public-private water control and state-level land development.  
The New Deal 
Beginning in the Great Depression of the early 1930s, the New Deal greatly 
increased the scale of federal involvement in flood control projects. Jameson Doig points 
out that impressive earlier civil works, such as the George Washington Bridge, built 
under the Port Authority of New York and completed in 1931, demonstrated to Governor 
Roosevelt the key role of an autonomous authority in carrying out largescale, regional 
projects above the local political fray.31 The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), based 
on this model, with direct federal backing in 1933, sought to restore agricultural vitality 
                                               
30 Donald J. Pisani, “Beyond the Hundredth Meridian: Nationalizing the History of Water in the 
United States,” Environmental History 5, no. 4 (2000): 466–82.   
31 Jameson W. Doig, “Expertise, Politics, and Technological Change The Search for Mission at the 
Port of New York Authority,” Journal of the American Planning Association 59, no. 1 (March 31, 
1993): 31–44, https://doi.org/10.1080/01944369308975843.   
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to impoverished lands through a combination of soil conservation, flood control, and, in a 
break from past civil works, rural electrification.  
TVA’s success was largely industrial and symbolic. As Bruce Schulman argues, 
TVA initially focused on making the Tennessee River more navigable and on the 
production of cheap fertilizer as ways of supporting the rural economy without 
reorganizing it.32 When these measures did not bring employment or wages past pre-
recession levels, TVA began to encourage industrial relocation to the region. The 
outbreak of the Second World War solved TVA’s economic growth problems. It was its 
large-scale, industrial, war-production capacity, based on cheap power, that became most 
tantalizing as a symbol of government investment.33 Ultimately TVA became a model for 
government-sponsored rural development that the U.S. would attempt to replicate 
throughout the world.34  
There were other New Deal projects that arguably had a greater impact on 
regional development. Pisani notes that Boulder Dam, built by the Bureau of Reclamation 
and completed in 1936, was linked to the growth of Southern California, in terms of both 
water and power, that affected the lives of millions and provided for wartime industries.35 
Competition and negotiation between powerful federal agencies, such as the Corps of 
Engineers versus the Bureau of Reclamation, set apart projects in the arid West from 
                                               
32 Bruce J. Schulman, From Cotton Belt to Sunbelt: Federal Policy, Economic Development, and the 
Transformation of the South, 1938-1980 (Duke University Press, 1994), 35. 
33 Thomas P. Hughes, American Genesis: A Century of Invention and Technological Enthusiasm, 
1870-1970 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 375. 
34 Nick Cullather, The Hungry World: America’s Cold War Battle Against Poverty in Asia (Harvard 
University Press, 2010), 132. 
35 Pisani, Water and American Government, 227. 
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many in the Southeast. Boulder Dam also represented a critical early conflict over the 
federal development of western resources, one that would be repeated after the war. In 
this case, a private utility, Southern California Edison, was allowed to run generators at 
the dam and sell power in California.36  
In the case of the New Deal in Los Angeles, Sarah Elkind writes that the local 
chamber of commerce became the “recognized representative of public opinion” on 
which projects should be selected and their benefit to the community.37 Federal policy 
was in fact responsive to local needs for economic development. “Because the federal 
government relied heavily on local leaders, both within and outside government, to 
articulate goals for federal programs in urban areas,” Elkind writes, “the entry of the 
Army Corps of Engineers, the Bureau of Reclamation, and other agencies into the field of 
urban public works did not substantially reorganize political influence in local 
government.”  
William Kahrl argues that the case of Southern California was different, however, 
from other western water projects, beginning with the “overwhelming” success of the Los 
Angeles Aqueduct in the early twentieth century. It provided “a forceful demonstration of 
the efficacy of a public water development,” Kahrl writes. “Los Angeles’ approach to 
water development was muscular, competitive, and self-reliant; and these same virtues 
                                               
36 Sarah S. Elkind, How Local Politics Shape Federal Policy: Business, Power, and the Environment 
in Twentieth-Century Los Angeles (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 2014), 12. 
37 Elkind, 4. 
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were reflected as well in the later construction of the Colorado Aqueduct and California’s 
State Water Project.”38  
Los Angeles made good use of programs to encourage water resources 
development from every level of government. In 1938, after two decades of local 
financing and failure to control flooding on the Los Angeles River, the county turned to 
the federal government and the Corps of Engineers to permanently “glue the Los Angeles 
River in place.” In a comprehensive plan very similar to the one approved two years later 
for Houston, the Corps built earthen dams and flood control basins and lined the river’s 
channel with concrete.39 The Flood Control Act of 1936 officially expanded the mission 
of the Corps of Engineers to controlling floods.40 It also authorized the Corps to work on 
non-navigable waterways like the Los Angeles and San Gabriel Rivers and the upper 
reaches of Houston’s Buffalo and White Oak Bayous for this purpose. As with the case of 
downtown Houston and its port versus the interests of rural Harris County, Elkind notes 
that Los Angeles River project also reflected the local balance of power. The Los 
Angeles Chamber of Commerce represented industrial business interests in the Long 
Beach area against small suburban farmers in the San Gabriel Valley far upstream.41  
                                               
38 William L Kahrl, Water and Power: The Conflict over Los Angeles’ Water Supply in the Owens 
Valley (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), 13, http://site.ebrary.com/id/10676271. 
39 William Deverell and Tom Sitton, Water and Los Angeles: A Tale of Three Rivers, 1900-1941 
(University of California Press, 2016), 11. 
40 William F Willingham, “The U.S. Moves towards More Integrative Approaches to Water Resources 
Management, 1970-2010,” in Two Centuries of Experience in Water Resources Management: A 
Dutch-U.S. Retrospective, ed. John Lonnquest et al. (Institute for Water Resources, U.S. Army Corps 
of Engineers, 2014), 302, 
http://www.iwr.usace.army.mil/Portals/70/docs/iwrreports/Two_Centuries.pdf. 
41 Elkind, How Local Politics Shape Federal Policy, 11. 
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In central Texas, the Lower Colorado River Authority (LCRA), authorized in 
1934, was modeled on the TVA and similarly focused on hydroelectric power, flood 
control, and rural welfare. Sarah Phillips argues that the LCRA’s goals were based on a 
New Deal theory that rural recovery would drive urban recovery.42 In theory, prosperous 
small farmers would restart city industries by buying manufactured goods. But as was the 
case in the Tennessee Valley, rural recovery in central Texas was slow, and champions of 
the LCRA, such as Congressman Lyndon Johnson, soon looked to cheap electricity to 
boost larger ranchers and bring new industries to the region. Phillips also points out that 
World War Two was a turning point where New Deal idealism could fully give way to 
the necessities of wartime production and the reality of industrial jobs. Houston’s flood 
control system finally became a reality because of the value of the Port of Houston and 
the petrochemical industries along the Houston Ship Channel to the war effort.  
Postwar projects 
Suburban flood control would become a defining issue of the postwar period, but 
at first the late 1940s and early 1950s saw a continuation and expansion of New Deal-era 
projects that had taken a pause during the war. After World War Two, business elites 
continued to lobby for federal funding that could solve local water challenges and allow 
development in their cities to accelerate. In California, the Bureau of Reclamation 
completed the stalled Central Valley Project, supporting incredibly productive 
agricultural lands, prosperous farmers, and growing coastal cities.43 Donald Worster 
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famously claimed that by the 1940s, a new “hydraulic society” was emerging in central 
California. It was run by “federal technicians, indefatigable in their reorganization of 
natural watersheds, in sending the flow up and down hill, in making reasonable what they 
saw as irrational.”44 In the Southeast, the TVA completed the navigation project on the 
Tennessee River and began building coal power plants to serve new industries that had 
located in the region. And in Miami the deficiencies in the 1937 Herbert Hoover Dike 
surrounding Lake Okeechobee would lead to the massive Central and Southern Florida 
Project that would transform how water moved through South Florida.45  
The rapid expansion of low-density, car-dependent subdivisions of single-family 
homes most defines the immediate postwar period in all three cities. In Houston, Miami, 
and Tampa, the new suburbs put thousands of young families in the path of flooding that 
had previously affected sparsely settled rural areas. In Houston, recurrent suburban 
flooding forced county leaders to continue flood control efforts locally while renewed 
federal funding was slow to be approved. In contrast, during the same period in Miami, 
widespread suburban flooding was the most salient justification for comprehensive, 
regional flood control on a regional scale.46  
In the last years of World War Two unprecedented federal subsidies began to be 
channeled towards homeowners through Federal Housing Administration and 
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Department of Veterans Affairs mortgage insurance and very generous tax benefits.47 In 
his now classic work on American suburbs, Crabgrass Frontier, Kenneth Jackson argues 
that suburban development was also subsidized through the absence of regulation and tax 
credits for new construction that greatly outweighed any benefit for renovating existing 
structures. “Suburbanization was not an historical inevitability created by geography, 
technology, and culture, but rather the product of government policies,” Jackson writes. 
“In effect, the social costs of low-density living have been paid by the general taxpayer 
rather than only by suburban residents.”48 In the 1950s, Houston’s taxpayers first 
supported  – and then consistently rejected – county attempts to raise funds for suburban 
flood control. 
New infrastructure of various types – such as suburban water and sewer systems – 
were also given federal support over aging urban systems. In the 1950s, gasoline taxes 
massively funded interstate highways that provided access to subdivisions even farther 
from central cities. In the Sunbelt, civic leaders actively sought significant Cold War 
defense investments in growing suburban areas.49 In Miami, flood control was another 
type of state-championed, postwar infrastructure investment in the future of its suburbs.  
Most importantly for flood control, the influential work of geographer Gilbert 
White highlighted the role of unregulated suburban development in exacerbating floods.50 
Despite billions of dollars spent combating floods through protective infrastructure, flood 
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damages increased in the 1950s as cheap land in floodplains was rapidly developed. 
White pushed policy-makers “to think more deeply about the ways people used 
floodplains,” Adam Rome argues. “What types of occupancy would yield maximum 
returns to society with minimum social costs?” White’s work fed into a growing 
skepticism about the role of civil works. 
A related problem southeastern sunbelt cities faced was a failure to anticipate the 
rapid speed and scale of postwar development. Infrastructure planned in the late 1940s 
could not protect the sprawl that developed in the 1950s in both Houston and Miami. In 
the case of Tampa, the failure to create alternate sources of water supply seemed 
increasingly shortsighted by the 1980s. In his dissertation on Atlanta, Eric Hardy 
discusses this failure of anticipation along with other factors that contributed to the city’s 
perennial struggles with adequate water supplies and sewage infrastructure.51 One of the 
main causes that Hardy cites, other than shortsightedness and a desire to keep utility rates 
low, is the fragmentation of regional authority. Atlanta could not come up with a 
comprehensive, integrated water management plan because it is so fragmented across 
counties and municipalities. In the cases of both Miami and Tampa, in contrast, regional 
water management districts were able to provide some form of comprehensive planning, 
even as political struggles between local authorities escalated.  
By the late 1950s, efforts to replicate the TVA’s multipurpose dams in other parts 
of the country were running into increasing resistance. Beginning in the West, dramatic 
cases of unfinished Bureau of Reclamation projects, such as the Hells Canyon High Dam 
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in Idaho and the Echo Park Dam in Colorado, again demonstrated the political power of 
local antigovernment sentiment concerning the federal development of western 
resources.52 In the case of Hells Canyon, the Idaho Power Company successfully sought 
to privately develop hydropower on the Snake River, ultimately dooming what would 
have been the highest dam in the country. In the case of Echo Park in Dinosaur National 
Monument, conservation organizations, led by the Sierra Club, successfully launched a 
national campaign to prevent the flooding of an area of spectacular natural beauty on the 
Green River.53 Mark Harvey argues that postwar affluence finally allowed wilderness 
preservation to “come of age” as millions of middle-class families visited American 
national parks and monuments. Tampa’s partially-completed flood control system, albeit 
on a smaller scale and designed for different purposes, fits in with these cases of shelved 
water development projects of the 1950s and 1960s.  
In the Southeast, Christopher Manganeillo documents similar kinds of resistance 
from local power companies and conservationists to large, multipurpose dams on the 
Savannah River during this period.54 In contrast to some of the western cases, the 
Savannah River dams, including Hartwell, Clarks Hill (Strom Thurmond), and Trotters 
Shoals (Richard B. Russell), were all completed by the 1970s. Nationally, the mid-1960s 
actually saw the peak of traditional infrastructure interventions in river systems.55 But 
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Manganiello argues that the negotiation process over the location and scale of these 
projects was a significant departure from earlier New South and New Deal boosterism 
and the old narrow focus on water supply alone. “The countryside conservationists and 
environmentalists repeatedly used water quality to justify a range of positions,” 
Manganiello writes. “They had an appetite for economic development, but not at the 
expense of southern waterways and certainly not at the expense of water quality in the 
massive federal reservoirs that were supposed to drive the Sun Belt’s growing 
recreational and service-based economy.”56 
Water resources development 
By the late 1960s, a fundamental shift in the goals of civil works for flood control 
was underway. Quality of life concerns arose along with suburban sprawl. Adam Rome 
documents ways in which the growing environmental movement of the 1960s was 
connected to concerns about suburban expansion.57 For example, issues like water quality 
became prominent through visible pollution from poorly maintained suburban septic 
systems and non-biodegradable detergents. Middle-class homeowners also became 
champions of preserving recreational open space against the poor aesthetics of rapid land 
development.  
The dramatic environmental resistance to completing the later phases of Miami’s 
flood control system in the Everglades, which was led by local conservationists as well as 
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national organizations such as National Audubon Society, also reflected the changing 
focus to water quality and recreational issues in the late 1960s.58 Robert Gottlieb 
highlights the grassroots, urban-focused environmental organizations that championed 
causes such as reducing industrial water pollution, improving air quality, and preserving 
natural areas as city parks.59 He argues that this local side of the 1960s environmental 
movement connects with early twentieth century Progressive-era public health campaigns 
and should be recognized along with the mainstream champions of natural beauty and 
wildlife like National Audubon Society and the Sierra Club. Grassroots organizations that 
opposed flood control on aesthetic grounds, such as the Buffalo Bayou Preservation 
Association in Houston, were also deeply concerned about water pollution issues.60  
By the end of the 1960s, as local recognition of recurrent suburban flooding 
became more widespread, Gilbert White’s approach to restricting development in 
floodplains reached the level of federal policy. The National Flood Insurance Program 
(NFIP) of 1968 subsidized insurance for homeowners living in high risk areas, if local 
governments took steps to mitigate the flood hazard or regulate future development in 
floodplains.61 The Corps of Engineers and the United States Geological Survey identified 
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hazardous locations and developed local flood zone maps for the program. Knowles and 
Kunreuther point out, however, that many communities did not initially join the NFIP 
because of pressure from developers and local governments. “Faced with restricting 
development or taking chances on a hurricane and hoping for disaster-relief payments,” 
they write, “it is clear that many communities in the early NFIP years chose to take their 
chances.” 
The growing emphasis on floodplain management in the 1970s coincided with a 
dramatic increase in environmental regulations and cuts to civil works budgets.62 In the 
decade prior to the Water Resources Development Act of 1986 (WRDA-86), there were 
no major Congressional authorizations for water-related civil works. For the Corps of 
Engineers, the 1970s were a decade of trying to more skillfully anticipate and mitigate 
environmental impacts associated with large projects. The Corps worked with a 
professional environmental advisory board, developed technical capacities to prepare 
environmental impact statements that would stand up to litigation, and gathered data to 
support non-structural approaches to flood control.  
Under the Reagan administration, WRDA-86 was a paradigmatic and 
organizational turning point for civil works projects carried out by the Corps of 
Engineers.63 Crucially, WRDA-86 forced at least 25 percent cost-sharing for all phases of 
all projects with local sponsors. In previous decades, cost-sharing had varied greatly, and 
it had often been part of the negotiations between the federal government and local 
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officials. For example, raising local contributions had been a key hurdle to overcome for 
the projects in Houston and Miami. County and state leaders in Texas and Florida came 
up with many creative ways to raise funds, or otherwise bend the rules, to get projects 
started and continue funding them across decades.  
WRDA-86 also galvanized the Corps’ work in environmental remediation. It 
expanded cost-benefit calculations to include measures of environmental impact and 
restoration, although these remained difficult to quantify.64 It allowed the Corps to review 
completed projects, and modify them if necessary, to prevent further environmental 
degradation. This review process set the stage for Everglades restoration in South Florida 
that started in earnest in the late 1990s.  
As a result of these societal changes and paradigmatic shifts in engineering 
practice, water management projects started to look quite different in the 1990s. In 
Houston, concrete-lined bayous were transformed into city parks with extended flood 
zones. The Corps of Engineers efforts to “fix the plumbing” in order to restore the Florida 
Everglades to something approaching their natural state have been far more expensive, 
and extensive, than the original Miami flood control projects.65 Meanwhile, Tampa’s 
Water Management District has continued to take a lead in protecting fresh water sources 
and river flood zones from development.  
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Natural hazards and environmental justice 
A different line of interdisciplinary scholarship has focused on natural hazards, 
local vulnerability to natural disasters, and campaigns to achieve greater environmental 
justice. Flood control projects in Houston, Miami, and Tampa were all born from 
disasters – dramatic events that brought flooding at a scale never before seen in those 
cities. The disasters that inspired the political effort towards securing significant federal 
flood control in each city were not their first major flood, nor the last. They were, 
however, occurring at moments of particularly heightened vulnerability in each city. 
These were times when rapid development had ignored natural hazards and exposed 
growing downtowns and suburbs to widespread damage.  
Since the 1960s, a critical line of scholarship on vulnerability has focused on the 
unequal impacts of natural disasters on different socioeconomic groups.66 The legacy of 
distinct urban politics, infrastructure development, land use, property values, and social 
services produces vulnerabilities that are “revealed” when a storm disrupts the normal 
functioning of a city.67 From this critical perspective, the concept of a “natural” disaster 
denies the policy choices that constructed such unequal vulnerabilities.68 Andrew Lakoff 
argues that vulnerability research, originally conducted under the Cold War-era Office of 
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Civil Defense, highlighted many difficult socioeconomic problems that did not have easy 
political solutions. By the 1980s, a change to “all hazards” research, and the doctrine of 
“emergency preparedness” under FEMA, would create a more politically acceptable way 
of handling repeated major disasters.69 Scott Knowles and Howard Kunreuther argue that 
there continues to be a significant “disaster science-policy action gap”; disaster experts 
take a long time to generate actionable, scientifically-valid data for policymakers to 
implement.70 Disasters are thus critical moments to evaluate the development of 
sociotechnical systems.  
New Orleans as a case study of the failure of these systems has been continually 
reassessed as different causal factors have come to light to explain the 2005 flooding 
tragedy following Hurricane Katrina.71 The vulnerability model remained valid for some 
scholars, as the storm clearly revealed layers of inequitable risk exposure due to 
socioeconomic structures.72 There were also technical failures to design and build 
specific structures to be robust enough for major hurricanes, and there were 
organizational failures to consistently plan an adequate system of protective works over 
many decades.73 Ten years after Katrina, evidence pointed to compromises made between 
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the Corps of Engineers and the local levee boards, in an attempt to cut costs, as the 
primary cause of the disaster.74 
Craig Colten, in his environmental history of the Crescent City, argues that 
suburbanization and the large-scale structural flood protection infrastructure built to 
protect New Orleans in the 1960s created a strong path-dependency; a set of investments 
constrained alternative approaches such as protecting wetlands and increasing urban 
density.75 Today, an emerging wider definition of infrastructure would include both 
natural barriers like wetlands, as well as the navigation channels that destroyed them.76 
The flood control projects in Houston, Miami, and Tampa were built during 
decades of rapid social change in the South after World War Two. These were the 
decades of civil rights and the decades of white flight. While flood control certainly 
supported the patterns of white flight and suburban sprawl in Houston, Miami, and 
Tampa, attempts to protect those suburban areas did not necessarily increase the 
vulnerability of poorer African American and Hispanic neighborhoods to flooding. In 
terms of the traditional vulnerability model, they represent a contrast to New Orleans. 
Hurricane Katrina revealed the deep inequality and structural vulnerability of the city to a 
major natural disaster. Infrastructure failed and flooded those low-lying neighborhoods 
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where the residents were least able to evacuate. Generally, surrounding neighborhoods 
were on higher ground and had long histories of being more racially and economically 
exclusive. 
In coastal Florida and Texas the case was more complicated. Some of the most 
well-established elite areas were the most vulnerable to flooding: from the River Oaks 
neighborhood along Buffalo Bayou in Houston to the Bayshore area along Hillsborough 
Bay in Tampa. In Houston, Miami, and Tampa, flood control projects were especially 
important to protecting new, middle-class subdivisions built after World War Two on 
hazardous, but cheap, land. Meanwhile, some of the most marginalized areas were on the 
highest ground near the old downtowns. For example, the Jim Crow-era “Colored Town” 
north of downtown Miami was on the old coastal ridge near the Florida East Coast 
railroad line. This was some of best-protected land from flooding in Dade County.  
N. D. B. Connolly writes in detail about the elite alliances across racial lines that 
allowed Colored Town to remain extremely segregated well into Miami’s great postwar 
expansion.77 Deteriorating housing conditions, a lack of public parks, and new highway 
overpasses were all hardships for that neighborhood, which remained relatively 
unaffected by the successful political transformations of the civil rights era. Flooding, 
however, was not among those hardships. By the 1950s, Connolly points out, there were 
also a few suburban developments planned for middle-class black families. These 
developments, as with most of the middle-class housing for whites built after the war, 
were in areas protected by the major South Florida flood control projects.78 
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In Houston the situation was similarly complicated. Some older African American 
neighborhoods, such as the Fourth Ward “Freedmen’s Town” just west of downtown, 
were flooded extensively in 1935. The area began to decline after 1940 because of the 
expansion of the downtown business and government center and the construction of 
highways through the neighborhood.79 But other areas with growing black populations, 
such as the Third Ward south of downtown, were on higher ground. After the war 
Houston’s black population expanded farther south into suburban areas where flooding 
on Brays and Greens Bayous was more problematic. Meanwhile, toxic air pollution from 
refineries and chemical production facilities along the ship channel has been a perennial 
concern of social justice activists in minority neighborhoods on the east side of the city. It 
is now clear that climate change will exacerbate the impacts of pollution, flooding, and 
heat stress on those who are the least able to adapt to it in the Houston area.80  
Today, Houston, Miami, and Tampa all face the threat of stronger storms and 
higher tides, and contrasting levels of social vulnerability will likely become more stark. 
These cities will have to make choices about which areas to further protect from flooding. 
It is unclear whether or not lower-income areas will be protected along with the most 
expensive real estate.81 Widespread recognition of which areas routinely flood and which 
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areas are on the high-ground might also lead to rapid gentrification of those better 
protected areas.  
Overview of the following chapters 
The following chapters develop and compare the case studies for Houston, 
Miami, and Tampa over five decades. Chapter Two considers local, state, and federal 
responses to Houston’s catastrophic flood of 1935. It set a pattern of creating a state 
institution to manage regional flood control, secure federal funding, and attempt to 
complete a system of protective infrastructure. World War Two proved both a delay – 
and later a justification – for completing Houston’s main flood control project. The 
chapter ends with a decade of civic frustration as county leaders tried, and only partially 
succeeded, to extend flood control projects to protect new suburban development in the 
1950s. For this account, I relied heavily on comprehensive newspaper files collected by a 
longtime commissioner for Harris County. 
Chapter Three moves to South Florida and the sweeping, regional flood of 1947. 
The system built to protect cities like Miami and Fort Lauderdale from future floods was 
enormous, and there has been a great deal of previous scholarship on its environmental 
impacts. I build the Miami case study around that earlier research, but I try to shift the 
focus towards the concerns of the metropolitan area which were often different from the 
farmers and conservationists in the Everglades. The chapter follows the Central and 
Southern Florida Project from its authorization through its first two phases, which were 
mostly complete by the late 1960s. Growing environmental concerns stalled several key 
extensions of the system in the 1970s.  
Chapter Four looks at the rural Southwest Florida Water Management District 
surrounding Tampa, and its responses to the major flood of 1960, as well as the years of 
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severe drought that followed. Very few elements of Tampa’s federal project, called the 
Four River Basins, were ever completed. But the approaches to flood control used by the 
Water Management District adapted to the reality of carrying out its mission in the 
budget-constrained 1970s under increasing environmental regulations. For this chapter, I 
was lucky to find several excellent oral histories that I use to show this change of 
approach from the perspective of the Water Management District’s leadership.  
Chapter Five compares the impacts of the local environmental movement on all 
three sites. Along with budget constraints, grassroots environmental activism – aligned 
with national attention on issues of ecosystem damage, water quality, and natural beauty– 
led to significant modifications of the plans for flood control in each city. Generally, this 
period began in the late 1960s and continued until the early 1980s. University libraries in 
each city have archived the papers of key activists and organizations, and these 
environmental collections proved invaluable for this comparison.  
Chapter Six attempts to draw out a variety of patterns and comparisons across the 
cases. Given these different cities and the decades in which their flood control projects 
started, I try to give some preliminary answers to the essential historical questions of 
what changed over time and what stayed the same. I am also particularly interested in 
how the story of flood control in each city is continuing today as these coastal sites start 
to increasingly feel the impacts of climate change.  
Finally, I want to highlight the appendix on coastal engineering. Houston, Miami, 
and Tampa are all coastal cities, and much of their development was oriented towards the 
waterfront. Coastal engineering activities gave the cities access to the beaches and 
waterways that were so crucial to their development. It also reflects the impact of the 
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environmental movement and the paradigmatic shift in engineering practice away from 
big infrastructure and towards non-structural approaches. While coastal engineering was 
not essential to the inland flood control systems that protected each city in the postwar 






CHAPTER 2   




On December 10, 1935, downtown Houston was underwater. Over the previous 
three days more than 20 inches of rain had fallen in Harris County, and Buffalo Bayou 
had risen 45 feet to reach a peak flood stage at more than 40 feet above sea level at Main 
Street on December 9.82 Lives were lost, and damage to the city was widespread. Six 
children and two adults drowned as flash flooding tore them from downtown bridges, 
warehouses and commercial buildings near Buffalo Bayou were completely destroyed, 
and over 100 residential blocks were flooded.83 Fires broke out in some of the damaged 
buildings, and firefighters, contending with poor access on flooded streets and broken 
waterlines, struggled to contain the blazes. All but one of the seventeen railroads serving 
the city of Houston were cut off. Out of fourteen bridges crossing Buffalo Bayou in the 
city, ten were underwater.84 At the time, damages were estimated at $2.5 million (about 
$45 million in 2016 dollars).  
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Figure 2.1 Buffalo Bayou near Main Street, 1935. Houston Chronicle. Harris County Archives 
As floodwaters began to recede over the next few days, over 2 million cubic yards 
of debris, trash, and silt continued to block access to the Port of Houston and the upper 
reaches of the Houston Ship Channel connecting the city with the Gulf of Mexico.85 
Houston’s main sewage treatment station was inundated and shutdown. The city was 
forced to dump half its untreated sewage directly into the ship channel.  The port was 
closed entirely for ten days, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers spent the next eight 
months clearing silt, mud, and debris from the ship channel.  
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Figure 2.2 Map of Houston's bayou watersheds, 2011. Bayou Preservation Association. 
http://www.bayoupreservation.org/Bayous 
Houston had been founded on the banks of Buffalo Bayou less than a hundred 
years previously. At that time Buffalo Bayou was a shallow, muddy creek only big 
enough for barges to bring cotton down to Galveston.86 Houston’s Harris County was 
famed for its mud and its meandering watercourses that had required decades of small 
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drainage projects to clear for the development of towns.87 The Houston Ship Channel had 
been carved out of the San Jacinto River and lower Buffalo Bayou by the Corps of 
Engineers between 1910 and 1914, and over the next 20 years Houston had grown to far 
surpass its regional rival, Galveston, as Texas’ key deepwater port. In fact, in 1935, 
Houston was the second largest port in the country in terms of total tonnage.88 
With its new ship channel, Houston was supposed to have been a “protected port” 
while Galveston was acutely vulnerable to hurricanes. Situated on a barrier island in the 
Gulf of Mexico, Galveston had been almost completely destroyed by a hurricane in 
September 1900. After the storm, Houston, via the State of Texas, had petitioned 
Congress for funding to dredge the ship channel so that the region could have another, 
safer port. Part of Houston’s success in becoming the commercial center of the Southwest 
had been because its location was less vulnerable to storms, but more importantly it 
offered easy access to cross-country rail lines, and with great fortune had been situated 
near major oil discoveries on the Louisiana border. In 1935, Houston was still a “Bayou 
City” with sandy soils and many creeks draining into the gulf.89 Annual rainfall in the 
Houston area was on average 50 inches, and significant flooding from “cloudbursts” – 
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where torrential amounts of rain could fall into a single drainage basin over the course of 
a day – was a constant concern.90 The 20-year-old deepwater port just east of downtown 
Houston had been closed a few times previously due to floods, most spectacularly only 
six years earlier when parts of the city’s commercial center had again been underwater.91 
The director of the Port of Houston, J. Russell Wait, claimed that episodes like this made 
it impossible for ships to travel down the channel, and these disruptions  to shipping were 
being exploited by competing ports who claimed to have more reliable conditions in their 
harbors.92 Development of the southeast Texas region as a whole was being hindered by 
the recurrent flooding. As a front-page editorial in the Houston Chronicle extolled the 
day after the flood waters peaked,  
“We must not forget this tragedy as we did the one in 1929. Houston has been visited 
by four serious floods in the last 40 years, each worse than the preceding one… This 
county simply can not now be drained by that little stream reaching from the Farmer's 
Market through the jumble of buildings and beneath low bridges to the Main Street 
Viaduct. Nor can it be drained by the winding, undeepened bayou leading from Main 
Street to the Turning Basin.” 93  
To protect Texas’ largest port and the commercial center of downtown Houston there was 
growing determination for permanent, transformative flood control. After the shocking 
aftermath of the 1900 Galveston hurricane, the Corps of Engineers had built a massive 
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seawall to protect that city from future storms.94 In 1935, the question loomed large – 
how would Houston be protected from future floods?  
Securing federal funding for flood control 
 The year 1935 had been a devastating one for flooding throughout Texas, with 
major damage in May and June in the cities of Austin and San Antonio and to nearby 
farms and ranches along the Colorado and Nueces rivers.95 As the year came to an end 
and yet another wave of floodwaters were still subsiding in Houston, the city’s civic 
leaders formed a Navigation and Flood Control Committee to find more permanent 
solutions to the recurring floods.96 The committee consisted of county officials, such as 
Harris County judge Roy Hofheinz and director of the Port of Houston, Russell Wait. 
There were also engineers who volunteered as consultants to the committee, such as 
Robert Cummins, who had formerly been in charge of a local drainage district and whose 
construction firm had built several facilities at the Port of Houston.  
The committee was chaired by Harry Washburn who was the Harris County 
auditor. He was a natural choice, since he had also been the auditor for the Port 
Commission and several area drainage districts.97 Washburn’s extraordinary commitment 
to financial discipline and public service to the Houston area had started before World 
War I. He would continue serving the county well into the late 1940s. Washburn did not 
believe in using municipal debt to pay for anything but capital projects, and he was 
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especially proud of putting Harris County on a “cash basis,” paying for services with 
money already collected.98 Even during the worst years of the Great Depression, 
Washburn had kept Harris County mostly away from new debt. He was proud that the 
value of Harris County’s bonds had increased, and he was not going to let new projects 
overextend that legacy. After Houston’s first catastrophic floods in 1929, Washburn had 
called for supporting larger flood control projects at the county level. The county’s ten 
drainage districts were financially sound but not capable of taking on debt to pay for 
larger-scale projects. If flood control was going to succeed at the scale it needed to be to 
protect the city as a whole, under Washburn’s watch, there needed to be one institution 
raising money for flood control, and he needed to find funders beyond Harris County.  
Starting in early 1936, the Corps of Engineers made early assessments of what a 
more effective flood control system would look like in the Houston area. One early and 
fairly inexpensive idea was simply to widen the channel of Buffalo Bayou through the 
city, straighten out bends, and clear away any obstructions. The bayou would then be able 
to handle larger floods, and flooding downtown would be more limited, but the excess 
volume of water dumped down the ship channel would still make navigation impossible. 
Russell Wait, who had become director of the Port of Houston in 1930, was immediately 
concerned that these initial plans would put the city ahead of the port. Wait championed 
the creation of a new flood control district that could speak equally for the interests of the 
Port of Houston as well as the city itself.  
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Figure 2.3 Pamphlet "Wild River", 1937. Harris County Flood Control District. 
https://www.hcfcd.org/media/1345/wildriver1937_hcfcd_created.pdf 
The Harris County Flood Control District (HCFCD) was authorized by the Texas 
legislature in 1937. Since the Port of Houston and the ship channel had been blocked for 
so long by the floods of 1935, and federal projects were still justified primarily as 
improvements to navigation, the flood control district’s primary mission was first to 
protect the port of Houston. A secondary goal was to protect property in the city of 
Houston itself, and the last priority was to prevent flooding in rural, unincorporated areas 
of Harris County. This last mission had been the purpose of the county’s drainage 
districts. The HCFCD was not Texas’ first flood control district, but it was the first to be 
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limited to only one county and essentially serve only one major city. Convincing Texas 
state legislators to approve the creation of the flood control district – an expansion of 
government that would primarily benefit only the city of Houston and its port especially – 
required some campaigning. A pamphlet entitled “Wild River” showed downtown 
Houston inundated at the height of the flood.  Materials like this were brought to the state 
legislature and printed in newspapers throughout Texas.99 They reminded Texas voters 
and their representatives that Houston had become the main port of embarkation for 
goods from the entire state and that disruptions to commerce in Houston affected farmers 
throughout the Southwest.  
Regional flood control was not, however, new. Large federal hydroelectric 
projects had been initiated on the Colorado River in the area around Austin only a few 
years previously.100 The floods of 1935 had also been very damaging to rural areas in 
central Texas, and flood control soon became part of the multipurpose mission of the 
Lower Colorado River Authority (LCRA). A young Congressman Lyndon Johnson had 
been particularly influential in bringing this kind of federal intervention, modeled on the 
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), to central Texas.  
The LCRA was clearly a New Deal precedent for the flood control works in 
Houston, but hydroelectric power was not appropriate for Harris County’s sluggish 
bayous. Both projects did eventually share the goal of federal intervention in water 
systems to boost industrial development, but civic leaders in the city never mentioned the 
ongoing projects less than a hundred and fifty miles away. While there had been many 
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rural drainage districts organized previously in Harris County for the purposes of 
agricultural conservation and land reclamation, the HCFCD would be a new state agency 
with additional powers to contract with the federal government and raise funds 
specifically for flood control infrastructure.101  
The Harris County Flood Control District was supposed to coordinate a range of 
flood control projects in Houston and Harris County and maintain infrastructure in the 
long term – adding to fears that it would eventually supersede older, locally-controlled 
drainage districts. It was a single agency to represent all the interests of Harris County 
and ensure financing for local contributions to federally sponsored dam and reservoir 
projects. Only with legislative and voter approval would the HCFCD be empowered to 
sell bonds, incur debt, and raise taxes to pay for the county’s share of the flood control 
infrastructure.  
With the HCFCD successfully in place, the next step for the county’s Navigation 
and Flood Control Committee was to secure the maximum amount of federal funds for 
flood control projects. Flood control on Houston’s Buffalo Bayou was justified by its 
benefits to the Port of Houston, and thus it fit with one of the primary missions of the 
Corps of Engineers to improve navigation. Clearly the city would also be protected.  
The Flood Control Act of 1936 allowed for the calculation of economic “benefits” 
to justify flood control projects to include potential development in the region. Although 
improvements to navigation on the ship channel were the first justification for federal 
funding, the total benefits in this case were calculated by the potential damages to 
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businesses and homes from future floods that could be avoided by each project. This 
wider calculation of benefits “to whomsoever they may accrue” to justify the costs of 
flood control projects was an expansion of the federal role. It allowed the Corps of 
Engineers to build infrastructure that protected property along rivers, as long as there 
were “local contributions”.102 Some of these local contributions could be money spent 
directly on related flood control projects, but more often they involved municipalities and 
counties giving rights-of-way for building dams, levees, and reservoirs. The 1936 Flood 
Control Act also mandated that localities absolve the federal government from damages 
resulting from the flood control works.  
Houston Congressman Albert Thomas and Major General J. L. Schley, the 
Army’s Chief of Engineers, testified before the House Committee on Rivers and Harbors 
in January 1938.103 Representative Thomas had been particularly enterprising in 
expanding federal support for these kinds of flood control projects, which had been 
previously restricted to the Mississippi Delta.104 As one skeptical committee member 
concluded the hearing, “You think up some good things so far as the Federal Government 
is concerned, Mr. Thomas.”105 At the hearing, Representative Thomas argued for the 
importance of Houston’s waterborne commerce – to the state of Texas and to the entire 
Southwest region. He proudly mentioned an article in Fortune magazine that noted 
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Houston had rapidly become the second largest port in the nation – all without the 
geographical advantages of a natural harbor. 
General Schley pointed out that the ship channel had to be dredged annually 
because of the large amounts of silt collecting at the bottom after high water events. 
Preventing flooding on the bayous would reduce the amount of money the federal 
government and the Harris County Navigation District spent on maintaining the channel 
each year.106 Both the federal government and Harris County had to pay for annual 
dredging costs, but locating sites for the spoils from dredging was the primary 
“contribution” of Harris County to keeping the ship channel deep enough for large cargo 
ships. Schley noted that federal money spent on these navigation projects would also 
directly benefit the city of Houston by protecting it from severe flooding in the future. 
In the case of Houston, as part of its local contribution, the city would give rights-
of-way to build a parkway along Buffalo Bayou that would remove homes and businesses 
from part of the flood zone. The existing road on the south side of the bayou, Buffalo 
Drive, would be raised up to act as a levee against future floods. It would also be widened 
into a main thoroughfare that could itself be a space to contain floodwaters.107 Although 
this new “Allen Parkway” would be beneficial to the city that had major roadbuilding 
plans, and some of the Navigation and Flood Control Committee members worried about 
the HCFCD and the Corps of Engineers essentially getting into the business of road 
building, it was still included as part of the flood control project because of its structural 
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purpose. Most importantly, the federal government would not contract with the city 
separately from the HCFCD, so some items on the agenda for city development, such as 
parkways along the bayous, became inherently linked to federal flood control. 
Competing plans: Measuring risk, controlling costs 
As director of the Port of Houston, Russell Wait was primarily concerned about 
protecting the ship channel from future floods, but he was also worried about the 
publicity of the bottom line price tag for local contributions the Corps of Engineers’ flood 
control projects. A vote on an early bond referendum was scheduled for that summer of 
1938. If infrastructure to contain and divert future floodwaters required too great an 
amount of local financing, Wait was afraid that voters would balk. Most importantly, the 
federal government had to be shown to be paying the greater part of the costs.108  
Business leaders and port commissioners supported flood control plans that could 
divert some water away from Buffalo Bayou, above the city, before it reached the ship 
channel. The simplest, and least expensive, solution of extending and widening Buffalo 
Bayou through downtown Houston so that it had more capacity to carry floodwaters had 
already been rejected because it would making transport on the ship channel unreliable. 
Simply widening Buffalo Bayou also would not prevent floods on the western edges of 
the city where future growth was most promising. In order to achieve the dual purpose of 
flood control and ship channel reliability, the Corps of Engineers proposed three plans: 
Two involved building systems of dams, detention reservoirs, and levees to contain 
floodwaters and channel them partially away from the ship channel, and one very 
                                               
108 J. Russell Wait, “Letter to H.L. Washburn,” January 27, 1938, J. Russell Wait Port of Houston 
Collection, Box 8, Woodson Research Center, Rice University. 
 46 
aggressive plan diverted floods entirely away from the city and proposed excavating a 
series of large canals that would move floodwaters north and south of Houston and 
eventually into Galveston Bay. This transformative plan would entirely control the flow 
of water through Buffalo Bayou and provide the most comprehensive flood control for 
Harris County. At nearly $54 million, it was also by far the most expensive plan, and it 
would require the most local contributions. 
The Harris County Navigation and Flood Control Committee preferred a more 
affordable compromise between all the water going through the city and complete 
diversion. The $22 million “Three Corridor Plan” was a scheme that allowed some water 
to be diverted away from the ship channel through dams and sluiceways, and then the 
remaining water could move down Buffalo Bayou in a more controlled flow.109 The first 
“corridor” was Buffalo Bayou itself, and the other corridors were north and south of the 
city. Short canals and sluiceways would connect existing drainage features to make the 
north and south corridors available for floodwaters from a dam above Buffalo Bayou. 
The Three Corridor Plan was designed by Harris County drainage engineer Jack Rafferty. 
For it to work, Harris County would have to put up nearly $10 million – mostly from 
rights-of-way and other improvements to the stretches of Buffalo Bayou running through 
the city – and the federal government would pay nearly $12 million to build the gates, 
dams, levees, and sluiceways.110   
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Estimates of the scale of flooding, and the amount of rain that would produce that 
volume of water over a certain period of time, became key points of contention in 
negotiations between the HCFCD, the city government, and the Port of Houston. For 
example, the Three Corridor Plan was designed to handle a storm like the one that had 
caused the 1935 floods, or as county drainage engineer Jack Rafferty explained, “a major 
portion of the flood waters such as the natural drainage arteries in the county might be 
called upon to handle in rainfall of 10 inches a day for each of three successive days.” 
The Three Corridor Plan also represented an early effort to achieve comprehensive flood 
control for all of Harris County, since it would leave open the possibility of diverting 
floodwaters from other bayous in the area in the future.  
The Corps of Engineers did not fully support the Three Corridor Plan because it 
did not show enough precaution for the scale of potential flooding in the future. Colonel 
Frank Besson, the Corps’ district engineer in Galveston, came back to the Navigation and 
Flood Control Committee with a new diversion plan that could shunt most floodwaters 
away from Buffalo Bayou.111 In the event of a flood of even greater proportions than 
1935, even more water could be prevented from ever passing into the ship channel and 
disrupting the port or damaging the city. For the larger scale of these works, the Corps of 
Engineers estimated the potential for rainfall in the Buffalo Bayou drainage basin 
exceeding both the 1929 and 1935 floods. They used the greatest recorded rainfall from 
high up in the Buffalo Bayou drainage basin, an 1899 storm near Hearne, Texas, that 
dropped 30 inches of rain above the Katy Prairie, and applied that amount to the entire 
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basin to calculate the maximum potential flood in Houston. It would produce runoff 50 
percent greater than the 1935 flood. This was the project “design storm,” or as Colonel 
Besson told the Navigation and Flood Control Committee a year later, “it is the largest 
storm that we think can happen in Houston, and if you are going to protect Houston you 
may as well protect it right.”112 
Still concerned about the cost of local contributions, Russell Wait shared his 
frustrations about the Corps’ intense rainfall estimates with Robert Cummins, a structural 
engineer who was consulting on the Buffalo Bayou project with the Navigation and 
Flood Control Committee.113 Cummins was responsible for rectifying differences 
between the county’s and the Corps of Engineers’ flood control plans. Wait showed some 
confusion over the rainfall estimates, claiming that the Corps of Engineers was using an 
estimate of more than 21 inches of rain falling in a hypothetical month, while he had 
recently presented Colonel Besson with statistics from Houston, going back to 1882, that 
showed that the monthly maximum was just over 15 inches falling in the city. 
Furthermore, Wait claimed that the Corps of Engineers was assuming that peak flood 
stages could happen simultaneously in the multiple bayous that fed into the Houston Ship 
Channel. Wait argued that these simultaneous peaks had never been observed.  
In his letters to Cummins over the next few months, Russell Wait disputed 
Colonel Besson’s estimates, complaining that the Corps of Engineers had imagined a 
“deluge” – or a theoretical “superflood.” Wait insisted that the county only needed a 
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flood control system based on the largest floods observed in the past. Works to contain 
floods the size of the 1935 incident would be at a more “sensible” scale that was “within 
the limits of Houston’s ability to pay.” He wrote, “It seems to us that the Navigation and 
Flood Control Committee is confronted now with only one problem, namely, a problem 
of policy. Shall we prepare a flood control plan which will take care of any flood which 
appears in past records, or shall we prepare for a flood which has never occurred and 
which may never occur, and at a cost of some twenty million additional dollars?”114  
The challenge of raising local contributions 
Six months later, in January 1939, with an early bond referendum scheduled the 
following month, the question of which plan would finally be implemented had not been 
fully resolved. Both the “Three Corridor Plan” that Russell Wait and the Navigation and 
Flood Control Committee had championed and the plan to mostly divert waters from a 
potential superflood into Galveston Bay, as proposed by the Colonel Besson and Corps of 
Engineers, were starting to look far too expensive. Congress had limited the federal 
expenditure to only $9 million, and Houston leaders were still concerned about the 
politics of raising funds that would end up being a greater amount than the federal 
contribution.  
The first step to be implemented with these funds was a drainage and clearing 
project on Buffalo and White Oak Bayous in downtown Houston administered by the 
Works Progress Administration (WPA). The Harris County Flood Control District’s 
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contribution would only be a quarter of the more than $2 million WPA budget.115 Men 
working for the WPA would begin by clearing obstructions at the confluence of Brays 
Bayou and the ship channel. Next they would build a levee to protect the city’s central 
waterworks. Finally they would begin clearing a park-like area around the confluence of 
White Oak and Buffalo Bayous, just north of Houston’s central commercial district. This 
park would be designed to flood first after a storm and thus provide some protection to 
the nearby downtown.  
 
Figure 2.4 Illustration from The Taxpayer broadsheet, 1939. J. Russell Wait Port of Houston Collection, 
Woodson Research Center, Rice University 
In February 1939, voters were asked whether or not to approve the first set of 
bonds to be issued by the HCFCD. Publicity for the first $500,000 bond issue was a key 
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concern for the Navigation and Flood Control Committee.116 Although the amount was 
small, even by the standards of the late 1930s, Houston’s long tradition of foregoing local 
taxes in favor of other means of making improvements to city infrastructure was on full 
display. Groups opposed to the bond issue published an issue of the The Taxpayer – a 
Harris County broadsheet devoted to opposing New Deal reforms – devoted entirely to 
flood control.117 It showed both the general confusion about the different flood control 
plans that had been put forward, and it demonstrated skepticism about the need to raise 
local contributions to federal projects. Fear that the costs of the projects would soar, and 
the federal aid diminish, were on the front cover in a screaming headline. “Bond 
Advocates have not told the whole truth about the bonds. They have endeavored to 
conceal fact that county will have to vote $13,000,000 to carry out Rafferty program.” 
Inside was an illustration of a deluge of cash flowing out of Houston’s city hall leading to 
“the greatest flood in the history of Houston.”  
The Navigation and Flood Control Committee and its allies in the Houston 
Chamber of Commerce, the local drainage districts, and the county and city government 
prepared their own media response in support of the bond issue.118 They secured the 
support of all three of Houston’s major newspapers. Everyone involved knew that this 
first bond issue for the new flood control district would be followed by a much larger 
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round of bonds in the future. But advocates of flood control believed that the first round 
of funding would demonstrate local support and help convince skeptics in the state 
legislature and Congress. Civic leaders also believed that if they waited to issue the bonds 
until more federal money was available, local opposition would be more well organized 
in the future, and only another catastrophic flood would be enough to bring back voter 
support for the bonds.  
In newspaper editorials in favor of the $500,000 WPA bonds, Harris County 
voters were reminded repeatedly, if perhaps misleadingly, that approving these bonds 
would not create county obligations for which additional taxes would have to be raised, 
nor would the flood control district become a new local authority that would levy its own 
taxes in the future. The flood control committee recognized that new taxes were 
especially a concern for property owners who were already paying taxes to local drainage 
districts and did not want to be “double taxed” for flood control. Although the country 
was still coming out of the recession of 1937–38, the Houston area was growing and new 
revenue was reducing past indebtedness for municipal improvements such as sewers, 
water treatment, roadways, and street lighting.119 There were also reminders of temporary 
jobs that the flood control projects would create. The WPA bayou drainage projects 
would employ more than two thousand workers for 18 months. 
Voters approved the first set of bonds for the WPA projects, but the amount of 
local opposition concerned the Navigation and Flood Control Committee. In order to 
raise the necessary funds for the larger Corps of Engineers projects that were still needed, 
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Harris County’s representatives in the state legislature pushed to be allowed to use some 
part of the state property taxes. They wanted the HCFCD to get half of the state ad 
valorem taxes from Harris County for a period ten years. This bill failed in the 
statehouse.  
With a more limited budget, an “Emergency Bypass Plan” was proposed by 
Colonel Besson in March 1939.120 The Corps of Engineers had devised a way to divert 
floodwaters from Buffalo Bayou above Houston without excavating large spillway 
channels or canals. Instead, an emergency diversion dam would allow floodwaters to 
temporarily “pool” and then be released along levee-enhanced watercourses south of the 
city, creating a slow-moving, natural “floodway” to Galveston Bay, mostly bypassing the 
ship channel. Colonel Besson believed these more low-profile works would allow the 
Corps to induce a “non-eroding, low-velocity flow” of floodwaters 35 miles across less-
developed rural areas and coastal wetlands.  
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Figure 2.5 Early Sketch of the "Emergency By-Pass Plan", Corps of Engineers, Galveston District, 1939. J. 
Russell Wait Port of Houston Collection, Woodson Research Center, Rice University 
Ultimately a modified version of this plan, combined with elements of the “Three 
Corridor Plan,” would be approved by Congress in the fall of 1940. It would provide 
significant protection from the 50-year “superflood” on Buffalo Bayou and thus keep 
downtown Houston mostly dry and the ship channel consistently operational.121 But this 
plan did not provide complete protection against the “design storm,” which would 
produce volumes of water 50 percent greater than the storms of December 1935.122 These 
estimates were eventually standardized into the “standard project flood” that would be 
used to model future additions to this first round of protective infrastructure.123  
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 The 1940 plan was also designed to prevent some flooding on the other bayous in 
the Houston area, but it was incomplete and did not anticipate the scale of postwar 
growth in those areas. The discarded Three Corridor Plan had been designed to prevent 
floods on White Oak Bayou – another creek of concern since it fed into Buffalo Bayou 
downtown at Main Street and ran through historic Houston Heights that had flooded in 
1935 – but that measure had been deemed too expensive by the Corps of Engineers.124 
With enormous pushback from the Navigation and Flood Control Committee, a small 
dam was added to the 1940 plans for White Oak Bayou. Brays Bayou, south of the city, 
was left largely unchecked. There would be no comprehensive flood control for Harris 
County in 1940. In the final compromise plan the stage was set for the recurrent flooding 
that would plague Houston in the decades after World War Two as new neighborhoods 
crowded the banks of White Oak and Brays Bayous which had been left out of the final 
Corps of Engineers project.  
The Definite Project Report for Buffalo Bayou, Texas, submitted by Colonel 
Frank Besson, was approved by the secretary of the army in October 1940. It called for a 
system of two dams with large retention ponds on Buffalo Bayou, a smaller dam on 
White Oak Bayou with its own reservoir, a levee on Cypress Creek to hold back floods 
on that part of the San Jacinto River, and two canals to shunt flood waters north and south 
of the city into Galveston Bay. Total costs were nearly $32 million – $19 million from 
the government and $13 million from Harris County. With voter approval, the HCFCD 
issued the first bonds for $3.5 million that same month. The first two projects, Barker and 
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Addicks Dams, were to commence construction in the fall of 1941, but World War Two 
would both delay, and prove important to, their completion.  
 
Figure 2.6 USACE Plan of Buffalo Bayou Project, 1940. HCFCD, Harris County Archives. Note north and 
south canals that were never completed. 
Implementing flood control during World War Two 
When the flood control projects in Houston had first been envisioned in the late 
1930s they were organized under a New Deal model. There were no hydroelectric dams 
planned for Buffalo Bayou, but surely the flood control aspects of the TVA and LCRA 
had been a model for the Harris County Flood Control District. The first local bonds 
approved in 1939 for clearing Buffalo Bayou had been to contribute to a WPA project. In 
his first letters to the House Appropriations Committee, Houston Congressman Albert 
Thomas still used the framing of New Deal arguments to secure funding for flood control 
in his district. This was similar to the language that had been used to champion the rural 
TVA six years earlier. Thomas wrote, “Perhaps the greatest economic waste confronting 
this Country today comes from floods and their companion evils, such as loss of life, loss 
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of personal property, soil erosion, and, of course, human misery.”125 The purpose of 
providing protection for the city of Houston and its vital port industries was very different 
from rural hydroelectric and flood control systems, and World War Two would provide a 
better justification for this kind of urban-industrial flood control. As Sarah Phillips 
argues, large New Deal dams may have started out to restore the prosperity of small-time 
farmers, but by the late 1930s they had become more oriented towards providing cheap 
power for regional industrialization.126 The war would complete this vision as defense 
industry jobs attracted people from rural areas who could make a better living than in 
agriculture.  
In Houston, defense industries brought new facilities to the ship channel. A large 
ammunitions depot was located near the mouth of the ship channel at San Jacinto. A tin 
smelting plant serving the navy was located nearby at Texas City.127 Shipbuilding 
facilities were developed, by an offshoot of the construction firm Brown and Root, 
further inland at the junction of Greens Bayou and the ship channel. By late in the war, 
the Brown Shipyards were building one destroyer escort a week. More than 20,000 men 
were employed in those yards.128 Even more importantly, World War Two brought 
critical demand for Houston’s oil production and refining.  
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Although the Buffalo Bayou flood control projects had been approved by 
Congress the year before, Houston Representative Albert Thomas again had trouble 
securing the first large federal payments in both the summers of 1940 and 1941. The 
economy was still unsteady after large spending programs to drag the country out of 
recession in 1938 were coming to an end. War had come to Europe, and domestic public 
works projects were not a top priority in comparison to defense spending.  
With America’s war looming and defense facilities already being planned along 
the ship channel, basic improvements to the navigable waterway from Galveston Bay to 
the Houston Port facilities were starting to compete with the need to start the dams to 
protect the city. The ship channel needed to be widened, both as a flood control measure 
and to handle more ship traffic. The navy was particularly concerned about a ship sinking 
in the channel and blocking badly needed materials from being sent out. President 
Roosevelt himself weighed in on the issue, blaming the Corps of Engineers for designing 
a narrow, winding channel that had too many bends and curves to operate at “100 percent 
efficiency and protection”.129 Nevertheless, the $5 million needed to start Barker Dam 
and widen the channel was not made available until the start of 1942, and only after the 
Harris County Flood Control District loaned the Corps of Engineers $2.5 million.  
In February 1942, construction work finally started on Barker Dam. The massive 
earthen structure was designed to catch floodwaters flowing off the Katy Prairie – a large 
area of marshland starting about 35 miles from the city center. At one time this wet 
prairie, very much like parts of the Florida Everglades, had been much closer to 
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Houston’s upscale western suburbs. But earlier drainage projects had allowed some of the 
city’s most expensive neighborhoods, such as River Oaks, to be developed in the 1920s 
on land that was on newly dry, high ground.130 Although the wetlands of Katy Prairie had 
been pushed back, water pooling from those areas after rainstorms was still the main 
source of intense flooding on the bayous in the city.  
Barker Dam looked more like a levee than a dam. It was nearly 14 miles of 
concrete-reinforced dirt embankment but only 18 feet high. Both Barker and its neighbor 
to the north, Addicks Dam, still in the planning stages in 1942, would have detention 
reservoirs behind them, but they would only be filled following flood events on Katy 
Prairie. Preventing silt from washing into the ship channel far downstream was a 
secondary purpose of the reservoirs. Water storage was not considered a dual benefit as it 
would be a decade later in the multipurpose flood control projects in South Florida.  
With the construction of Barker Dam much of the wetland sheet flow would be 
contained well outside the farthest suburbs after severe rainstorms. At full capacity the 
reservoir could contain 207,000 acre-feet of water. If a storm like the one that brought the 
1935 disaster struck again, the peak floodwaters on Buffalo Bayou downtown would be 
reduced by five feet.131  
Within a few months, however, the War Production Board shut down work on 
Barker Dam. Large civil works projects around the country not deemed essential to the 
war effort were all being paused due to shortages of critical materials and manpower. 
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Port Director Russell Wait protested the War Production Board’s order to the Corps of 
Engineers. Barker Dam was an earthen structure, and therefore few critical materials 
were involved. But the shortage of workers could not be denied. Over the next few 
months, some parts of the project did continue, such as building levees around the 
reservoir outlets.132 By late April 1943, the War Production Board had reversed their 
order and allowed work to continue on Barker Dam partly because Russell Wait had 
convinced the Corps of Engineers that flooding on the ship channel would directly 
threaten war industries. Barker Dam would ultimately cost $2.5 million to complete. 
Some of the other projects lower on the bayou, such as redesigning downtown bridges to 
allow more water to flow under them in a flood, had to wait until manpower shortages 
ended with the war.  
The beginning of postwar suburban expansion 
Meanwhile, in the spring of 1943, even as all-efforts continued in the war in 
Europe and the Pacific, planning was already underway for a massive program of postwar 
road expansion. Dallas had already approached the State Highway Commission about 
permission to build a new kind of high-speed roadway with limited access – Texas’ first 
“freeway.”133 Regional competition between Houston and Dallas was already fierce, and 
the Houston-Harris County Postwar Highway Planning Committee also sought 
permission from the state to build a freeway. Texas’ first freeway was started in 1946, 
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and it would fully open in 1952.134 The Gulf Freeway connected Houston to its 
vanquished regional rival Galveston, now increasingly a weekend getaway from the city.  
The plans for road expansion would dwarf the costs of flood control. Over $125 
million was proposed by the Highway Planning Commission in 1943, including new 
freeways, tunnels under the ship channel, and a complete highway “loop” around 
Houston. Much of this money would come from the federal government and the state of 
Texas through an expansion of the Federal-Aid Highway system. The regional roadway 
network was the basic infrastructure for sprawling postwar development in Harris 
County. Although the core of Houston and its industrial heart along the ship channel 
would be protected from flooding, the new suburbs were often planned in low-lying areas 
that had been only marginally protected by the old agricultural drainage districts. Without 
any legal authority to control development, the HCFCD was desperate to keep up with 
the flood control responsibilities created by the new subdivisions.  
By the time Barker Dam was nearing completion in the fall of 1944, proposals 
were already underway for a comprehensive program of flood control for Houston and 
Harris County that the flood control district engineer, Richard J. Putney, claimed would 
“almost entirely remove the menace of floods to lives and property.”135 The proposal 
would eliminate all the earlier drainage districts and put the HCFCD directly in the Harris 
County budget. In addition to supplementing the larger federal projects already underway 
on Buffalo and White Oak bayous, $9 million in bonds would cover small drainage 
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projects on all 23 of the watersheds in Harris County. Every bayou – over 900 miles of 
streams - would be integrated into a network of ditches, culverts, and storm drains in 
existing and newly developed areas. This was the first comprehensive, county-level flood 
control program in Texas.  
County-wide, comprehensive flood control was only part of the Postwar Planning 
Committee’s $57 million bond proposal for Harris County. New sewer systems, roads, 
tunnels under the ship channel, and schools were all under consideration by voters in 
early 1945. Major Frank Clemens, chairman of the Houston Chamber of Commerce’s 
Flood Control Committee, argued that now was the time to secure Houston’s postwar 
development since after years of deferred projects to the war effort Harris County was 
“richer than ever.”136 Ad valorem taxes had been reduced for four years straight, and the 
new bonds would not return them to their prewar level. Another key argument for voters 
to approve the bonds was that drainage projects and roadbuilding would employ returning 
soldiers and laid-off workers from shipyards as the war came to an end. In a March 1945 
article listing the range of projects planned for the city, The Houston Chronicle 
championed the employment role of postwar construction: “The construction business 
here after the war is expected to enjoy its greatest period of prosperity and become of the 
largest industries of this area, furnishing thousands of jobs for returning veterans.”137 
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Figure 2.7. Ads supporting county bonds, 1944. Squatty Lyons Papers. Harris County Archives 
Despite the availability of cash from the 1944 bonds and support from Houston’s 
local government and business elite, the vision for comprehensive flood control on all the 
county’s streams would not be implemented until much later. By 1946, Harris County 
and the federal government had spent a combined $31 million on flood control projects 
stemming directly from the 1935 disaster.138 Barker Dam was completed in February 
1945. Addicks Dam was finished three years later. Colonel Frank Besson’s plans for the 
north and south canals were never to see completion, although they had been part of the 
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Corps of Engineers’ Definite Project Report in 1940. The costs of buying land became 
prohibitive as the city pushed outward in the late 1940s. But the two completed dams, 
with their ability to slowly release flood waters down Buffalo Bayou, were largely 
successful in preventing the same scale of flooding downtown, and they were even more 
effective at stopping future disruptions to commerce on the Houston Ship Channel.  
With the war over, justifications for new civil works projects were everywhere, 
and Congress was largely ready to appropriate these funds in order to slow the weaning 
of wartime expenditures and employ returning servicemen. In late 1945 the Southwestern 
Division of the Corps of Engineers was waiting for congressional appropriations to begin 
construction on $112 million in flood control projects for Texas.139 According to General 
E. H. Marks, the Southwestern Division commander, these projects would more than 
offset the loss of $25 million in military construction projects that had been canceled by 
the end of the war.  
The scale and expense for flood control projects on the Brazos, Trinity, and 
Angelina rivers were many times greater than what had been authorized for Houston: $28 
million for a dam and large reservoir on the Brazos River near Waco, and $22 million for 
a reservoir on the Angelina River near Nacogdoches. These were large, regional projects 
compared with the $4 million authorized for Addicks Dam on Buffalo Bayou that same 
year. As was the case in Houston, the war had interrupted planned New Deal-era 
navigation, flood control, and hydroelectric power projects throughout Texas. But in 
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contrast to Houston, the value of land in rural areas of the state was not increasing 
dramatically. 
The Corps of Engineers was finding a new, significant postwar role that would 
eventually lead to accusations of self-interest and pork-barrel politics. Certainly some of 
the projects they proposed for Texas and Florida were on a grand scale. For example, the 
War Department’s $300 million civil works budget for 1947 included plans to make 300 
miles of the Trinity River navigable, from the Gulf of Mexico to Fort Worth, and to cut a 
barge canal over a hundred miles across north Florida as part of the Intracoastal 
Waterway.140 Although neither of these projects would ever see completion, it was a 
moment when large-scale civil works could still be envisioned and gain support. That 
same year, widespread flooding in newly-populous South Florida would inspire local 
officials to demand federal action, and the Corps of Engineers would begin their largest 
flood control project outside of the Mississippi valley. 
In the late 1940s the city of Houston itself was rapidly growing, both in 
population and in area. Prior to the war, most of the population of Harris County lived 
inside the city of Houston. Beyond the city limits were a few small towns and large rural 
areas. Before the war, in 1939, some Harris County residents had vehemently opposed 
the federal flood control projects because they seemed to benefit the city and port over 
rural areas.141 By the end of the war, flood control had become a county-wide project, 
                                               
140 “$2,200,000 in Flood Work Here Favored,” Houston Chronicle, February 6, 1946, Squatty Lyons 
Papers, 1946, Harris County Archives.   
141 Harris County, “Transcript of Report by Mr. Rafferty to the Navigation and Flood Control 
Committee.”   
 66 
rural areas were disappearing, and the population was shifting outside of the city into new 
suburbs in unincorporated areas.  
 
Figure 2.8 Graphic from Wild River (1951 Reprise) showing suburban population gains in greater 
Houston, 1951. Auditor’s Papers, Harris County Archives 
The struggle to keep the suburbs dry in the 1950s  
In the first years after World War Two, Houston became the fastest growing city 
in the country. Between 1940 and 1950, the population of Harris County increased by 50 
percent to about 810,000 people. During that time, the population of close-in suburban 
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areas such as the town of Bellaire and the neighborhoods of South Houston, both near to 
Brays Bayou, doubled. The same explosive growth happened in east side suburban 
working-class neighborhoods, such as the town of Galena Park, that served the industries 
along the ship channel. Along with other sunbelt cities, Houston’s historic neighborhoods 
closest to downtown experienced small population losses, a trend that would accelerate 
during the 1950s.142  
 In 1948 alone property values increased by 13 percent. Harris County’s 
operational budget increased likewise, but it was not enough even to provide services, let 
alone finance the necessary infrastructure of roadways and sewers, to all the new areas.143 
“The Problems of Growth” suddenly made headlines. Questions remained about whether 
some new developments outside the city limits should remain in unincorporated Harris 
County, incorporate into their own cities, or be annexed by the city of Houston.  
The new suburbs of the late 1940s were almost entirely unregulated; they did not 
put in facilities for drainage or sewage treatment, relying instead on septic systems, as 
was a common practice around the country.144 Many did not even plan for trash 
collection. Sometimes they were built far too close to bayou floodplains. In his 
environmental history of suburban expansion during this period, Adam Rome writes that 
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the “construction of homes in flood-prone areas became much more common” after 
World War Two. He elaborates: 
“In some fast-growing regions, the increase was phenomenal. In Denver, the 
residential acreage in floodplains jumped by 250 percent in the 1960s. In Dallas, the 
number of single-family homes in the floodplains of the Trinity River rose by 641 
percent from 1936 to 1957; in the Pico-Rivera section of Los Angeles, the increase 
was 867 percent. Though compilers of floodplain statistics focused on construction 
along major rivers, a few analysts also noted a tremendous increase in building 
along creeks and streams.”145 
Although Houston’s flood control projects had achieved their primary goal after World 
War Two, rapid new development would eventually require expanded flood protection.  
 The problem was how to pay for it. Increasing property values meant that the cost 
of rights of way also increased. The cost of securing rights of way for a 30-mile canal 
was suddenly prohibitively expensive. By 1956 there was growing reluctance on the part 
of county property owners to approve new bonds to contribute to federal flood control 
projects, or even simply to improve local drainage. Voters also repeatedly rebuked the 
county’s attempts to raise money for new roads and to support the deepening of the 
Houston Ship Channel. Meanwhile, the resurvey process to begin a second phase of the 
federal projects was lengthy and uncertain. The frustrations of how to protect the new 
suburbs were in marked contrast with the relative speed and unified determination to start 
the earlier, pre-war flood control plans.  
Civic institutions supporting postwar flood control 
Houston was filling up Harris County and grabbing land for affordable middle-
class suburbs while maintaining a central authority in the form of a city manager.146 
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Although Houston’s population was becoming more diverse as the city became firmly 
established as a regional industrial center, with many new jobs attracting Mexican and 
African Americans, the annexation program allowed the city to maintain white majority 
rule well past the era of Jim Crow restrictions. As the city annexed unincorporated areas 
around it, surrounding towns were pressured to vote for annexation. It was a strategy that 
would reinforce sprawl well after the end of official segregation two decades later.  It was 
also a strategy that brought the interests of the city of Houston into closer alignment with 
Harris County. This pattern of annexation was similar to some sunbelt cities, such as 
Phoenix, but quite different from the fragmentation that occurred in others, such the 
Atlanta region.147 The piecemeal annexation strategy also did not push jurisdictional 
integration to the same extent as the metropolitan form of government that was 
established during this same period in “Miami-Dade” County.148  
After World War Two, county road construction and flood control became tied 
together, at least in the way in which they were presented to voters on bond referendums. 
At first county leaders were forcefully optimistic that superhighways and comprehensive 
flood control could solve the traffic and flooding problems permanently. As in the case of 
Miami and Tampa later there was still a short-sightedness about the consequences of 
rapid, sprawling growth. Houston’s heavily promoted super-highway “loop” would 
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become a traffic-clogged inner ring as suburbs grew rapidly past it, and continued 
development in floodplains would ensure that there was always at least a couple flooded 
subdivisions to make the local news. 
The aspiration of comprehensive flood control for Houston was institutionalized 
through the array of agencies involved. First, the Harris County Flood Control District 
responded to urgent needs as flooding continued in new neighborhoods that had not been 
affected, or had not even existed, when the first round of federal projects was designed in 
1939. The HCFCD hired consultants to study the economic impact of these recurrent 
floods and produced a report claiming that damages were $5 million annually.149 Second, 
numerous civil lawsuits involving property disputes with the HCFCD led to the creation 
of the office of Harris County Attorney. These cases would no longer be handled through 
a firm with a private contract with the county but through an elected position.150 Third, 
funding the maintenance of flood control systems became easier, although new 
construction remained a persistent challenge: While the HCFCD had failed to get tax 
remission from the state in 1939, in 1950 the Texas legislature canceled state property 
taxes and allowed individual counties instead to raise ad valorem taxes up to 30 cents for 
every $100. There were only two uses permitted for these new taxes: farm-to-market 
roads and flood control.  
Finally in the late 1940s, the Houston Chamber of Commerce established a 
standing committee to fulfill its “civic responsibility” to ensure continued progress on 
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flood control projects that were “essential to the continued and healthy growth of 
Houston.”151 This committee was chaired by key business leaders, often ones versed in 
construction or related industries. County commissioners often attended these meetings. 
The Flood Control Committee of the Houston Chamber of Commerce continued to lobby 
for the passage of local bonds and for federal authorization to ensure the completion of 
comprehensive flood control in Harris County. The chamber of commerce, through 
research, hearings, and lobbying, was particularly instrumental in providing economic 
justifications for further federal support, although it was the official policy of the 
chamber not to request funding appropriations from Congress. This ambivalence was a 
key political strategy for civic organizations in the increasingly Washington-wary 
postwar South, and it was a common role for chambers of commerce in rapidly-
developing areas such as Los Angeles.152 For the next two decades, Houston became 
famous for resisting regulation across every domain, from city zoning to controlling 
water pollution, while simultaneously celebrating large federal investments such as the 
Johnson Space Center.  
In prosperous postwar Houston county bonds at first seemed like a good solution 
to twin forms of congested infrastructure – the flow of water and cars through the 
expanding city – but as voter trust eroded, land values increased, and federal funds lagged 
behind, road and flood control projects were continually delayed. By the end of the 
decade, the federal government would solve the road problem by providing funds to 
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acquire rights-of-way for state and federal interstate highways. The flood control system 
in Harris County, however, remained perpetually unfinished, and it would soon encounter 
grassroots opposition from environmental groups who stood behind a different set of 
values besides expedient drainage. While bayou flooding became a routine occurrence in 
metropolitan Houston, large, multi-purpose flood control and water supply projects in 
southeast Texas would move forward on the region’s major rivers.  
Referendum year and 
purpose 
Total amount Amount for flood control Approved? 
1945; completion of 1940 
flood control plan 
$9 million $9 million Yes 
1950; county roads and 
drainage 
$9 million $6 million Yes 
1953; county roads, Port 
of Houston, and drainage 
$39 million $11 million Yes 
1955; county roads and 
Port of Houston 
$18.5 million $0 No 
July, 1956; freeway 
rights-of-way, flood 
control, juvenile detention 
home 
$23.5 million $7.5 million No 
September, 1956; freeway 
rights-of-way proposition 
alone 
$15 million $0 Yes 
Figure 2.9 Harris County Infrastructure Bond Referenda, 1945-1956 
Responding to floods on Brays Bayou, 1946–1951 
In January 1946, flooding on Brays Bayou south of downtown swamped new 
suburban neighborhoods, overflowed sewers, and raised fears of spreading disease during 
a polio epidemic in the city. Major medical facilities were themselves in the path of Brays 
Bayou flooding. Sewage-filled waters threatened Hermann Hospital, Baylor School of 
Medicine, the M. D. Anderson research hospital, and the land set aside for a “hospital 
district” that would become the Texas Medical Center. New subdivisions often worked 
hard to connect to municipal water supplies, but few of them built sewage treatment 
facilities, and septic systems leaked, or worse, wastewater was sometimes pumped 
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directly into nearby bayous. Local flooding, contaminated water, and inadequate roads 
were in the headlines on a regular basis as developers built new neighborhoods in bayou 
floodplains without any comprehensive planning or county-level oversight.  
The floods of 1935 had overwhelmed much of the area of the city between Brays 
and Buffalo Bayous, and the system of dams and outlets built by the Corps of Engineers 
did prevent some floodwaters from ever entering Brays Bayou, but it was a secondary 
concern to the main channel of Buffalo Bayou.153 In 1946 Barker Dam and its controlled 
outlets to Buffalo Bayou largely protected downtown Houston and the ship channel, but it 
did not prevent flooding in neighborhoods only five miles away, such as Braeswood and 
West University Place. This kind of localized, suburban flooding would set a pattern 
from which Houston has still not escaped. Subdivision after subdivision, Houston had not 
anticipated the scale of pent-up, rapid development as the war was coming to an end, and 
water treatment was particularly inadequate in newly-developed areas. Brays Bayou itself 
became the main sewer line.  
In January 1946, only a couple of weeks after the Brays Bayou flooding, hearings 
were held by the Corps of Engineers to consider a new round of flood control projects.154 
Along with flood control, public health concerns were a new justification for federal 
intervention into Houston’s drainage problems. The new round of flood control in 
Houston focused on the “rectification” of the main bayous running through the city. The 
plan was to straighten and deepen the channels of Buffalo, White Oak, and Brays bayous. 
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In order to prevent erosion and allow water to drain more rapidly out of the city, the 
bottom of each bayou would be lined with concrete for several miles in urban 
neighborhoods.155 Brush and trees along the banks would be cleared. It was essentially a 
project to improve drainage instead of to build new structures to contain or divert floods. 
The next year, however, the Corps of Engineers returned an unfavorable report on 
a more extensive solution to the flooding on Brays Bayou. In the summer of 1947, 
Colonel Henry Hutchings, the Southwestern Division commander, essentially confirmed 
that the south canal, which had been a key part of the plan for the flood control system in 
1940, was never going to be built.156 There was still some hope that a northern canal 
could be finished, but the costs were now too high to justify the benefits to Houston’s 
southern suburbs. A planned outlet to divert floods on Brays Bayou into the south canal 
was now also off the table. Improving drainage on the bayou was going to be the only 
solution going forward, it would likely cost at least $10 million, and that work had not 
been included in the project report in 1940.  
So in early January of the following year, 1948, a large delegation of Houston 
officials and business leaders, including Warren Bellows, one of the area’s major builders 
and the president of the chamber of commerce, went to Washington to get support for 
hastening drainage work on Brays Bayou.157  Representatives from the new Texas 
Medical Center and the Baylor University College of Medicine were especially involved 
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in this appeal as their proposed, $100 million plans to build south of downtown were 
threatened by Brays Bayou flooding.158  On this basis, the Corps’ Board of Engineers 
were receptive to including drainage work on Brays Bayou as part of the Buffalo Bayou 
project, pending a resurvey.159 With the completion of Addicks Dam in December 1948, 
the Buffalo Bayou and Tributaries Project – first studied in 1936, approved in 1938, and 
started in 1940 – was now operating to prevent flooding on Buffalo Bayou and to protect 
the Port of Houston. The first phase of flood control was complete, but county leaders 
were already campaigning for the next one to begin.  
In October 1949, the need for a restudy was confirmed by another major flood on 
Brays Bayou following severe thunderstorms. There were more than five thousand 
evacuations from neighborhoods and towns along the bayou such as Bellaire, Southern 
Oaks, and West University Place. Seven hundred blocks of homes, many built in the 
previous five years, were completely cut off. The main roads leading south of the city 
were inaccessible for days. All told over 11,000 homes flooded or were surrounded by 
high water. Direct damages were estimated at $5 million. After flying over the flooded 
area, a Houston Press reporter wrote that “Homes look like houseboats”.160  
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Figure 2.10 Aerial view of flooding in new subdivision in Bellaire, Southwest Houston, 1949. Wild River 
(1951). Auditor’s Papers, Harris County Archives. 
Within a couple of weeks, the Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors gave a 
favorable report for the resurvey of the Buffalo Bayou and Tributaries Project, focusing 
on protecting new development in the area of Brays and White Oak bayous. The resurvey 
was supposed to be complete by 1951. But with two significant floods in the same area 
over a three-year period, county officials had to take some immediate action.  
The Commissioners’ Court authorized the HCFCD engineer, Richard Putney, to 
go ahead with $2 million worth of brush clearing and widening work on Brays, White 
Oak, and Greens bayous. A $9 million bond vote was scheduled for early the following 
year. That money would have to go towards acquiring rights-of-way, since property 
values were steadily increasing despite the repeated flooding. Meanwhile, with the 
country in recession, appropriations for the Corps’ resurvey were uncertain, and Harris 
County had to loan the Corps funds to begin the process. Congressman Albert Thomas, 
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who had been so involved in the start of flood control in Houston a decade earlier, made 
this much smaller deal in the hopes that it would be the beginning of another major 
project. 
In late January 1950, the county held the scheduled vote on the $9 million bond 
issue. It included funds for flood control, county roads, completion of a vehicle tunnel 
under the ship channel, a public “charity” hospital at the new Texas Medical Center, and 
a new city police headquarters and jail. Only property owners who had paid their poll-
taxes in the previous year were eligible to vote, and not many of them did. There were 
only 14,000 votes cast, but all the measures passed. In contrast to the conflicting urban 
and rural interests that had clashed around bond referendums before the war, it was clear 
that rural Harris County was disappearing in the late 1940s, and suburban voters were a 
growing political force. As a Houston Chronicle editorial declared in full booster voice, 
“The city and rural folks have become so mixed that it is impossible to say where city 
interests and rural interests have a dividing line.”161    
With the money in hand, HCFCD hired a full-time civil engineer, H. R. Norman, 
who had been working in the Corps’ Galveston District office, to coordinate the restudy 
of the Buffalo Bayou project. Because the original project essentially ignored flooding on 
Brays and Greens bayous, Norman estimated that thirty miles of rectification through 
suburban land would now cost at least $50 million – a stunning figure when the entire 
original project had come in under $40 million a decade earlier. “You can’t play with one 
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faucet and let the other faucets run on,” Norman justified. “Brays Bayou is especially 
important.”162  
A couple of months later, county commissioners were becoming increasingly 
frustrated with the delays in clearing Brays Bayou and the spiraling cost estimates 
coming out of the project restudy. In March, after a public argument with one county 
commissioner, Harris County flood control engineer Richard Putney resigned from the 
HCFCD. Putney had been with the flood control district since the project had begun 
construction during the war. Putney was replaced by his technical assistant Howard 
Jensen, who had previously worked at the Corps’ Galveston office. At the same time, the 
Galveston District was transferring much of its flood control expertise to Fort Worth, 
which was in charge of the much larger multi-purpose river projects in the region.  
Despite its high cost, a new flood control plan was approved by the Harris County 
Commissioners Court in June 1950. The four main bayous running through the 
expanding metropolitan area would all be cleared, widened, and lined with concrete in 
some sections. HCFCD still hoped that, somehow, shorter versions of the north and south 
canals would be part of the system. With the “combination of advanced costs and city 
growth” the projects were now estimated at $60-70 million.163 When complete it was 
supposed to produce $20 million in benefits, annually, to Harris County.  The Corps held 
a public hearing on the revised plan that same month.  
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The frustrations of financing the next phase of the Buffalo Bayou Project, 1951–1956 
Seeking to bypass the Corps’ lengthy restudy process, Harris County leaders 
returned to Washington in July 1951. This time they sought only a $1 million 
appropriation to continue clearing Brays Bayou, with full expectations that it would be 
the beginning of regular funding for the next phase of the project. War had broken out on 
the Korean peninsula the month before, and Harris County’s representatives were quick 
to justify the need to move ahead on suburban flood control in terms of the critical 
defense industries located along the Houston Ship Channel. This justification had worked 
in World War Two to release funds to complete the two main dams on Buffalo Bayou. 
Now representatives from the HCFCD, the navigation district, the chamber of commerce, 
and the city of Houston reprised a key piece of early marketing – the “Wild River” 
pamphlet that had convinced the Texas legislature to approve a new flood control district 
in 1937.164  
The updated version of “Wild River” was full of pictures of floods, old and new, 
along with statistics showing how much Harris County had grown over the last 15 years. 
It made the pitch that the need to protect expensive development both justified another 
federal project, and at the same time made it impossible for the county to pay for 
improved drainage alone. Over 20 years, from 1930 to 1950, Houston’s population had 
almost exactly doubled from 292,000 to 600,000 residents. But during that same period, 
the value of building permits increased by a factor of ten, from $17.6 million to $176 
million, perhaps making an unfair comparison between Depression-era stagnation and 
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postwar prosperity. “Wild River” also captured its moment of Cold War hyperbole. 
“Repetition of this area’s flood of 1935 would be the equivalent of an atomic bomb 
dropped on the City of Houston in terms of the disruption and loss of production in the 
locality,” it screamed. “Many of the new industries, particularly chemicals and oil, have 
been established since 1935.”165 
Despite the glossy piece of marketing, and the real strategic importance of 
refining industries in Houston, the junket to Washington was a failure. The Corps of 
Engineers went on the record against the requested $1 million appropriation. The Board 
of Engineers was rightfully wary of allowing new construction to begin before a restudy 
of the entire project was complete. After all, the dams on Buffalo Bayou were protecting 
the industry along the ship channel; it was the suburban neighborhoods that needed flood 
protection, and these areas were not critical to national defense during the current 
emergency. 
Early the following year, in January 1952, the HCFCD completed the $9 million 
county drainage program that had been started in 1945. Local drainage efforts had 
accomplished all they could by clearing of underbrush from the bayous, and moving dirt 
from smaller creeks that fed into them. New excavation work would have to wait for 
federal funding. “If we don’t get the federal funds, we’ll just bog down,” county flood 
control engineer Howard Jensen declared. “We have the work almost completed on all 
                                               
165 Harris County Flood Control District. The new Wild River petition emphasized major facilities 
built during and after the war along the Ship Channel - such as the Dickson Gun Plant, Diamond 
Alkali Plant, Goodyear synthetic rubber and Sinclair Refinery expansion - that were now in the path of 
a flood if it met “project proportions” (because the diversion canals were never finished). These 
facilities were real indicators of how important Houston was becoming as a petrochemical center after 
the war.  
 
 81 
water arteries flowing into the three bayous. But when the year is over, we’ll be broke – 
unless we get the federal money we’ve asked for.”166   
That summer, drainage concerns centered around another community health 
crisis. The county health department blamed a new outbreak of polio on raw sewage 
being dumping in the bayous. Authorities responded by spraying pesticides to kill the 
flies that they assumed were spreading the disease. It was clear that there was not enough 
treatment of sewage at the county’s 54 disposal plants, but homeowners in southwest 
Houston blamed poor drainage. They crowded a meeting of the Commissioners Court 
demanding that one particularly noxious drainage ditch leading to Brays Bayou through 
the backyards of West University Place homes be covered or lined with concrete. Howard 
Jensen estimated that it would be $320,000 to line that ditch alone, for a couple of 
miles.167 By October the city of West University Place had undertaken the project on 
their own because the county did not have the funds to take on the project.  
Finally, in August 1952 the Board of Engineers approved modifications to the 
1940 project on Buffalo Bayou. The restudy had taken three years. As had been 
anticipated, the north and south canals were now completely gone from the plans. The 
project would cost $50 million, with the federal portion limited to $26 million, and it 
would only attempt to “clear, enlarge, straighten and line if needed” Buffalo, Brays, and 
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White Oak bayous.168 But with the ongoing Korean War and an election that year, 
Congress did not pass a rivers and harbors bill. County leaders were left facing the same 
challenge: how to raise funds on their own.  
In June 1953, county commissioners scheduled another bond vote. At $39 million, 
it was the largest ever submitted to Harris County property owners. Voters were told that 
financing the new debt would likely raise property taxes. Of the total, $11 million was set 
for flood control, $11.5 million was for county roads, and $15 million was for the 
navigation district to improve the Houston Ship Channel. There was also $1.5 million for 
a new county courthouse and jail. Local papers, such as the Houston Post and the 
Houston Informer, again supported the bonds, and decried “intolerable” motor traffic.169  
Meanwhile flooding, and the never-finished comprehensive system, was 
becoming too routine. “[T]he flood control system is only partially finished. It must be 
completed sooner or later, so the sensible course is to vote the bonds and get the 
protection as soon as possible. No one knows when another disastrous flood like those of 
1929, 1935, 1945 and 1949, which caused damages aggregating more than $21 Million, 
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may visit the county.”170 By the end of the month, all the bond issues were approved as 
well as a 3-cent tax for maintenance of the existing flood control system. Since they were 
limited to registered property owners who were motivated to turn out, these local bond 
referenda continued to come down to small numbers. Only 21,000 total votes were cast; 
but it was 7,000 more than the last bond referendum in 1950.  
A year later, in September 1954, the Flood Control Act of 1954 finally authorized 
the second phase of the Buffalo Bayou Project. It would be a $67 million comprehensive 
flood control program for Harris County based on the results of the Corps’ restudy. In 
general, it involved expanding on the HCFCD’s drainage program; lining the primary 
bayou channels with concrete, clearing brush, and sodding their banks. Local sponsors 
were committed to paying $29 million – or 40 percent of the project’s costs. It was five 
years since the last bout of suburban flooding on Brays Bayou, and the local drainage 
program was still struggling to keep up with the pace of development in the area. After 
months of congressional debate, the persistent efforts of the county to raise bond funds 
for local, stop-gap drainage seemed more fully justified.  
But even having an approved second phase of the federal project did not mean 
construction could begin any time soon. As would be the case with the later phases of 
projects in Miami and Tampa, this second phase of the Buffalo Bayou Project was held 
back by the annual appropriations cycle. The risk of recurrent flooding on Brays Bayou 
was especially high, and county leaders did not want to wait. In the spring of 1955, 
another county junket to Washington failed to get firm answers about the start of 
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construction from the Army Engineers. County judge Bob Casey, flood control engineer 
Howard Jensen, and County Commissioner Kyle Chapman went to Washington seeking 
approval for the first construction funds needed to fully line Brays Bayou (which was 
estimated to cost $25 million of the $67 million authorized total). Enough studies had 
been done by 1955 that funds appropriated that year could be used to get started 
immediately.171  
Alternatively, the Corps said that the county could lend them the money to get 
started, but commissioners such as Squatty Lyons said no, that they had tried this 
approach in the past, and that Harris County was still owed $2.9 million that had been 
lent to the federal government in order to start construction on Barker Dam during World 
War Two.172 Phase Two was supposed to be a “funds matching” program, with about half 
from the county, half from the federal government. Without an appropriation in 1955, it 
was back to the same local stop-gap drainage efforts. “Federal procrastination had the 
county fathers in a ‘do-it-yourself’ mood” the Houston Press commented.173   
In September 1955, another referendum on a new bond issue of $18.5 million was 
scheduled. The bulk of this funding would go to county roads, but the navigation district 
also requested $5 million for new facilities and acquiring sites to dump spoils from 
dredging out the ship channel. There was no additional county drainage funding. This 
time, county leaders had to admit that Harris County’s increasing indebtedness would 
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lead to higher property taxes. Simultaneously, Harris County proposed a 33 percent 
increase to the licensing tax for motor vehicle registrations. The “wheel-tax” would pay 
for the rights-of-way for state and federal highways. “The first freeway and highway ‘pay 
as you ride’ development program in the county’s history,” county judge Bob Casey 
declared. It would give a “green light” for a freeway program “second to none in the 
nation.”174  
Despite a newspaper campaign sounding alarms that traffic was “out of control,” 
and only these measures could solve it, voters saw the bond referendum as a package of 
new taxes with no certain return, and rejected the bond proposals. The “wheel-tax” for 
rights-of-way passed, but it would eventually die in the Texas Supreme Court. “What’s 
the Matter with Our Houston?” the Houston Press editorial read. “We’ve Lost Our 
Trust… Do we not still believe in a “better Houston?” With county commissioners’ and 
chamber of commerce flood control committee frustrations mounting, another 
referendum was scheduled for the following July 1956 during the Democratic primary.  
In June, the chamber of commerce flood control committee met; finally, there was 
good news from Washington. Senator Lyndon Johnson sent a telegram saying an 
appropriation of $6.9 million for Buffalo Bayou had been made by the Senate 
appropriations committee. More than $4 million of that amount was repayment of past 
loans from Harris County, but there was $2.5 million to get started on the rectification of 
Brays Bayou. All that was necessary now was securing the local contributions. County 
leaders were exasperated. While there were signs that the federal government would be 
                                               
174 “Freeway Net 2nd to None Seen,” Houston Post, September 20, 1955, Squatty Lyons Papers, 1955, 
Harris County Archives. 
 86 
coming to the rescue for flood control and highways soon, taxpayers were not supporting 
local efforts that had been taken for granted since the end of the war.175 
The flood control committee then discussed how to build support for the bond 
referendum scheduled for the July Democratic primary. They were asking voters to 
approve even more money this time than they had the previous year. Total bonds would 
be $23.5 million; $15 million for freeway rights-of-way, $7.5 million for flood control 
projects, and that was contingent on getting the 1940 loans paid back by the federal 
government. The flood control committee decided that the best framing to sell flood 
control to voters would be that it was “the most affordable form of flood insurance.”  
Meanwhile, the chamber of commerce’s highway committee, needing to win a 
much harder two-thirds majority on their proposition for the referendum, hired an 
advertising firm to gain support for the highway bonds. The campaign would include 
billboards at particularly famous traffic bottle-necks, 15-minute television “programs,” 
and newspaper ads. The advertising campaign would cost $7,000. The flood control 
committee, not to be outdone, decided to raise $1,500 for their own newspaper campaign 
“with pictures – drainage as well as flood control should be stressed.” The Houston Post 
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and Chronicle dutifully wrote editorials in support of the bonds, again reminding the 
city’s influx of new residents how bad the area had flooded in the past. “There are several 
hundred thousand people in Harris County who were not here during the great flood of 
1935, and many others who were not here during the lesser floods of 1945 and 1949,” the 
Post’s editorial read. “They were not pleasant.”176   
But all the bond propositions were rejected in the July Democratic primary vote. 
It was another major failure for the county commissioners and their allies at the chamber 
of commerce. “A jolting setback,” the Chronicle wrote. “The urban freeway system must 
be completed or Metropolitan Houston will strangle in its own traffic.” The Post declared 
that Houston’s legacy as Texas’ center of commerce was now at stake. “This is a crisis in 
the progress of the Houston area,” the Post wrote. “It must be recognized as such, and 
met.”   
Part of the problem was that that summer southeast Texas was experiencing a 
severe drought – one of the worst since the early 1930s. This kind of cycle – flooding 
followed by drought – was much more acute in South Florida, and the political tension 
between flood control and water supply was much more pronounced in both Miami and 
Tampa than in Houston. In the 1950s, traffic seemed to be getting worse every day, but 
flooding was not a big concern for many residents of Houston’s suburbs. It had been 
seven years since the last major flood. People living in new areas developed near the 
water retention areas behind Addicks and Barker dams had never seen the reservoirs 
holding any water. The newspapers published maps of the incomplete flood control 
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system, trying to remind readers of the system that was protecting them, but the county 
and chamber of commerce decided to put all its resources behind a campaign for freeway 
bonds, scheduled for the next vote in September that year.  
 
Figure 2.11 Map of Houston's flood control system published before bond referendum. Houston Post, 1956. 
Squatty Lyons Papers, Harris County Archives. 
The campaign was highly visible and well-covered. It became a referendum on 
the effectiveness of both political and business leadership in Houston. On this third 
attempt, with a national program for generously financing highways in the news, all the 
bond propositions finally passed. The freeway bonds were approved by voters 
overwhelmingly, at a majority of 4 in favor to 1 against. Houston would have its 
freeways, and it would have its main bayous lined in concrete, and for the next decade 
there would be widespread support for this form of suburban development and drainage.  
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Figure 2.12 Freeway bond campaign coverage, 1956. Squatty Lyons Papers, Harris County Archives 
Chapter summary  
Over a twenty-year period, Houston recovered from catastrophic urban flooding 
and saw significant flood control projects started after four years of debate and delays. 
These projects were never to be completed as designed. But Houston’s value to the war 
effort – its munitions depot, shipbuilding, and petrochemical complex – all helped justify 
the rapid completion of Barker and Addicks dams. 
Twenty years changed Houston from a fairly compact city surrounded by rural 
land to a sprawling center for the oil and gas industry. In 1948, the flood control projects 
were only 25 percent complete, but county leaders, who had always worried about their 
ability to secure funds for local contributions to the federal projects, decided the original 
plan was far too expensive to see truly finished. Instead, business leaders and county 
officials supported the Corps’ restudy of the Buffalo Bayou project which would weigh 
the high costs of suburban land against the need to provide some flood protection to those 
new suburbs.  
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A new plan took shape in the 1950s: comprehensive flood control in the form of 
improved drainage instead of canals, levees, and additional dams. At first, it was easy to 
raise funds through bond elections to pay for the local pieces of these suburban drainage 
projects. Flood control was often on the same ballot as local freeway development and 
improving the Port of Houston. But by the late 1950s, it took persistent campaigning to 
continue funding the local projects to straighten and line the bayous with sod and 
concrete. Although funding did eventually come through, these stalled channelization 
efforts would also come to a halt in the late 1960s, this time in large part due to equally 




CHAPTER 3  
KEEPING THE SUBURBS DRY AND WATERED:  




Miami – a landscape like no other 
 South Florida is a landscape where all fresh water is channeled, collected, and 
metered by a massive system of civil works infrastructure developed by the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers in the 1950s. The power of all those levees, canals, and pumping 
stations to transform the beautiful and subtle Everglades ecosystem has been the subject 
of highly critical scholarship.177 Michael Grunwald’s epic narrative The Swamp: The 
Everglades, Florida, and the Politics of Paradise (2007) delves into the decline of the 
Everglades from a wilderness frontier to a compartmentalized, degraded preserve at 
midcentury, to the current multibillion-dollar federal program to restore the Everglades 
National Park and surrounding wilderness preserves back to something approaching their 
former wild state. Grunwald argues that after the floods of 1947, the Central and 
Southern Florida (C&SF) flood control projects “set the stage for south Florida’s 
spectacular postwar development,” but this development came at a huge cost. “Half the 
Everglades is gone. The other half is an ecological mess,” he writes.178 Grunwald 
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squarely blames the Corps of Engineers – “the ground troops in America’s war against 
nature” – for this environmental disaster. He harshly frames the Corps of Engineers as 
arrogant in its desire to control entire watersheds over thousands of square miles and as 
dismissive of the ecological consequences of its projects. He argues the Corps can never 
restore the Everglades because it has not changed the kind of domineering thinking that 
destroyed the ecosystem in the first place. “The agency is still unrestrained and 
unreformed,” Grunwald writes.179  
In response to these kinds of sweeping critiques the Jacksonville District of the 
Corps of Engineers worked with an external research firm to write an institutional history 
of the Everglades projects. In River of Interests (2012), Godfrey and Catton argue that the 
Corps has always been trying to balance the competing interests of developers, civic 
boosters, farmers, conservationists, and others. Some of those interests were more vocal, 
and more politically effective, than others at different points in time. “For many years, 
the people of South Florida generally regarded flood control and water supply as more 
important than fish and wildlife issues,” the authors argue, “and in the eyes of many 
observers, the Corps’ C&SF Project accordingly shunted ecological concerns aside.”180   
Mistakes were made often out of “innocent ignorance” of how profound the ecological 
impacts of water control could be. Those impacts can best be seen as unintended 
consequences of large-scale, governmental action to address the most salient public 
concerns of the time.    
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This chapter focuses on the floods of 1947 and the C&SF flood control projects 
that followed, and it leans heavily on previous scholarship. While the ecological drama of 
the Everglades cannot be ignored, my goal for this comparative project is to understand 
how flood control affected the development of the Miami-Fort Lauderdale-West Palm 
Beach megaregion. Flood control allowed for a particular kind of affordable, low-density 
suburban development in South Florida that would not have been possible, in that form, 
without major federal works. The C&SF project was successful in creating large areas of 
reliably dry land that could be rapidly developed into affordable postwar housing. This 
federal and state investment made Florida living accessible to millions of former 
servicemen, their families, and retirees. As the southeast coast of Florida was transformed 
into a sprawling megacity, which by 1980 stretched for a hundred miles across three 
counties, supplying enough clean, fresh water was a constant problem. Flood control in 
South Florida caused perennial water crises because it both changed the natural water 
cycle and created the territory for new development.  
Focusing on the Miami metropolitan area allows me to make comparisons with 
the case of flood control in Houston a decade earlier and Tampa a decade later. In a few 
critical ways Miami is an outlier. In contrast to Houston and Tampa, there is no 
significant industrial base in Miami. Its economy has always been service-oriented: 
tourism, real estate, banking, and logistics. As an article in Esquire magazine articulated 
during some of the city’s hardest years, “Miami doesn’t produce much. It processes 
things – money, information, hopes, dreams.”181 Its early success was because of its 
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warm and beautiful location – not because of any geographic or strategic advantage. 
Miami represents by far the largest civil works project of the three cities, with significant 
construction still in progress today on Everglades restoration.  
While the Corps of Engineers’ projects in Houston were run out of the Galveston 
District, of the Southwestern Division headquartered in Dallas, both Miami’s and 
Tampa’s projects were run by the Jacksonville District, with headquarters of the South 
Atlantic Division in Atlanta. There were significant bureaucratic barriers for lessons 
learned about flood control to cross the Gulf of Mexico and impact plans for South 
Florida. But I argue that while Houston may not have been a precedent for Miami, there 
are more similarities between civil works in southeast Florida and Texas than comparing 
those projects with the long history of flood control in the area around New Orleans.  
After World War Two, both Miami and Houston were challenged by suburban 
development and the inadequate legacy of past flood control projects. Where Houston ran 
into financial limits, the fate of Miami became tied to the destiny of greater South 
Florida, and that state-level political support opened up possibilities for transformative 
infrastructure that were quickly dismissed as too expensive on the coast of Texas. 
Miami’s postwar projects also show how the priorities of Florida politicians changed over 
time from emphasizing flood control and development to protecting natural resources.   
How the South Florida landscape constrained development before 1947  
In the subtropical landscape of southeast Florida, land and water come together in 
dramatic ways that attracted millions of visitors and new residents throughout the 
twentieth century. The southern tip of the Florida peninsula is so flat and low-lying that 
only a few feet of elevation make the difference between wet and dry. Miami itself is a 
city surrounded by water. The site where Henry Flagler’s Florida East Coast Railroad 
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first started developing a resort town in 1895 was on the high ground of the coastal ridge 
at the mouth of the small Miami River.182 To the east of this ridge were the shallow 
waters of Biscayne Bay. A string of long, narrow barrier islands on the far side of the bay 
offered some protection from Atlantic storms for Flagler’s hotel and growing town. 
Starting just before World War One, the development of Miami Beach on one of those 
barrier islands transformed the mangroves and dunes to create a vacation destination 
directly on the Atlantic Ocean.  
Immediately to the west of the coastal ridge and the town of Miami were the vast 
wetlands of the original Florida Everglades. This diverse ecosystem covered almost the 
entire southern end of the peninsula. During the rainy season water from Lake 
Okeechobee, ninety miles to the northwest of Miami, pooled, spilled over, and then 
slowly flowed through ponds, hammocks, sawgrass marshes and sloughs to the Bay of 
Florida and the Gulf of Mexico.183 The water in Lake Okeechobee was often only 12 feet 
above sea level. The journey across South Florida to a sea level was a slow, sheet-flow of 
water over a period of months, a process conservation journalist Marjory Stoneman 
Douglas famously called “The River of Grass.”184 In dry parts of the year the water from 
Lake Okeechobee was only a trickle, and parts of the Everglades occasionally burned.   
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Figure 3.1 Road map of South Florida showing extent of Everglades and early drainage canals, c. 1927. 
Florida Memory, State Library and Archives of Florida.  
For any large and lasting human settlement beyond the barrier islands and coastal 
ridge, the seasonally flooded landscape of the Everglades had to be drastically altered. As 
Miami Herald reporter Jeanne Bellamy wrote in 1948 in a series of articles meant to 
educate the public about flood control, “Without water control, Everglades land could not 
be farmed, and the cities of Florida’s East Coast would be confined forever to the limits 
of the ridge on which they started.”185  
After many grandiose and failed attempts to completely drain the vast swamp in 
the  nineteenth century so farmers could make use of the rich peat soils below the 
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marshes, the state of Florida created the Everglades Drainage District in 1905.186 The 
drainage district had the power to raise taxes on landowners and use those funds to dig 
canals and build dikes that would reclaim year-round areas of dry land upstream. The 
canals would also help to at least partially control floods. But farmers in the Everglades 
still faced huge challenges including subsiding muck soils, lack of nutrients, and peat 
fires during droughts.187 Although reclamation did not bring the large number of settlers 
that developers had hoped for, and the drainage district never could pay its debts to the 
state, the canals and dikes were responsible for making more land available for farming 
south of Lake Okeechobee and attracting a small population to that midsection of the 
peninsula to work in agriculture.188 Many smaller, drainage sub-districts in Dade County 
also raised funds, more or less successfully, to reclaim land from the wetlands directly to 
the west of Miami’s original downtown area.189 The drainage districts financed ditches, 
dikes, and pumping stations to contain and channel water away from areas to be 
developed into farms and planned resort communities. By the early 1920s over $17 
million had been spent by the state and the local drainage districts on canals and locks.190 
After the First World War Florida first became famous for selling the dream of 
planned communities in the sun.191 The heavily promoted new towns of Coral Gables, 
                                               
186 Gail Clement, “Everglades Drainage in Earnest (1900 - 1919),” Everglades Digital Library, Florida 
International University, accessed January 20, 2016, 
http://everglades.fiu.edu/reclaim/timeline/timeline6.htm.   
187 Davis and Ogden, Everglades: The Ecosystem and Its Restoration, 330. 
188 Grunwald, The Swamp, 185. 
189 Paul S. George, “History of Miami,” HistoryMiami, accessed January 20, 2016, 
http://www.historymiami.org/research-miami/topics/history-of-miami/.   
190 “Publicity Piece - ‘Florida’s Aladdin Touch’” (Christian Science Monitor, December 20, 1948), 
Jeanne Bellamy Water Resources Collection, HistoryMiami.   
191 Paul S. George, “Brokers, Binders, and Builders: Greater Miami’s Boom of the Mid-1920s,” The 
Florida Historical Quarterly, 1986, 27–51.   
 98 
Hollywood, and Boca Raton were all designed to attract wealthy northern investors 
during this period. Miami quadrupled its population from a small town with less than 
9,000 people in 1910 to a small city with more than 36,000 permanent residents in 1920. 
The state’s population as a whole grew by 30 percent in five years to 1.2 million people. 
Two major hurricanes struck Miami and other cities along the newly imagined “Gold 
Coast” in 1926 and 1928 and marked the end of the first Florida land boom. High winds 
damaged most of the hotels on Miami Beach and new offices in downtown Miami, which 
was slowly becoming more than just a winter resort.192 Storm surge forced the hulks of 
schooners out of their moorings on Biscayne Bay and slung them onto Bayfront Park. 
Flooding, however, was not a major impact of the storm. Concern about future hurricanes 
was also not a big part of the storm’s aftermath. Environmental historian Ted Steinberg 
notes that the Miami Herald was so focused on local boosterism and development that its 
coverage of the 1926 storm vastly underplayed the damage to the city.193  
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Figure 3.2 Ships stranded in Bayfront Park after 1926 Miami Hurricane. Florida Memory, State Library 
and Archives of Florida.  
  
The Great Miami Hurricane (1926), followed soon after by the Okeechobee 
Hurricane (1928), which killed around 2,500 people around the lake, followed by the 
Great Depression, combined with the financial troubles of the local drainage districts, 
created a long hiatus in the development of new suburbs in the Everglades. It was only 
the start of the Second World War that began to reinvigorate the Miami area. During the 
war years, the small Port of Miami was taken over entirely by the U.S. Navy for use 
primarily as a training center for submarine chasers. South Florida also presented 
excellent year-round training conditions for naval aviators, and several naval air stations 
were commissioned from existing commercial airport facilities in the area. Most of the 
hotels on Miami Beach were taken over by the army and turned into personnel 
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housing.194 Wartime training in Miami gave thousands of servicemen their first 
experience of Florida recreation and sunny winter weather. After the war many would 
return to vacation and buy homes.  
Developers were waiting for them. Suburbs that had been planned in the land 
boom of the 1920s suddenly became real towns. Miami Springs, for example, had less 
than 100 residents in 1940. In 1950 there were more than 5,000. With an influx of 
veterans and their families, the small town of North Miami became one of the fastest 
growing in the country, with its population increasing by nearly 500 percent, from less 
than 2,000 in 1940 to more than 10,000 in 1950. North Miami became a city in 1953 and 
opened its first high school the next year. Further up the coast, Hollywood and Fort 
Lauderdale doubled their populations over the decade. 
A Comprehensive, federal response to the floods of 1947 
The war years in South Florida were mostly dry and free from major storms. A 
hurricane and subsequent fire did lead to the destruction of massive airship hangers at the 
Richmond Naval Air Station near Homestead, but water shortages were more a concern 
than flooding.195 Then, suddenly, in the spring of 1947, after several years of severe 
drought, the water cycle changed dramatically in South Florida. That year the southern 
end of the peninsula would get almost twice its average annual rainfall. Miami alone 
would get 102 inches of rain. In June and July a series of tropical storms began dumping 
large amounts of rainfall into the Lake Okeechobee watershed. The Everglades became 
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saturated. Then in mid-September and early October two hurricanes brought even more 
rain to the region. Fifteen inches of rain fell in Fort Lauderdale over a one-day period 
causing widespread flooding downtown.196 The surface of Lake Okeechobee reached its 
highest recorded level – nearly 19 feet above sea level. Nearby drainage ditches and dikes 
were completely overwhelmed with overflowing water, and farmers fought to save their 
fields as drainage district officials sought to protect towns such as Belle Glade and Canal 
Point.197 
 
Figure 3.3 Flooding on Hammond Drive in Miami Springs, September, 1947. Martha Pierson on PBase. 
http://www.pbase.com/donboyd/image/80755884 
Just the year before Houston’s new suburbs had seen a similar kind of flooding 
along Brays Bayou, but it had been more localized, thanks to the federal flood control 
projects completed during the war. In South Florida, the local, land boom-era drainage 
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systems were entirely inadequate. West of Miami the drainage canals were at capacity, 
and water overflowed from the marshes of the Everglades and inundated newly sprawling 
subdivisions with affordable homes for returning servicemen. Access to Miami Springs 
and parts of Hialeah were completely cutoff, with thousands of residents stranded. 
Florida’s National Guard was activated to provide relief. Three-quarters of Dade County 
was under standing water which did not recede for several days.198  
 
Figure 3.4 Weeping Cow book. 1947. South Florida Water Management District 
Total damages from the flood of 1947 were estimated at between $60 and $90 
million, and annual flooding in the region at more than $11 million.199 Local 
governments and boosters clamored for greater flood protection than the state could 
provide on its own without delay. As the editor of the Palm Beach Post sensationalized, 
“Men sweat and strain and fight to erect dikes against the wash….Lake Worth, Boynton, 
Delray, Boca Raton, Fort Lauderdale and Miami are flooded past recollection of man to 
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compare. Disease breeds in floods. It is no time for politics, it is a time for remedies, if 
necessary, for drastic remedies.”200 Unable to provide any solutions for future storms, the 
beleaguered Everglades Drainage District turned to campaigning for outside intervention. 
It sent out a “tentative report on flood damage” with a dramatic drawing on the cover of a 
weeping cow, barely keeping its head above the water, surrounded by flooded Everglades 
farms. The thin book showed aerials of flooded orange groves and subdivisions in 
Hialeah, flooded roads and fields south of Lake Okeechobee, and dead cows in fields in 
Palm Beach County.201 The “Weeping Cow” book, in very much the same role as “Wild 
River” pamphlet in the case of Houston, helped make the case that the damage was too 
profound for local authorities to handle. It was the beginning of a campaign to bring in 
federal money for a more lasting fix to South Florida’s water problems.  
The idea of comprehensive flood control for South Florida, instead of local 
drainage efforts, was not new. There was already one major federal flood control project 
on Lake Okeechobee. The Great Hurricane of 1928 churned up storm surge on the lake, 
overwhelming the small dike built by the Everglades Drainage District and causing 
massive flooding in the surrounding towns and farmlands.  The surge contributed to the 
second largest death-toll from a U.S. hurricane after the Galveston storm of 1900. In 
1932 the Corps of Engineers began work on a longer and taller levee to hold back Lake 
Okeechobee from overflowing in future storms. The Hoover Dike, completed in 1938, 
was over thirty feet high and wrapped around the southern edge of the lake for nearly 70 
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miles.202 By the end of World War Two the costs of building and maintaining this 
defense around Lake Okeechobee had added up to more than $25 million – surpassing all 
previous drainage and flood control costs in South Florida.203 
Because of this massive structure the lake remained safely in its basin during the 
storms of 1947. But the suburban areas that had been recently developed closer to Miami, 
on top of the former Everglades wetlands, did not have enough drainage to prevent 
several feet of water from sloshing around the driveways of new GI homes for weeks. In 
the farms around lake Okeechobee the drainage was even worse, and the floodwaters 
covered fields for months. The 1947 floods threatened both the remaining agricultural 
areas and the rapid postwar development of the southeast coast. 
Starting in 1949, and continuing for the next decade, South Florida would quietly 
become the site of the second most extensive flood control projects in the U.S. after the 
Mississippi Delta. The Central and Southern Florida (C&SF) Flood Control Project 
would manage water flows over 15,000 square miles of the lower peninsula, or one 
quarter of the entire state. In the first half of the twentieth century, the scope of federal 
flood control had been steadily expanding its mission in different regions of the country. 
For decades flood control on the Mississippi had been an expensive and controversial 
federal project.204 Army Engineers had controlled the Sacramento River in California 
from seasonally inundating the state capital. Large dams generated power in the 
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Tennessee Valley and along the Colorado River. In fact, the number of smaller dams 
planned around the country during this period would reach into the hundreds, thanks to 
dedicated federal funding.205 Meanwhile, the federal flood control system on Houston’s 
bayous was nearing completion. 
In contrast to earlier federal flood control projects in the southeast region, there 
were almost no benefits of the C&SF Projects in postwar Florida to navigation.206 The 
mission of the Corps of Engineers had been expanded after the Rivers and Harbors Act of 
1936 to include flood control on waterways for the benefit of settlements and 
infrastructure. The 1936 act allowed for the calculation of economic benefits to justify 
flood control projects to include potential development in the region. For the postwar 
projects in South Florida the primary justification in terms of local benefits was 
“increased land use.”207 In 1948 the vast majority of lands to be protected from flooding 
were slated to be developed for agriculture. Urban and suburban areas, however, would 
expand rapidly during the early project phases and challenge the Corps of Engineers’ 
initial expectations. Proponents of flood control estimated that there would annually be 
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over $24 million in direct benefits along with $45 million from increased federal tax 
revenues as lands protected from flood control were developed.208  
The C&SF flood control projects aimed to comprehensively and permanently 
transform the way water moved throughout the entire region. The Corps of Engineers’ 
plan recognized that “flood protection, drainage, and water control were all interrelated 
problems in South Florida.”209 The scale of this management of the entire Lake 
Okeechobee and Everglades watershed was what distinguished the C&SF projects from 
all earlier flood control efforts in the area. The Corps of Engineers’ plan was to build a 
series of levees and canals separating “dry” areas for development along the East Coast 
from large, shallow lakes designated as “water conservation areas” to the west. Diesel-
powered pumping stations and hydraulic control structures located on the south side of 
Lake Okeechobee and along four main drainage canals would maintain water levels in 
the water conservation areas.210 The water conservation areas could supply water to cities 
and farms during droughts and hold excess water during floods.211 The very southern tip 
of the Everglades in a new Everglades National Park (dedicated in 1947 by President 
Truman during the winter before the floods) would be left in its “natural state”.212 There 
                                               
208 Matthews, “Letter to Jeanne Bellamy.”   
209 Godfrey and Catton, River of Interests, 25. 
210 Although most of the pumping stations were diesel powered, increasing demands for electrical 
power were part of the C&SF Project, and even more importantly, the development of South Florida. 
This is another demonstration of how the timing, at least, of flood control and rapid development were 
concurrent. One of the earliest plants in the region, at Dania near Fort Lauderdale, was built by Florida 
Power and Light in 1928 and was diesel powered. In the early 1960s, FPL built new, much larger oil-
fired plants at Port Everglades and Riviera Beach (to serve the West Palm Beach area). As Dade 
County continued to expand to the south, and there were aborted plans to attract defense industries to 
the Everglades, the Turkey Point nuclear facility on Biscayne Bay was started in 1967.  
211 Godfrey and Catton, River of Interests, 26. 
212 Bellamy, “Taming the Everglades.”   
 107 
was no specification for how much water the new park would need in order to maintain 
that natural state.213 
 
Figure 3.5 C&SF Plan, 1953. Records of the Jacksonville District, US Army Corps of Engineers, National 
Archives at Atlanta.  
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Under the Flood Control Act of 1948 Congress first appropriated more than 
$200,000 for the Corps of Engineers to begin surveying for flood control projects 
designed to protect the coastal cities and the agricultural areas near Lake Okeechobee. 
Lieutenant General Raymond A. Wheeler, who had been appointed the Army’s Chief of 
Engineers in late 1945 after exceptional service in World War Two, had to walk a fine 
line in arguing for more flood control infrastructure without making it seem like previous 
federal projects in the region had failed. In the official 1948 report to Congress on flood 
control in central and southern Florida, General Wheeler’s summary acknowledged that 
dikes and canals built by the Corps of Engineers were already in place on the south shore 
of Lake Okeechobee. That infrastructure had been designed to prevent true “disasters” – 
ones like the spillover deluge of 1928 – but the persistent problem of “too much water” in 
South Florida had not yet been solved.214 Thanks to the Hoover Dike and canals, instead 
of a devastating flash flood, waters from the 1947 storm had taken months to slowly drain 
through the Everglades, and minor flooding events remained frequent in the region.  
The recurrent problem of “Too Much Water” in the summer had its seasonal 
opposite in droughts, and infrastructure for flood control was also designed to mitigate 
water shortages. The recurrent problem of “too little water” was an equal justification for 
another round of flood control projects in South Florida. “During the dry years from 1943 
to 1946, cattle died in the pastures of the Kissimmee Valley for lack of water,” General 
Wheeler reported. “Smoke from burning muck lands of the Everglades darkened the 
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coastal cities; and salt water moved inland along drainage canals and through the 
underlying rock as the supply of fresh water diminished.” 
Wheeler’s report declared that the new comprehensive flood control projects 
would stabilize the natural cycles that made life in South Florida unpredictable for new 
residents and longtime farmers. The civil works projects would allow fresh water to be 
retained for use during dry spells but also quickly diverted after heavy storms. As 
Colonel Mason Young, the Southeastern Division Engineer in Atlanta, wrote to the 
congressional Committee on Public Works, “If the coastal and Everglades sections of 
south Florida are to continue to prosper and develop, conservation of their water 
resources is as important and urgent as is provision of additional drainage and elimination 
of flood damage.”215  
The fact that such massive transformations of the natural water cycle could cause 
ecological tradeoffs was recognized by other government agencies reviewing the Corps’ 
1949 report.216 To protect these resources, the Corps initially proposed releasing some of 
the water stored in retention areas for the benefit of the new Everglades National Park, 
especially during droughts. But these allotments of water for the national park did not end 
up being prioritized as the C&SF Projects became a reality, especially when demands for 
agricultural and drinking water competed with the needs of the remaining Everglades 
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ecosystem.217 As Godfrey and Catton point out, the fear of a repeat of the 1947 floods 
overshadowed all other priorities such as protecting fisheries, wildlife, and landscapes in 
South Florida. There were too many people invested in the expansion of Miami’s 
suburbs. “The looming fear of flooding felt by most Floridians steamrolled these 
concerns,” they write, “and created a groundswell of support for the project that Congress 
could not ignore.”218  
The politics of raising local contributions to the federal projects 
The process of advocating for federal flood control in South Florida went 
remarkably smoothly compared to earlier controversies in other states. Following the 
devastating floods of 1927, states in the Lower Mississippi River Valley had squabbled 
over federal compensation for disaster relief and new floodways.219 In the late 1930s in 
Houston, local opposition to approving bonds for flood control had been significant, and 
the federal role in funding was still being defined. In contrast, Florida’s business leaders, 
elected officials, and civic groups showed remarkable unity in making the case for a 
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transformational project. It was as if the coast of South Florida was the key to a postwar 
destiny for the entire state.  
Up until that point, the interests of increasingly suburban South Florida seemed to 
diverge from the rest of the state’s rural counties. State legislators from northern counties 
had controlled state politics through the “The Pork Chop Gang” for decades. In the post-
Reconstruction era state constitution, representation in the state assembly was equal by 
county, regardless of population. As the population and economic importance of South 
Florida had grown, its representatives had to continually cater to the rural-serving, 
socially conservative agenda of Tallahassee. Yet, when it came to fixing South Florida’s 
water problems, in contrast to the controversy in the case of Houston a decade earlier, 
there was the little question of why the whole state of Florida should raise funds for 
projects that would only benefit some of the southernmost counties.  
 This concerted effort by local and state officials, newspapers, and chambers of 
commerce was also due to the remaining threat of flooding in the near future, as the 
following spring of 1948 was again unusually rainy.220 Anticipating federal support, 
county commissioners and local chamber of commerce in Palm Beach, Broward, and 
Dade counties hurried to raise funds so the Corps of Engineers could begin their initial 
studies for the C&SF Project. The army’s deputy chief for flood control, Colonel Hebert 
Gee, noted that it was a “record” for the Corps of Engineers to move from a survey after 
a flood to an authorized project in just a year.221 That summer state legislators also moved 
to condemn and replace the old Everglades and Okeechobee Drainage Districts with a 
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new flood control district that could work with the federal projects across the entire 
region.222 A local institution for regional flood control was a reality just one year after the 
disaster. This same process of creating an overarching flood control district and 
dismantling local drainage districts had taken four years in the case of Houston’s floods.  
As they made their case for funding in Congress that summer and fall, Florida’s 
elected officials made sure to appear united around the need for flood control that they 
deemed essential for the state’s continued development. This show of support was to 
convince Congress, but it was even more important to convince state representatives to 
put up the local contributions. In November 1948 the governor-elect, Fuller Warren, who 
had run as a progressive conservationist, addressed the State Chamber of Commerce 
declaring, “We have no choice, we have no alternative. Flood control involves the 
survival of this State.”223 Spessard Holland, a former Governor and now the state’s junior 
senator, called for unity at the same meeting. “…the minute we split up, either in our 
delegation or back at home in our support of this project, that very minute we give up any 
hope to getting continued Federal support.”  
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Figure 3.6 L-R: Gov. Warren, Chamber of Commerce President Walter Hays, Senator Spessard Holland 
and Senator Claude Pepper. c. 1949. Florida Memory, State Library and Archives of Florida.  
“Splitting up” would mean cities and farmers losing sight of the big picture and 
advocating for different solutions. Rural areas near the lake were sure to benefit, but the 
interests of the urban coast could also be served by the same projects. Senator Holland 
went on to point out that the flood control could provide a better solution to intractable, 
local problems such as maintaining supplies of fresh water to the city of Miami. Local 
water utilities were not usually a federal concern, but in the case of South Florida federal 
intervention might protect Miami’s groundwater for years to come. “The infiltration of 
salt water from the Atlantic has presented a tremendously grave problem in dollars and 
cents, in terms of limitation of that area insofar as its ability to continue to grow and serve 
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are concerned,” Holland said. “Of course, that problem does not lie within the field of 
exclusive Federal operation or the exclusive bringing of Federal relief.”224  
At the same meeting, Florida’s senior senator, Claude Pepper, who had been a 
strong ally of Franklin Roosevelt during the New Deal, reminded attendees about just 
how important southeast Florida had become to the state’s economy. “There are a lot of 
things I want to see Florida have,” said Pepper, as he tried to justify the large costs of 
flood control to the state. The high value of coastal land and the attraction of tourism was 
the key to Florida’s postwar future. The influx of new residents was creating a burden on 
state resources, however. In addition to flood control, Florida desperately needed new 
schools and expanded facilities at state universities to handle demand from the GI Bill. 
“Our government is facing the burden of a tremendously growing state,” Pepper declared. 
“We have grown half a million since 1940.” The C&SF projects would affect “a fifth of 
the territory of this State, a third of our people, and half of our assessed value property,” 
Senator Pepper said. “Now if that is not a State project, what is? When do you get 
something that is of greater state significance than that?”  
To continue making the case for what was projected to be $37 million in local 
contributions, the State Chamber of Commerce worked with development boosters at 
local newspapers to get favorable coverage of the benefits of flood control.225 Miami 
Herald journalist Jeanne Bellamy wrote a series of widely read articles with the title 
“Taming the Everglades” to promote the flood control projects. She argued that a 
comprehensive, federally backed solution was absolutely necessary because piecemeal 
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efforts were bound to fail, as the state drainage districts had previously. “So vast and so 
flat is this region,” she wrote, “that trying to control the water in any small part, by itself, 
is about like trying to empty one side of a full soup bowl by spooning soup from that side 
to the other.”226  
Despite this kind of persistent advocacy, the biggest challenge was raising the 
local contributions in a state that, like Texas, was ideologically committed to low taxes 
and minimal bureaucratic regulation at the state level.227 The initial federal investment of 
$16 million to start work on the C&SF projects, authorized by Congress in July 1948, 
required a local contribution from the state of Florida of just $3.25 million.228 The 
Citizens Committee on Water Control was convened by outgoing Governor Millard 
Caldwell to come up with novel strategies to help raise the initial local contribution 
without raising state taxes.229 The citizens committee was also clearly focused on 
promoting the massive project across the state, especially in northern counties not 
directly affected by the 1947 floods. The state’s malproportioned legislature was a 
continual hurdle to overcome for unified fundraising efforts. The citizens committee was 
chaired by State Advertising Commissioner John D. Montgomery, and members included 
key newspaper editors, state representatives, judges, and business leaders. Because of her 
success in promoting flood control through the Miami Herald, reporter Jeanne Bellamy 
was asked to be secretary. 
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Fuller Warren, the incoming governor, addressed the first citizens committee 
meeting in Orlando in November 1948 and warned members against establishing any 
new state institution to raise funds. It was a somewhat ironic situation for the new 
governor. Warren had run with the backing of big business to improve the state’s schools 
and infrastructure. To raise the funds for these improvements, he pushed through the 
state’s first sales tax, overshadowing his next two years as governor.230 “I hope the 
committee won’t even entertain the idea that a special flood control district should be set 
up to bear the cost,” Warren said.231 After considering a variety of strategies – such as 
new gas taxes, legalizing gambling, issuing new state bonds, and raiding the state’s 
unemployment compensation fund – the leadership of the committee soon proposed just 
such a special flood control district as the only viable solution to raise local contributions 
in the long run.232  
Breaking with tradition that had taxed land owners in specific areas in proportion 
to the benefits they received from drainage projects, the new, regional flood control 
district would have the power to raise funds from ad valorem property taxes equally in all 
15 counties across South Florida. Its reach was far greater than Houston’s Flood Control 
District, which had been confined to a single county. In South Florida, raising funds 
through county ad valorem taxes was a clear benefit to the large Okeechobee-area 
farmers to shift the burden of financing flood control to the cities.233 The citizens 
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committee pointed out that future economic benefits, such as increasing land values, 
would rapidly recoup the state’s investment in flood control. For the boosters it was a 
capital investment in the state’s growth; an “insurance fund” against future disasters. For 
Florida’s local representatives it was time for their state’s own TVA. 
Meanwhile in Congress, Senator Holland “meticulously choreographed” a series 
of hearings to make the case for C&SF Project as essential for South Florida’s 
development and well worth the federal investment. Grunwald argues that Holland was a 
master of the emerging postwar, pork-barrel politics, and the design of the C&SF Project 
served many of his most committed special interests such as cattle ranchers in the 
Kissimmee Valley in central Florida.234 Yet Holland had been equally committed to 
Florida’s development when he had served as governor during World War Two – luring 
navy bases to the state, instituting gas taxes to build highways, and stabilizing funding for 
public education. Although some of the areas protected from floods might have included 
particular interests, such as central Florida ranchers and farmers, who had supported 
Holland’s political career, his determination to bring in major federal investments and 
improve infrastructure fit with the senator’s commitment to Florida’s modernization and 
growth in the manner of the New Deal in the South.  
In 1949, with congressional approval of the C&SF projects at hand, it fell to the 
Florida state legislature to secure the local contribution so that the Corps of Engineers’ 
construction work could start that year.235 Even more so than in the case of Houston, 
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there were multiple interests in South Florida that really needed a single representative: 
the boosters of the coastal cities, the farmers around Lake Okeechobee and south of 
Miami in Homestead, and even a few conservationists who were concerned about fish 
and wildlife. The 1949 legislature created the Central and Southern Florida Flood Control 
District (C&SF District) to coordinate, operate, and maintain all federal projects in the 
Okeechobee watershed.236 It was also empowered to raise funds for these operations. 
Unlike previous drainage and flood control districts in the region, the new C&SF 
District had the authority to maintain infrastructure specifically for water supply and 
flood control, and its jurisdiction covered a much larger area. Both the Everglades 
Drainage District and the Okeechobee Flood Control District were replaced by the 
regional C&SF District headquartered in West Palm Beach. It was a new institution 
governing water across 17 counties covering a territory of more than fifteen thousand 
square miles – twice the size of the State of New Jersey. It stretched from the Kissimmee 
River south of Orlando to the lower Florida Keys, and across the peninsula from the 
Atlantic to the Gulf of Mexico.  
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Figure 3.7 Topographic Projection of the C&SF District, 1959. Florida Memory, State Library and 
Archives of Florida.  
For their initial contribution the state appropriated more than $3 million, but the 
annual operating expenses for the C&SF District were to be raised through ad valorem 
taxes on real estate and personal property within the district’s borders. Most of the tax 
burden fell on the most intensively developed areas near the coast, and it fell especially 
hard on three cities: West Palm Beach, Fort Lauderdale, and Miami. Dade County alone, 
with its expensive vacation areas and growing suburbs, was paying for half of the flood 
control district’s costs.237 Despite this metropolitan burden of responsibility, the board of 
directors for the C&SF District was appointed by the governor, and most of them came 
from rural areas of the district. Nevertheless, the first structure to be built was a levee to 
separate suburban Miami from a water conservation area in the Everglades to the east.238 
The protection of the suburbs that had flooded three years before was still the first 
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priority. For later stages of the project’s construction, additional federal funds were to be 
appropriated in each year’s congressional budget, and Dade County planners were 
concerned that this uncertainty meant the C&SF Project would not be completed as 
initially planned, leaving parts of Miami without adequate protection from floods and 
fresh water supplies.  
Planning the next phase of the C&SF Project, 1952-1960  
Over the next decade the federal government would spend more than $49 million 
making sure South Florida would never flood again to the same extent as it did in the 
summer of 1947. By 1959, estimates for total costs to complete the project had ballooned 
to more than $300 million. In both estimated costs and planned regional scale these 
projects would be at least ten times greater than flood control in Houston. For its part, the 
state of Florida would pay slightly more than $9 million for actual construction. The state 
also paid nearly $13 million for acquiring rights of way and maintenance.239 Significant 
federal and state cost-sharing was an attribute of flood control in South Florida that set it 
apart from many New Deal-era projects in the West and the larger TVA projects in the 
Southeast.240 South Florida’s levees produced no electricity to sell and its water 
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conservation areas were not a public utility, but Miami and Fort Lauderdale did have land 
to develop, and property taxes would sustain flood control operations.   
In terms of South Florida’s postwar growth, regional flood control was extremely 
effective; developers added hundreds of square miles of new, low-density, single-family 
home suburbs to Miami, Fort Lauderdale, and West Palm Beach over the next thirty years 
in formerly flooded areas. The flood control projects were integral to this suburban 
pattern of development in the area – if not necessarily the powerful draw of people to the 
Sunshine State. A place in the sun attracted former service members who had 
experienced the beaches and climate during the war. The denser areas of the coastal 
cities, such as Miami Beach, had long attracted seniors from the Northeast, and after the 
war the entire region would be a draw for retirees from expanding demographics and 
areas of the country. Between the late 1940s and 1960, the combined population of the 
cities of southeastern Florida more than quadrupled from a little more than 320,000 to 1.3 
million people.241 “South Florida, overrun by young GIs as well as retirees – ‘the newly 
wed and the nearly dead’ – grew more than twice as fast as the rest of the state.”242 
Meanwhile, the physical transformations to the Lake Okeechobee watershed 
continued in the background, beyond the edge of the suburbs and the rapidly disappearing 
citrus groves and small farms of northern Dade County. By 1950 work had begun on a 
more than 100-mile-long levee along the East Coast to separate “dry areas” for 
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development from “wet areas” for flood control and water conservation.243 The water 
conservation areas were essentially large, permanently flooded reservoirs that were 
contained by levees and canals. During periods of abundant rainfall, pumping stations 
could refill the conservation areas from canals and drainage channels on the dry side of 
the levee. The water conservation areas could then act as reservoirs for agricultural uses, 
or more crucially, as high pressure caps to keep salt water from infiltrating the Biscayne 
Aquifer and ruining municipal wells.  
Everglades land devoted to water conservation was thus unusable, and the 
location and size of these areas had to be renegotiated several times. For example, the 
Florida Seminole Tribe governed reservation land and kept cattle on many of the wet 
prairies that were to be permanently flooded for water conservation. Other ranchers and 
farmers nearby wanted more land to be set aside for agriculture. Wildlife conservationists 
and sportsmen’s associations campaigned for the most northern Water Conservation Area 
#1, in Palm Beach County, to be managed as a wildlife refuge. All these factors resulted 
in the water conservation areas being significantly smaller than originally planned. The 
reduction in area meant that fresh surface water could not be used as extensively as a cap 
to prevent Atlantic salt water from getting into groundwater supplies. As the coastal cities 
grew, contamination and draining of the Biscayne Aquifer would lead to persistent 
concerns about fresh water supplies in South Florida.  
As the challenges of building the extensive network of canals, levees, and 
pumping stations became apparent, construction delays set in. Requests for congressional 
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appropriations increased. The project needed at least $5 million a year to stay on track, 
but in 1950 and 1951 it only got a fourth of that amount. By 1953 the estimated costs to 
fully complete the whole C&SF Project rose by 65 percent – from the $70 million that 
had been authorized in 1948 to over $116 million. First-term Senator George Smathers 
was particularly interested in reviewing the process of civil works authorizations and the 
delays in the C&SF Project.244 A report he requested claimed that the jump in the 
project’s costs was to blame partly on “price rises” but to a greater extent on “size 
increases in elements of the project.”245  
Even with the first phase still incomplete, a long series of levees ran for nearly 
100 miles down the east coast of Florida from the south end of Lake Okeechobee to near 
Homestead.246 The network of drainage canals had been extended so that water from the 
Everglades could be shunted rapidly into the Atlantic Ocean. The seasonal wetlands were 
now confined west of the coastal levee. Older Miami suburbs such as Hialeah and Coral 
Gables could expand westward towards the levee, and new suburbs such as Miramar, 
near Fort Lauderdale, and Boca Raton, south of Palm Beach, were planned for areas of 
former wetlands and scrub pines. New construction projects were required by county 
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ordinance to connect their drainage to the network of canals and to meet minimum 
ground-level requirements.247 Building sites were literally “built up” while the water was 
held back, diverted, and pumped away. When flood conditions returned again in the 
summer of 1953, these regulations and early protective works built for the C&SF Project 
kept the driveways of the new suburban bungalows dry. 
Meanwhile, the scope of flood control was expanding north of Lake Okeechobee 
and into the meandering valley of the Kissimmee River, south of Orlando. Agricultural 
interests in central Florida pushed to expedite a second phase of the C&SF Project that 
would control flooding in the Kissimmee River basin and also provide a steadier supply 
of water to the farms south of the lake. Not only would this second stage of the project 
control flooding in central Florida, it would also allow for Lake Okeechobee itself to be a 
reservoir for fresh water to meet increased agricultural and urban water usage. As Lamar 
Johnson, the chief engineer for the C&SF District, testified at a Corps of Engineers 
hearing that year on phase two of the project, “Partly because of the promise of the 
protection to result from the construction of the flood control project, land development 
and use have outstripped the progress of the construction program. Therefore, the need 
for Lake control today is greater than when the flood control project was authorized.”248 
The water levels in the conservation areas had to be maintained at precise levels. 
Too much water, and the risk of flooding was increased. Too little water, and agricultural 
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and urban water supply shortages would result.  This fragile balance made it hard to 
factor in the best water level for fish and wildlife as well. The Everglades National Park 
did not get enough water during dry years, and some rivers treasured by sportsmen, such 
as the St. Lucie River in Martin County, were flushed out with runoff in years with 
abundant water.249 The Corps of Engineers seemed to be prioritizing some interests over 
others as they brought the early phases of the C&SF Project to completion in the 1950s. 
Suburban flood control and water supply were above the interests of Everglades National 
Park and the new Loxahatchee Wildlife Refuge that had been established in the 
northernmost water conservation area.250 Meanwhile, salt water intrusion was an 
increasing concern as Dade County continued to grow rapidly in the 1950s and 
contributed an increasing percentage of the ad valorem taxes that maintained C&SF 
operations. Between 1949 and 1952, Dade County’s taxes added up to over $2 million, or 
67 percent of the C&SF District’s total assessed levies.251 For Dade County 
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representatives, the politics were clear: If Miami was going to be paying for the system, 
why were their municipal water supplies not the first priority?   
After repeated concerns from Florida’s representatives in Congress that the later 
phases of the C&SF project would not be completed because of inadequate 
appropriations, the Flood Control Act of 1954 authorized the entire C&SF budget. The 
uncertainty over annual congressional appropriations came to end, at least for the next 
decade. The estimate for local contributions rose to nearly $29 million, or 39 percent of 
the total.252   
In the 1950s, the unincorporated suburban areas of Dade County, such as Kendall, 
were growing rapidly. Small towns, such as Hialeah, were also booming. All this growth 
left behind the increasingly cash-strapped city of Miami itself. Dade County struggled to 
provide services across large areas that had been sparsely populated citrus groves before 
the war. City and county commissioners proposed a metropolitan form of government in 
the early 1950s. At the time, it was a novel solution to these demographic shifts and 
management challenges. Voters approved the new government structure in 1957.253 
“Miami-Dade” was the first city-county, cost-sharing metropolitan government in the 
country. Miami’s struggles with suburban fragmentation were not unique, as central-city 
business interests started to erode in the 1950s. Miami and Atlanta saw these 
demographic shifts outside of city borders, but other sunbelt cities such as Houston and 
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Phoenix annexed many surrounding areas, reinforcing the sprawling central city.254 
Miami-Dade County found a governing balance between these interests.255 After 1957, 
the metro government took over responsibility for building codes, water supplies, sewer 
and drainage, shoreline protection, and recreational facilities. 
Flood control was still a priority, but concerns about long-term fresh water 
supplies were starting to become most prominent. In 1958, Miami-Dade County’s Public 
Works Department released a report on “Water Control in South Florida” that sought to 
justify further work on the C&SF Project in Dade County in terms of benefits to the water 
supply.256 The report, written by Turner Wallis who had been the first chief engineer of 
the C&SF District, prioritized the “stabilization and insured future adequacy” of fresh 
water supplies as a justification for modifying the original C&SF designs.257 Wallis’ 
report for Miami-Dade County Public Works also noted that urban development was a 
particular benefit for Dade County that warranted a modification of the original Corps of 
Engineers’ plans.  
Suburbs and farms in the most low-lying, southern areas of Dade County needed 
more than just canals to avoid flooding. The original plans for the C&SF Project had just 
specified the levees along the east coast and two main drainage canals to protect this 
suburban area around Homestead that was still largely rural in 1948. But with the rapid 
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growth of the Miami area, and perhaps a growing confidence in the reality of flood 
control, new planned communities were cut out of the pines, orchards, and desiccated 
wetlands. By 1952, thousands of new, affordable concrete-block-on-concrete-slab homes, 
with screened-in Florida rooms and carports, were a reality in south Dade.258  
To protect the newly developed areas of south Dade, the Corps of Engineers 
developed a supplementary plan for the C&SF Project that included four large pumping 
stations to move excess water in suburban Dade County uphill, past the east coast levee, 
and into the water conservation areas. Turner Wallis accused the Corps of Engineers of 
being reluctant to actually approve this supplementary plan with its expensive pumping 
stations because that would substantially increase the costs of completing the C&SF 
Project. Instead the Corps of Engineers demanded new studies of drainage patterns and 
land usage before sending the supplementary plans to Congress for approval.  
The Waters of Destiny 
During this period, the Corps of Engineers and the C&SF District also sponsored 
a film promoting the flood control projects in South Florida. Comprised of documentary 
footage, and narrated in the supremely melodramatic, public service style of the late 
1950s, the film was titled Waters of Destiny.259 It was a turning point for the C&SF 
projects; a moment to capture the transformative changes underway in South Florida. In 
                                               
258 Allan Shulman and Jean-François Lejeune, “Florida Home: Modern Living, 1945-1965,” 
HistoryMiami, 2005, http://historymiamiarchives.org/online-
exhibits/florida_home/florida_home_essay.htm.   Interestingly, many of these homes did not have 
central air conditioning before 1960. Early 1950s modernist Florida ranch homes had to be cooled 
through ventilation, fans, and proper orientation towards prevailing breezes. Concrete-slab 
construction made them cheaper, but it removed the traditional method of cooling through raised 
wooden floors above a ventilated crawlspace. 
259 State Library and Archives of Florida, “Waters of Destiny,” Florida Memory, accessed September 
11, 2017, https://www.floridamemory.com/items/show/232410.   
 129 
Michael Grunwald’s view, Waters of Destiny conveyed the ultimate engineering hubris. 
It made a clear statement of man’s “mastery” over nature that ignored everything that 
made South Florida unique.260 But the film also captured many of the real sentiments of 
politicians and boosters who had pushed for such a large-scale response to the 1947 
floods. To a large extent this was the narrative Florida’s politicians had been trying to sell 
to the nation, and the 1950s was a moment when Florida’s spectacular growth seemed to 
fulfill what had been promised. 
Waters of Destiny was aptly named. It made the case that the C&SF projects were 
finally helping South Florida live up to its destiny as something more substantial than just 
a winter vacation destination. The film extolled the damages prevented by flood control, 
and then the narration turned to Florida’s 1950s boom. “When you get past the saving, 
think of the making,” it intoned. “The livestock industry for instance, growing even more 
fantastically since the project was started, is contributing considerably to the assets of the 
area. So is industry, by millions each year. More tourists have come, cities have grown, 
sport has been better than ever, families safer than ever.” 
Most importantly, the film called for the completion of the C&SF Project Plan as 
a way for Florida to fulfill its destiny to the nation as a whole:  
“Flood control must proceed, as fast as humanly possible so that everyone, not 
only in just this 15,000 square miles of land, but everyone, everywhere, can share in the 
rich results of man’s mastery of the elements. Then it shall be that water, once the fierce, 
uncompromising enemy of this long, wide, low-lying land, will become its greatest ally. 
The rains may come, but there will be no fear in them. They are the waters of Florida’s 
unfolding destiny, the bright promise of Florida’s glowing future.”  
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In the spring of 1960, the successful narrative of Waters of Destiny received its first test 
from the elements. Starting in March that year a series of major storms crossed the lower 
Florida peninsula. The potential for large-scale flooding was largely controlled, however, 
by the C&SF works already in place. Water conservation areas filled and canals shunted 
excess flood waters to the Atlantic and the Gulf. While there was some flooding in the 
rural areas of Palm Beach and Broward counties, the Corps of Engineers estimated that 
nearly $28 million in flood damages were prevented by the systems partially in place.261  
Total benefits, in terms of property damage prevented, between 1949 and 1961 
was more than $84 million. This was greater than all the money that had been spent on 
construction costs to that point.262 In the early 1960s, flood control was justified by the 
C&SF District as an unmitigated success: over the next fifty years it was projected to 
return four times the amount of benefits for the costs. As Waters of Destiny had 
proclaimed, “The work goes on, the drilling, the digging, the placing, the forming with 
the sure and complete knowledge that every dollar, every man hour of labor, will be 
repaid several times over.”  
Chapter summary 
Extensive suburban and rural flooding throughout South Florida could not have 
come at a better time than in the summer of 1947. Postwar growth was creating another 
housing boom in South Florida, and it was empowering major civil works projects around 
the country. And in contrast to Houston, Miami politicians and boosters were successful 
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in linking suburban flooding to the development of the state as a whole. Florida’s unique 
geography helped in this regard, since the same floodwaters that damaged crops around 
Lake Okeechobee also cutoff suburban homes in Dade County 80 miles away.  
The comprehensive flood control projects were rapidly studied by the Corps of 
Engineers and authorized by Congress practically overnight, compared to the usual pace 
of these deliberations. The state of Florida stepped through with initial funding. Despite 
delayed appropriations from Congress, planning and construction of the first levees and 
canals also proceeded quickly so that major impacts from floods in 1953 and again in 
1960 were largely prevented.  
During the 1950s, South Florida continued to boom, and the memory of flooding 
started to fade, while property taxes covered the costs of operating the extensive water 
management system out of sight. As in Houston, by the late 1960s, a strengthening 
environmental movement and budget cuts would stall the system’s completion. 
Meanwhile, in the nearby Tampa Bay area, those storms of 1960 would be far more 
damaging and would inspire another round of flood control projects on the Gulf Coast of 
Florida.   
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CHAPTER 4  





Compared to downtown Houston and suburban Miami, flood control in Tampa 
was a more rural, and far more controversial, project from the start. Flood control in 
Houston was a New Deal endeavor meant to protect a core city’s downtown and port. 
The massive postwar water management systems in South Florida permanently reclaimed 
large areas of the Everglades for suburban growth. In the 1960s the hills, rivers, and 
wetlands around Tampa were still mostly rural. Flood control was meant to primarily 
protect citrus farmers and cattle ranchers. In contrast to the flood control projects in 
Miami and Houston, Tampa represents a case where most of the infrastructure designed 
by the Corps of Engineers in the early 1960s was never completed. A critical overflow 
canal to protect the city of Tampa itself from flooding on the Hillsborough River was 
finished in 1981, and some smaller canals and a reservoir in rural areas of central Florida 
were also built, but ninety percent of the federal works were shelved in the 1970s.  
During that transformational decade both environmental concerns and budgetary 
constraints ultimately forced a change in strategy. Instead of relying on a structural 
system of canals and reservoirs, the Southwest Florida Water Management District 
(SWFWMD) acquired land in floodplains and regulated nearby development to 
successfully control flooding. Attempts by water managers to regulate access to fresh 
water supplies in a rapidly-changing region were less successful.  
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The case of unrealized flood control projects in Tampa also represents a starker 
version of what eventually happened in both Houston and Miami in the 1970s. In both of 
those cities environmental concerns and shrinking budgets halted the Corps of Engineers’ 
plans for more structures, such as concrete-lined bayous in the suburbs of Houston and 
more canals in the Everglades. As in Tampa, Harris County authorities chose to acquire 
land and create nature parks and recreation areas for “nonstructural” flood control in 
Houston. In Miami, the Corps of Engineers began to alter its mission dramatically from 
trying to control nature to restoring wetland ecosystems, and thus to protecting water 
quality and recreational resources in South Florida for the long run.  
The Landscape of the Tampa Bay Area 
Tampa Bay is Florida’s best natural, protected harbor on the Gulf Coast. In 
contrast to the flat topography of both Houston and Miami, there is hilly terrain within a 
few miles of the estuary shore. Native American and later Spanish exploration and 
colonization in the region dates back centuries, but permanent American settlement began 
in 1824 with the establishment of Fort Brooke at the mouth of the Hillsborough River.263 
With its municipal incorporation in the decade before the Civil War, Tampa is actually 
only slightly younger than Houston, and a much older city than Miami, but the federal 
flood control projects in the Tampa Bay area were started most recently.  
                                               
263 Canter Brown, Tampa before the Civil War, Tampa Bay History Center Reference Library Series, 
no. 8 (Tampa, FL: University of Tampa Press, 1999), 31. 
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Figure 4.1 Cummer Sons Cypress Company Engine 104 in the Green Swamp, 1939. Florida Memory. 
  
The Hillsborough River meanders south into Tampa Bay from a large, elevated 
area of wetlands called the Green Swamp on the central Florida plateau. Green Swamp 
was never drained and the area was only sparsely settled. Huge stands of cypress trees in 
the wetlands were logged extensively in the 1920s, and the surrounding area had a few 
citrus farms and cattle ranches. Green Swamp, located mostly in Polk County, is the 
headwaters of Southwest Florida’s four main rivers: the Hillsborough, Withlacoochee, 
Peace, and Ocklawaha. Crucially the swamp is also the main recharge area for the 
Floridan Aquifer which supplies fresh water to much of the region through a system of 
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wellfields. The Floridan Aquifer is the source of 60 percent of the entire state’s 
groundwater.264  
The last major hurricane to hit the Tampa area during the twentieth century 
occurred in 1921. It caused extensive damage to St. Petersburg’s waterfront, and it 
flooded expensive homes in Tampa’s wealthy Bayshore and Hyde Park neighborhoods 
along Hillsborough Bay. As with the 1926 Miami hurricane a few years later, however, 
the storm did not stop local developers and their allies from pursuing opportunities in the 
Great Florida Land Boom. They emphasized rapid rebuilding and downplayed future 
risks.265 The last hurricane of any size to come ashore in Tampa Bay was in 1946 and 
resulted in little damage. Neither the 1921 or 1946 storms inspired concerted efforts by 
local governments to secure protective infrastructure.  
Tampa’s protected location near the Caribbean and Latin America made it an 
important port in the early twentieth century. By the 1880’s Tampa had been connected 
by rail to Jacksonville, creating a shortcut across the Florida peninsula. The Port of 
Tampa was long a critical shipping center for Florida lumber and cattle to Cuba, and the 
discovery of phosphate in Southwest Florida made it also a key producer of fertilizer for 
the entire Caribbean.266 Meanwhile by the 1920’s Cuban immigrants to Tampa had 
developed the world’s largest cigar manufacturing center, and cigars became another 
                                               
264 Richard L. Marella, “Water Use in Florida, 2005 and Trends 1950–2005,” US Geological Survey, 
2008, https://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3080/. 
265 Eric Jarvis, “‘Secrecy Has No Excuse’: The Florida Land Boom, Tourism, and the 1926 Smallpox 
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266 Port Tampa Bay, “Location and History of Port Tampa Bay,” accessed June 2, 2016, 
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major Tampa export.267 Although the Great Depression was hard on the cigar industry, 
the Second World War reinvigorated the Tampa Bay area by bringing two large ship-
building facilities to the Port of Tampa and the construction of MacDill Airbase for the 
Army Air Force.268 Thousands of pilots and support personnel trained in Tampa during 
the war. After the war, a Central Florida commodity rapidly became a staple of American 
breakfasts: orange juice. In 1948, annual citrus production in Florida was more than half 
of the total in the United States, at nearly 100 million boxes. Production in Florida 
continued to outpace California and Texas, with more than 66 percent of the US total 
coming from Florida’s 550,000 acres of citrus groves by 1960.269  
Postwar growth greatly expanded cities on both sides of Tampa Bay, although not 
as dramatically as the growth of the Miami area during the same period. The city of 
Tampa’s population more than doubled between 1940 and 1960, to more than 250,000 
residents.270 Hillsborough County, on the east side of the Bay surrounding the city of 
Tampa, also doubled its population to almost 400,000. St. Petersburg tripled its size 
during the same period to around 180,000. The narrow peninsula of Pinellas County, 
sandwiched between the west side of Tampa Bay and the Gulf of Mexico, including the 
city of St. Petersburg, became the most densely populated county in Florida during the 
same period, quadrupling its total population to 375,000. As in Miami, many of the new 
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270 US Census Bureau, “Census of Population and Housing.”   
 137 
residents of Pinellas County were retirees from the North. New suburbs of Tampa such as 
Temple Terrace, which had been little more than an aspiration during the land boom of 
the 1920’s, became home to the new University of South Florida and nearly four 
thousand residents by 1960. Immediately north of Hillsborough county was the still-
mostly rural areas of Pasco and Hernando counties, home to large ranching operations 
and citrus groves.  
 
Figure 4.2 Map of Florida Counties with Tampa Bay Area inset, University of Florida Libraries 
The Floods of 1959 and 1960  
The suburbs of Tampa first experienced flooding in August, 1959. Forest Hills, 
near Temple Terrace, was another planned suburb of the 1920’s land boom that never 
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saw much home construction until the early 1950s.271 Its main feature was an aging golf 
course and country club surrounded by many local, spring-fed lakes. The summer of 
1959 had been unusually wet, even for Florida’s “rainy season”, and the Corps of 
Engineers had been evacuating water from Lake Okeechobee to prevent flooding in 
South Florida. After another series of large rainstorms passed through the Tampa Area, 
the water table was already high, and lakes which normally drained through limestone 
sinkholes into the aquifer below overflowed. In Forest Hills ninety homes flooded, and 
300 acres were underwater.272 The Red Cross setup shelters, and fears of a typhoid fever 
outbreak sparked a mass vaccination campaign.273  
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Figure 4.3 Corps of Engineers Flood survey in the Tampa suburb of Forest Hills, 1959. Records of the 
Jacksonville District, US Army Corps of Engineers, National Archives at Atlanta.  
The following year, flooding went from being a local emergency to a regional 
catastrophe. In March 1960 a series of spring storms inundated much of southwest 
Florida. The Gulf Coast and central region of the state received 27 inches of rain over 
four days. The US Army Corps of Engineers noted this was representative of the 40-year 
flood event in the region. Quiet, spring-fed rivers became raging torrents across much of 
Central Florida. The Hillsborough River brought floodwaters directly into the suburbs of 
Tampa. Water flowed in the front doors of new midcentury homes in Temple Terrace, 
and orange groves in rural areas of Hillsborough County were ruined.274 In the 
Everglades south of Lake Okeechobee, flooding from the same storms was even more 
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August 1960, Box 9, Accession No. 077-96-0017, RG 77, National Archives at Atlanta. 
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extensive, but the new Central and Southern Florida (C&SF) flood control projects 
largely kept the east coast cities dry.275  
Perhaps these storms alone would not have been enough to catalyze a push for 
regional flood control in the Tampa area, but they were followed by a powerful hurricane 
several months later. In September Hurricane Donna made landfall just south of Sarasota 
and crossed the state, drenching much of central Florida before eventually causing 
extensive damage along the mid-Atlantic coast. Donna did not come ashore in Tampa 
Bay itself, and Tampa and St. Petersburg were saved from coastal storm damage, but the 
hurricane led to another round of flooding on the rivers of central Florida. This second 
calamity in a six-month period forced disparate local interests from urban and rural areas 
finally to unite behind the need for a federal project like the one that had protected the 
Miami area in the previous decade.    
 
Figure 4.4 Flooding at Masaryktown, 1960. SWFWMD Water Matters Magazine, 2011 
  
                                               
275 Huser, Kirchhoff, and Nicholas, Into the Fifth Decade: The First Forty Years of the South Florida 
Water Management District, 1949-1989, 25. 
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Rural interests were the first drivers of the projects in Southwest Florida. Small 
farmers were wiped out by the repeated floods of 1960. The destruction of poultry farms 
in Masaryktown, a timy farming village forty miles north of Tampa, just on the edge of 
Hernando County, became the symbol for regional flood control. Masaryktown had been 
founded by Czech immigrants in the 1920s.276 The settlers had attempted to plant citrus 
groves, but frosts had killed their early crops. Most of the few hundred families gave up 
and moved elsewhere, but some stayed and started raising chickens. By the 1950s, the 
family-run poultry industry in Masaryktown was the largest in Florida, which was rapidly 
becoming a chicken-exporting state. Many retirees had also joined the aging original 
Czech settlers. Dale Twachtmann, who served as the second Executive Director of the 
Southwest Florida Water Management District (SWFWMD) from 1962 to 1972, recalled 
the damage to the poultry industry. “The District was formed as a result of Donna,” 
Twachtmann said. “It was a real crisis. In Masaryktown, people lost their homes and their 
businesses. Farmland was underwater. Tens of thousands of chickens drowned during the 
hurricane.”277 
Remarkably, it would be 25 years before another major hurricane would even 
threaten the Tampa Bay area. Instead, the region was next ravaged by a prolonged 
drought, which started in 1961 and lasted until late 1962, and water shortages became a 
more immediate context for infrastructure in the region. As was the case in Miami, flood 
control had to be intimately tied to securing fresh water supplies for agriculture and 
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growing cities. “People were asking me why we were spending all this money on flood 
control when their problem was a lack of rain,” said SWFWMD Director Twachtmann. 
“The problem at that time was drought, not flooding.”278  
There were few effective responses available to local authorities. County 
commissioners could not coordinate regulations on groundwater usage across the region. 
City-based utilities, especially booming St. Petersburg, focused on ensuring steady 
supplies to their growing number of users. Planners in Hillsborough and Pinellas counties 
did respond to the drought, however, by launching a major effort to understand land use, 
water supply, water usage, and future population growth in the Tampa Bay region as a 
whole. Planners were especially interested in learning more about the impacts of 
increased demand on groundwater levels. Much of this data had never before been 
compiled regionally when the aquifers seemed like a limitless resource.  
On the state level, the legislature created a fund to acquire land for “conservation 
and recreation.”279 Flood control and water supply were the underlying factors motivating 
land purchases through the fund.280 As in much of the country, reservoirs were becoming 
sites for recreation, paid for by local recreation bonds and state taxes. Land values had 
been increasing dramatically in the 1950’s across the state, and parts of the C&SF project 
were becoming far more costly. The new state fund could be used by local authorities 
across Florida to acquire land that would be useful for water projects. It was financed by 
                                               
278 Southwest Florida Water Management District. 
279 James A. Farr and Greg O. Brock, “Acquisition History,” Florida Department of Environmental 
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a 5 percent sales tax on “outdoor clothing and equipment”, which was really targeting 
bathing suits. The “bathing suit tax” ended up being rather unpopular, and in 1964 it was 
replaced by recreation bonds financed by taxes on real estate transactions.  
Most importantly, in the counties that had been impacted by the 1960 floods, the 
state created a new flood control district with an explicit, multi-purpose “water 
management” mission. Founded in 1961, the SWFWMD would try to strike a different 
balance from the Central and Southern Florida (C&SF) Flood Control District that was 
already facing political and environmental challenges. Like the C&SF Flood Control 
District, the new Water Management District was run by a Board of Governors appointed 
by the Governor of Florida, but in a move to decentralize some of the policymaking, the 
SWFWMD had 11 separate “basin boards” that were each responsible for a single 
watershed.  
This decentralization was in part because of rivalries between more urbanized 
Pinellas County and the rural counties north of Tampa. State Senator C.W. Young, who 
hailed from a suburb of St. Petersburg, had opposed the creation of the SWFWMD 
because he felt the tax burden would fall mostly on Pinellas County and its thousands of 
new retirees. Most of the benefits would end up on the other side of Tampa Bay.281 
Likewise, the rural counties did not want to shoulder a disproportionate share of the 
burden of fixing the flood problems in Tampa’s suburbs. These tensions between St. 
Petersburg, Tampa, their suburbs, and the rural counties around Tampa would haunt the 
Water Management District for the next two decades. To get around the issue in 1961, 
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the basin boards were given 25 percent of the ad-valorem tax revenues collected by the 
SWFWMD for their own, smaller projects on the rivers in that watershed.  
 
Figure 4.5 Counties and basins in the SWFWMD, 1961. Records of the Jacksonville District, US Army 
Corps of Engineers, National Archives at Atlanta. 
Alfred McKethan, a long-time banker and developer in the ranching and farming 
town of Brooksville, which had been at the center of the 1960 floods, was appointed by 
Governor Farris Bryant as the first Chair of the SWFWMD Board of Governors. The 
other board members were also landowners in central Florida, many of them involved in 
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citrus growing.282 The first headquarters of the new Water Management District was only 
a couple blocks away from McKethan’s bank in Brooksville. The payroll account was 
deposited there as well. McKethan had been chairman of the State Road Board under 
Governor Fuller Warren who had championed the C&SF District in the late 1940s. In 
1961 McKethan was the president of the Florida Banker’s Association, and had close ties 
to newly-elected Governor Bryant and the “Pork Chop Gang” – the conservative coalition 
of Democrats from small, northern Florida counties that controlled much of state politics 
in the 1950s. Brooksville was the seat of Hernando County, and although its population 
was small, its state representatives were committed to defending a traditional vision of 
rural life in Florida.  
 
Figure 4.6 Dale Twachtmann, The Tampa Times, 1972 
McKethan hired Dale Twachtmann as the district’s third employee and the first 
with any engineering background. Twachtmann studied civil engineering at Iowa State 
University, became interested in hydrology, and served in the Air Force for four years 
before moving to Tampa in 1959. He worked in his father-in-law’s construction business 
                                               
282 Dale Twachtmann, Interview with Dale Twachtmann on Water Management, interview by Julian 
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in Tampa, but remembered that it “wasn’t the kind of work I wanted to do.”283 When 
Twachtmann heard about the founding of the SWFWMD in 1961, he drove up to 
Brooksville and inquired about a job. Four months later he was acting Executive 
Director, as the first board member who had taken that position left to run the Democratic 
Party’s office in Manatee County.284 Despite that very informal start, Twachtmann would 
serve the Water Management District as Executive Director from 1962-1972. He would 
go on to direct Tampa’s water utilities in the 1970s and eventually he would become 
Secretary of the state’s Department of Environmental Regulation.  
During his tenure as Executive Director of the SWFWMD, Twachtmann would 
become a symbol for the expensive, domineering approach to large, structural water 
management that was rapidly becoming untenable for the flood control projects in both 
Miami and Tampa. “I had the engineering psyche,” Twachtmann remembered in 1991. “I 
tried to solve problems, and environmentalists bashed the daylights out of me for it.”285 
Along with the Water Management District itself, however, Twachtmann would change 
his approach by the early 1970s. In a 2006 interview he remembered the impact critics of 
flood control exerted on his thinking. “When I started in 1951,” he recalled, “mostly Civil 
Engineering was a challenge: If there’s something out there to do, by Golly, we’re going 
to do it! Prove it can be done. We didn’t think about the natural systems. That was just 
not an important part of the consideration. And in my time, in those early 60s, in the 
Water Management District, a lot of my attitudes about that [were changed as] they were 
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presented. I changed, I grew, and I adopted them. Because they were things that seemed 
to me to make sense, but things that I hadn’t thought of before.”286  
The SWFWMD in a time of political change 
The founding of the Southwest Florida Water Management District coincided 
with enormous political changes at the state level. Since the late 19th century Florida’s 
legislature had limited each county to just one senator and three representatives, even 
when the population of the three large counties in Southeast Florida started growing 
much faster than the more conservative, rural areas of the northern part of the state in the 
late 1940s.287 Thus the Pork Chop Gang was able to direct state politics against the 
interests of the rapidly expanding suburban retirement and vacation areas in the south. 
This control was particularly obvious in the prolonged imposition of racial segregation 
throughout the state. In the late 1950’s Florida’s flood control projects were still bound to 
these state politics, and planners had to prioritize agricultural, ranching, and small-scale 
industrial interests along with those of suburban areas. For example, the C&SF District 
was repeatedly accused of prioritizing the needs of farmers around Lake Okeechobee 
over the water supply demands of Dade County.288  
The lack of representative apportionment in the State Government began to 
change quickly after 1962 when the Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle of “one man, 
one vote” in the case of Baker v. Carr. Florida was forced reluctantly to reapportion the 
state legislature to accurately represent the population surge in the Miami, Tampa, and 
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Orlando areas. A new state constitution was approved in 1968. The Pork Chop Gang 
remained a force in Florida politics well into the 1970s, but greater representation from 
more diverse urban areas brought new concerns to Tallahassee. Some of these concerns 
centered on environmental quality – and especially clean water supplies – in the Tampa 
Bay Area. Thus the SWFWMD was quickly involved in this new arena of environmental 
politics, without the inertia shown in South Florida or Houston. 
The first sign of political transformation was the surprise election of Governor 
Claude Kirk in 1966, a Republican businessman from Jacksonville and Palm Beach who 
had never before held political office. Kirk was the first Republican governor of Florida 
in 94 years.289 He was outrageous, constantly self-promotional, and bombastic. He 
pushed back against federal efforts to desegregate Florida schools, and he created the 
state’s first Departments of Environmental Protection and Law Enforcement. Most of all 
he was a great promoter of Florida for development and tourism. He was instrumental in 
bringing the 1968 Republican National Convention to Miami, and made a deal with Roy 
Disney that would lead to the development of Walt Disney World near Orlando. In his 
first year in office he hosted the Republican Governor’s Conference in Palm Beach, and 
gave numerous television interviews. When asked about his constant showmanship, Kirk 
said, “I’m just sellin’ orange juice. Sellin’ orange juice, sellin’ Kirk, sellin’ Florida. 
People are paying attention.”290  
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Figure 4.7 Derrill McAteer, c. 1969. Tampa Bay Times, 2016. 
Governor Kirk appointed Derrill McAteer, a Republican agricultural 
businessman, developer, and Tampa political ally, to the SWFWMD Governing Board. 
McAteer would replace banker Alfred McKethan as Chairman in 1969 and served in that 
role until 1980. McAteer would prove to be a dedicated public servant, a passionate 
conservationist, and, as the mission of the SWFWMD expanded beyond flood control, a 
champion of stronger regulations over groundwater usage. McAteer’s son remembered 
that his father “had strong ties to agriculture, and people would come to him with third- 
or fourth-generation farms and say, 'Please don't condemn our farms,' or 'Please don't take 
away our pumping rights,'” he recalled. “That was one of the toughest things he had to 
do. He had to choose (the public interest) over their right to farm.”291  
 McAteer may well have chosen the public interest over that of small farmers, but 
he also spent 40 years working for Lykes Brothers, Inc. – the largest landholder in 
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Central Florida, and one of the wealthiest families in Tampa.292 McAteer ran one of their 
feedlots near Brooksville, the headquarters of the SWFWMD. The Lykes family ran large 
cattle ranching operations in Central Florida as well as many citrus farms. They were also 
in banking, shipping, and the local gas utility. In the 1960s they bought Sunkist brand 
orange juice and pioneered the production of frozen concentrate.293 In 2004 McAteer 
claimed that he never had a conflict of interest between his job at Lykes Brothers and his 
Governing Board role at the Southwest Florida Water Management District. “All the 
years I was with Lykes Brothers, not once did they interfere with a decision that I made 
as a board member. Never.”294  
The Four River Basins Project 
On the federal level, the primary response to the floods of 1960 was a new, 
comprehensive flood control project, modeled on the C&SF Project that had successfully 
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protected Miami. At first, the Four River Basins project made securing water supplies 
during droughts, such as the one in the early 1960s, a secondary, “collateral use” of the 
flood control system.295 Prior to the floods of 1960, there had already been some basic 
planning for flood control in central and southwestern Florida. The general outlines of a 
major project to regulate the four main rivers of the watershed surrounding Tampa had 
been by explored by the Corps of Engineers in 1958. These watersheds covered an area 
of 6,100 square miles that included the headwaters of the Hillsborough, Withlacoochee, 
and Peace rivers that all flowed into the Gulf of Mexico on the Southwest coast of 
Florida. The Four River Basins project covered part of the central ridge of Florida, 
dividing watersheds on both sides of the state, and the Oklawaha River that flowed from 
that same area into the St. John’s River and eventually into the Atlantic Ocean at 
Jacksonville. By December, 1960, as the region was still recovering from the second of 
the two major floods, the first proposal for a $96 million dual-use project was already 
before Congress. 
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Figure 4.8 Map of Proposed Four River Basins Projects, 1961. Records of the Jacksonville District, US 
Army Corps of Engineers, National Archives at Atlanta. 
As in Houston in the late 1930s, and again in Miami a decade later, the first step 
in the Four River Basins project was building local support. SWFWMD Director Dale 
Twachtmann recalled making hundreds of speeches, and going to “every Kiwanis club, 
every civic association in fifteen counties” to tell the story of why a federal project was 
necessary.296  
As in Houston and Miami, a key early issue was determining the balance between 
local and federal financing. Generally, the formula was the same for the C&SF project. 
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Run out of the same District office in Jacksonville, the Corps of Engineers saw many 
similarities between the two regions, geographically.297 The State of Florida’s 
contribution, to be financed by the 16 counties comprising the new SWFWMD, was to be 
a 20 percent cash contribution of the total construction costs. The 1954 Rivers and 
Harbors Act had made this increase to a fifth of the total for local contributions to all new 
projects in the United States. Fifteen percent had been used originally in the C&SF 
project in 1949. SWFWMD and Corps of Engineers planners were concerned that a 
higher proportion of local contributions could be too burdensome for the relatively poor 
rural areas in the sixteen counties surrounding Tampa.  
Local obligations rose further because few of the components of the Four River 
Basins system could be justified as simply flood control. Local authorities still needed to 
purchase most of the land to be used for ten reservoirs that would maintain water supplies 
during dry periods. Only some of those reservoirs were acting as water containment 
areas. As was the case in both Miami and Houston, local authorities additionally had to 
procure rights-of-way for levees, canals and control structures along the rivers. Of the 
estimated $100 million total project costs, local contributions of cash, land, and 
maintenance were around $42 million.298 It became something more approaching a 50-50 
split between Florida and the federal government. 
At the local level, the politics and demographics of greater South Florida were 
starting to diverge from the rest of the Southeast (and Florida’s own northern counties). 
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There were also much larger Corps of Engineers projects nearby, such as the Cross-
Florida Barge Canal, that were already generating some significant local opposition. The 
Barge Canal was planned as a shortcut on the Intracoastal Waterway that would cut 
through the northern part of the state from Jacksonville, down the St. Johns river, and 
through a system of canals and reservoirs to Yankeetown on the Gulf of Mexico in the 
mostly-uninhabited “armpit” of the state.  
Other large projects that attempted to extend the TVA-model of flood control, 
agricultural support, and power generation to different parts of the Southeast ran into 
increasingly organized efforts to slow or modify them. Opposition to federal projects was 
part of a broader pattern of resistance in the Southeast to large federal projects, such as 
dams on the Savannah River. In the 1960s, local environmental conservation efforts 
intersected with increased desires for state control as Southern politics generally became 
more wary of federal interference during the Civil Rights Era.299  
As the Four River Basins project began to make its way through Congress in early 
1961, the Corps of Engineers started surveying sites of reservoirs, levees, and canals. The 
studies the Corps undertook from 1960-1962 analyzed the hydrology of each river basin, 
how often floods occurred there, and in what season. The Corps also attempted to 
forecast how often floods would occur and their potential impact, given the scale of 
potential development in the region.300 For this forecast, the Corps used demographic 
models to anticipate population increases and future land development. In contrast to the 
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sprawling suburbs of South Florida, much of the development in the rural areas around 
Tampa was supposed to be for farming and ranching. In the early 1960s, suburban growth 
in the Tampa Bay Area was forecast to be more limited. This estimate changed 
dramatically a decade later, but the first forecast was essential to calculating the potential 
benefits from the “improved land use” that would most likely follow after flood control 
was a reality. At the time, the Corps of Engineers calculated that 60 percent of the project 
benefits would come from reduced flood damages, or about $8 million per year, with the 
remaining 40 percent were connected to increased returns from land use.301 Funding for 
the project in its entirety was authorized by Congress in October as part of the Flood 
Control Act 1962. The first large local contribution for the project was not required until 
1965, when construction actually started. At that time, the State of Florida appropriated 
nearly $5.5 million. 
In a similar design to the original “emergency bypass” plan for the works in 
Houston, the Four River Basins system in the Tampa area was planned to safely hold 
back floodwaters in two major reservoirs and then slowly discharge the overflow waters 
through a canal that bypassed most downtown areas. The risk threshold was the “safe 
discharge of the standard project flood”, which was estimated as being 25 percent greater 
than the 100-year flood – or the “reasonable upper limit” of flooding on the Hillsborough 
River.302 The Corps also modelled what the impact of the 1960 floods would have been if 
the Four River Basins project had been functioning at the time.  
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Plans for the Four River Basins project were even more extensive for the rural, 
interior region beyond the more urbanized coast. Realizing that water conservation for 
farmers was equally as important as flood control, the Corps of Engineers planned ten 
reservoirs in total. They even included a plan to connect the reservoir system all the way 
to giant Lake Apopka at the head of the Oklawaha River near Orlando. There were other, 
cheaper solutions for flood control – such as a plan limited to just two canals and 
widening bottlenecks on the rivers - but these approaches would not have provided “safe 
storage of water”.303  
Development, Environmental Concerns, and Unfinished Designs  
Suburban development in the counties around Tampa did not take off with the 
same immediacy as Miami and Houston in the 1950s and 1960s. While the Eastern “Gold 
Coast” was becoming a contiguous urban area, much of the land in northern 
Hillsborough, Pasco and Hernando counties remained rural into the 1980s. There were 
some scattered projects planned during the late 1960’s for the large, rural areas of the 
Four River Basins, but few were actually built until more than a decade later.  
In 1967, for example, the Mackle brothers’ Deltona Corporation planned what 
would have been a small city of 50,000 residents in Hernando County near Brooksville 
(headquarters of the SWFWMD), 45 miles north of Tampa.304 A few years earlier the 
Mackle brothers had successfully developed the affordable retirement community of 
Marco Island from mangrove swamps near Naples and the town of Deltona on more solid 
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ground north of Orlando.305 Thousands of Tampa area residents drove to Hernando 
County and toured the dusty layout of unfinished roads and golf courses on its opening 
day. The 1960 flood that had nearly wiped out the chickens in nearby Masaryktown was 
mostly forgotten after years of drought, but the new developers still celebrated with an 
annual chicken-plucking contest.306  
 
Figure 4.9 Cover of brochure promoting Spring Hill, 1968. 
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With aggressive sales in New York City, nearly 28,000 modest lots, in what 
became known as “Spring Hill”, were sold by 1970.307 But most those lots were sold on 
installment plans and few homes were built until the early 1980s. Although rural land 
remained cheap, a slowing national economy, combined with growing inflation and 
higher interest rates on mortgages, did not support these large-scale projects as they 
moved out of the planning phases in the early 1970s. Because projects such as Spring Hill 
were already faltering, the rise of environmental regulation probably had little impact on 
development in the Four River Basins area. But new environmental regulations did 
irreparably damage the Deltona Corporation when the Corps of Engineers refused to 
issue dredging permits for the continued filling of mangrove wetlands around Marco 
Island, the Mackle’s most valuable development.308 
The Four River Basins Project itself did not long maintain its momentum. With 
early pushback against land purchases by rural communities, the strengthening of 
environmental concerns in the late 1960s, and more limited federal budgets, only two of 
the ten reservoirs were ever completed. As early as 1965, the first representative from 
Tampa’s newly-created tenth Congressional District, Sam Gibbons, had to bring images 
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of newly-flooded homes along the Hillsborough River to the House Appropriations 
Committee in order to secure an extra $600,000 to get the Four River Basins project out 
of the planning phases.309 Gibbons, who had run Kennedy’s 1960 campaign in Florida, 
had counted on promises from the President to fully fund the Four River Basins flood 
control projects, but as the costs of US involvement in the Vietnam War increased, 
President Johnson asked Congress to restrict spending on new civil works projects. 
The key reservoir that would have inundated the Green Swamp and the 
headwaters of the four rivers was never built. Instead the area became a wilderness 
preserve that also acted to store and filter much of the region’s water. Water quality, and 
especially cleaning up pollution in Lake Apopka and Tampa Bay, became the focus of 
grassroots environmental groups in the 1970s. Ironically, the Squirrel Prairie works that 
had been planned to protect and provide water for the farming town of Masaryktown, 
whose drowned chickens had been so prominent in the call for flood control, were never 
built. Masaryktown did get a much smaller 5.5 mile canal that ended up preventing 
significant flooding in 1998 and again in 2004 after hurricane Frances crossed the state. 
The canal cost a little more than $760,000 when it was completed. Out of a dozen 
planned structures in the Four River Basins, the Masaryktown canal was one of only four 
that were ever completed.310 
The following, chronologically-overlapping sections of this chapter detail the 
compromises made on several of the Four River Basins Project’s key components.  
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The Tampa Bypass Canal (1966-1981) 
The Hillsborough River is Tampa’s river. It runs 60 miles from the Green Swamp 
on the central Florida plateau through Tampa’s northern suburbs and then through some 
of the city’s oldest neighborhoods on its way to Tampa Bay. The city’s earliest water 
supply came from the Hillsborough River, and it was flooding on the Hillsborough River 
that caused the most extensive damage to the city after the storms of 1960. That spring, 
before Hurricane Donna turned flood control into a regional project, Hillsborough County 
Commissioners and Congressional representatives from the Tampa Bay area investigated 
the possibility of just cleaning out and enlarging the Hillsborough River to handle 
floodwaters from the next storm. Since the Hillsborough River was connected to channels 
leading into the Port of Tampa, this more limited project could be argued to be already 
within the scope and budget of the Corps of Engineers’ mission to maintain navigation on 
the nation’s waterways. But Colonel Paul Troxler, the District Engineer in Jacksonville, 
had the area surveyed and concluded that the “clearing and snagging” project on the river 
would be too expensive for the District’s budget already set aside for similar 
maintenance.311 Instead, he encouraged local representatives to support the vastly larger, 
comprehensive flood control project proposed for the Four River Basins. When Hurricane 
Donna roared through a few months later, the simpler, local solutions no longer seemed 
appropriate to the repeated risk.  
Even after the Four River Basins project was authorized, the SWFWMD again 
looked into improving the Hillsborough River itself to handle floods. Once again the high 
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costs of buying rights-of-way, redirecting sewers and powerlines, and clearing out the 
rocky, twisting channel did not justify the benefits to Tampa and its suburbs – if there 
were a cheaper means of flood control for the city.312 The Corps of Engineers also 
estimated these costs, and verified that the Hillsborough River could be cleared of 
obstructions in order to successfully carry the volume of 75 percent of the Standard 
Project Flood, but during that kind of event the flow of water through residential 
neighborhoods would be rapid and dangerous.   
 
Figure 4.10 Plan for the Tampa Bypass Canal (Completed sections marked in red and planned sections in 
green), 1975. Records of the Jacksonville District, US Army Corps of Engineers, National Archives at 
Atlanta. 
Instead a less-expensive, and more effective, 14-mile canal was planned to divert 
water from the Hillsborough River around the city of Tampa and into a corner of Tampa 
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Bay during floods. The Tampa Bypass Canal, started in 1966 and not fully completed 
until 1981 because of years of budget constraints, became the primary protection for the 
city of Tampa and its closest suburbs. During major flood events, gates on the canal fully 
open to allow the maximum amount of water to exit the river. It was designed to provide 
“standard flood protection”, which, along with the Four River Basins project as a whole, 
was based on the 100-year flood which was greater than what the city had seen in 
1960.313   
As work on the Tampa Bypass Canal continued, some of the water storage 
components of the Four River Basins project were clearly in trouble due to funding 
shortages, the high cost of land acquisition, and local resistance. It became clear to the 
SWFWMD that the Bypass Canal itself could be used as an alternative area to store 
water. Working with Jerry Parker, a hydrogeologist, who had formerly been with the US 
Geological Survey, SWFWMD made the case to the Corps of Engineers that the Tampa 
Bypass Canal should be able to store water as well as prevent floods in the city. In the 
late 1960’s, a small dam and control structure on the Hillsborough River in the suburb of 
Temple Terrace were added to the canal’s designs. It was thus transformed into an 
elongated reservoir during rainy years. Only in the most severe flooding events would it 
shunt the river’s overflow into Tampa Bay.  
Starting again in the early 1970’s, SWFWMD executives and Tampa 
Congressman Sam Gibbons repeatedly appealed to Congress asking for appropriations to 
continue work on the Tampa Bypass Canal.314 SWFWMD Director Don Feaster “said he 
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was beginning to ‘sound like a parrot’ because of repeated delays in completing the 
bypass canal.”315 At an Appropriations Committee hearing Congressman Gibbons noted 
that after more than $22 million had been spent on the canal, with an expected $8 million 
more in 1973, President Nixon’s budget included only $1.5 million, which meant almost 
no progress could be made towards completing the remaining nine miles of excavation. 
The following year’s budget was down to only $400,000 for the canal. Gibbons argued 
that this one piece of the Four River Basins Project was essential for the safety of the city 
of Tampa and had no alternative.  
It would take another seven years to complete, with most funding restored under 
President Carter. The SWFWMD and Corps of Engineers have insisted ever since that 
there was no cost-effective alternative to this system.316 The city had been spared major 
storms until only a few years after the Bypass Canal was completed. On Labor Day 
weekend, 1985, the system was put to the test when Hurricane Elena stalled off the 
Florida coast in the Gulf of Mexico, producing heavy rainfall for days, although never 
making landfall in the state. The Tampa Bypass Canal was first put into operation and 
proved successful at preventing flooding in the city.  
The outcome of the designs for the flood control system in Tampa were 
essentially the opposite of what had happened in Houston. Designs in both cities had 
called for dams, reservoirs, and bypass canals. In Houston, the bypass canal was never 
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built, and the dams provided primary flood control. In Tampa, the dams were never built 
and the bypass canal was the key solution. In the case of Tampa, the bypass canal was  
less than half as long as what had been planned for Houston – 14 miles instead of 35. In 
contrast to both Houston and Tampa, the massive projects in Miami used multiple levees, 
dikes, pumping stations, and hundreds of miles of canals, to transform a seasonally 
watery landscape into permanently dry land.  
The Green Swamp Project: The power of local resistance (1962-1974) 
In the early years of the Four River Basins project, resistance to dams, reservoirs, 
and flooded “water conservation areas” had been growing in other parts of the region. 
This opposition was especially pronounced in the small towns and ranching areas of 
Central Florida, high up on the backbone of the state, that had not seen such extensive 
flooding from Hurricane Donna. The controversy around the Green Swamp eventually 
centered on the issue of preserving land entirely for its ecological services.  Protecting the 
Green Swamp became the SWFWMD’s strategy to ensure fresh water supplies by 
recharging the underlying Floridian Aquifer at its highest point.  
As early as March, 1962, before the Four River Basins Project was authorized by 
Congress that October, the Polk County Property Owners League and the city of Winter 
Haven had vigorously opposed plans to transform the Green Swamp into a reservoir that 
would have flooded over the many spring-fed lakes and wetlands in the area.317 Concerns 
about development, rising property values, and land-use were most important to the 
Property Owners League when they started their appeal. Arthur Bissett, the Managing 
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Director of the Property Owners League, wrote that the Green Swamp was Polk County’s 
“last frontier” and “must be left available for this expansion of our agriculture in order 
that the tax and business economy of the County is not depressed.”318  
The Property Owners League contacted Senator Spessard Holland, long a friend 
of rural interests in South Florida, to halt construction of the reservoir pending additional 
studies by the Corps of Engineers. Fifteen years earlier Senator Holland had pushed 
through the massive C&SF flood control projects in the Everglades by aligning the 
interests of growing cities such as Miami with farmers around Lake Okeechobee. Now he 
would play a far more ambivalent role in giving voice to rural interests in the Tampa area 
that did not clearly see the benefits of development.  
The Property Owners League hired a consulting engineer, Raymond Stuck, to 
make an official critique of the entire Four River Basins project. First Stuck, who had 
retired from the Corps of Engineers after a long career, attacked the essential cost-benefit 
ratio that justified the project. He claimed it would be at least $200 million – twice as 
expensive as planned – because of increased land values and the challenges of building 
heavy, leak-proof structures in the sandy soils beneath the swamp. If there was too much 
seepage around the levees, then they would not work to contain floods or store water in 
dry years. Another former Corps of Engineers officer, retired Colonel Herbert Gee, who 
had been consulting for the SWFWMD, responded that the construction cost estimates 
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for the Four River Basins had been based on the Corps’ extensive experience in similar 
conditions with the C&SF Project over the past decade.319  
Stuck also argued that the Green Swamp was not the primary source of flooding 
in Tampa, nor would a reservoir there fill quickly enough to act as a worthwhile water 
conservation area, and certainly not quickly enough to recharge the aquifer below. As 
Stuck testified to the Senate Subcommittee on Rivers and Harbors in September, 1962, 
“the great damage resulting in Tampa and over that watershed is from the rain that fell 
directly on them, not rain that came from the Green Swamp area, because it contributes 
too little: but if you make a study of storms that happened in there, they centered right 
over Tampa and there was not enough outlet for this water to get out into the bay, and it 
simply drowned them out.”320 Responding for the SWFWMD, Colonel Gee pointed out 
that the Withlacoochee River, with origins in the Green Swamp, also contributed to the 
severity of the 1960 floods in Tampa. Only a major reservoir in the headwaters could 
prevent flooding on a regional scale and, more importantly, maintain the level of the 
aquifer for the region’s growth.  
In 1962 the SWFWMD framed Stuck’s report and the Polk County Property 
Owner League’s campaign as an “attempt of desperation to cast doubt on a worthy 
project in high places with the hope of arousing enough doubts to result in its not being 
authorized in this session of Congress.” A year later the Corps of Engineers dismissed 
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both the uproar of the Polk County property owners, and the quieter concerns of W.W. 
Cummer, a former cypress lumber king and big landholder in Pasco County, as really an 
attempt to keep their property taxes low indefinitely. Reservoirs would inundate less 
valuable swampland, and thus make logging and ranching operations on the remaining 
land less profitable. “While such a purpose is understandable,” the Jacksonville District 
Engineer wrote to the Division Engineer in Atlanta, “it puts the organizations in the 
position of opposing all significant progress in the region and preventing normal and 
potential development.” As with both Houston and Miami, at first it seemed that local 
resistance would only delay work on the overall Four River Basins project but not 
prevent its completion. Construction of the Green Swamp Reservoir was postponed until 
the Corps of Engineers could complete a restudy and new cost-benefit analysis, but the 
rest of the system was authorized by Congress.  
Within a few years, however, it was clear that the region around Tampa was very 
different from Houston and Miami. Local interests were more diverse and conflicted 
between urban and rural areas, and between counties, without a singular vision that had 
united them in Texas’ Harris County and on the opposite coast of Florida. The Green 
Swamp Reservoir was the first, but not the last, of the Four River Basins components that 
would never be completed. Raymond’s Stuck’s critique had been essentially right in its 
conclusions that construction costs would be much higher than expected because land 
would become so much more valuable in the region, and the Property Owners League 
demonstrated just how effective local resistance could be.321  
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Even though there was to be no reservoir in the Green Swamp, the ranchers and 
citrus farmers of Polk County ultimately would not get the opportunity to develop their 
“last frontier”. Raymond Stuck had been wrong about how crucial the Green Swamp was 
to the Floridian Aquifer below it. SWFWMD executives were convinced that it had to be 
protected, one way or another, as the primary source of the region’s fresh water. As 
former SWFWMD executive director Dale Twachtmann remembered, “The Corps knew 
that that was a key recharge area.  So the Corps project had big reservoirs there to hold 
water.  But that was again, you hold water for long periods of time you're going to kill all 
the trees and all this.  So we decided we'd just buy all the land. Then it could stay in its 
natural state.  If government owned it, you could control it as best possible to let water 
stay on it and let it do its ace recharge work.”  
Former chairman Derrill McAteer recalled personally purchasing the first part of 
the Green Swamp for the Water Management District in the early 1970s. He bought the 
last of the Cummer Land Company’s former cypress logging territory from W.W. 
Cummer himself over a sandwich and a handshake. “Mr. Cummer and I sat down under a 
tree, eating that barbeque, and I bought the last of it for $103,000. That’s the heart of the 
district; it’s the heart of the deal.”322 The rest of the Green Swamp would be purchased in 
the next few years.  
The reapportionment of the state legislature in the late 1960s, population shifts to 
South Florida, and a strengthening environmental movement all laid the groundwork for 
an exceptionally progressive state government in the mid-1970s. Words such as “carrying 
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capacity” and “limits to growth” were starting to be used by state planners.323 The 
crowning achievement of environmental advocates was the Florida Water Resources Act 
of 1972, sponsored by Governor Reubin Askew who had come into office the previous 
year. Water managers such as Derrill McAteer campaigned along with Governor Askew 
across the state to gain support for this transformational legislation. It divided the entire 
state into water management districts, and gave them permitting power for water use. 
That same year, the Florida Environmental Land and Water Act created a fund to 
purchase environmentally sensitive land. 
By 1974, the Florida Department of Natural Resources had allocated $23 million 
to the SWFWMD to purchase the rest of the Green Swamp and much of its surrounding 
watershed. Those areas were designated a state Area of Critical Concern which limited 
how much development could happen on those lands. Local opposition was no longer 
strong enough to overcome a governor and state legislature that built political power from 
cities such as Miami, Orlando and St. Petersburg rather than rural counties. The 
headwaters of the four river basins was now mostly a nature preserve, and a non-
structural, natural water storage area and filtration system for the Floridian aquifer. For 
the growing cities and suburbs of the Tampa Bay Area, this was clearly a victory as a key 
critical water source was now protected.  
The fate of Hillsborough River dams and the rise of “natural” flood control (1968-1975) 
While the Tampa Bypass Canal was one structural component of the Four River 
Basins Project that was actually completed, other works planned for higher up the 
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Hillsborough River shared a similar fate to the unfinished Green Swamp Reservoir. In 
1967 a dam and permanent reservoir had also been slated to be constructed closer to 
river’s headwaters in the Green Swamp. It had been seven years since significant 
flooding had affected the Tampa Bay Area and Water Management District leaders were 
questioning how robust the system actually needed to be. Part of this reconsideration was 
the increased costs of acquiring land for reservoirs and rights-of-way for canals and 
channels. After several dry years in the early 1960s, reservoirs seemed to be more 
important for ensuring water supplies rather than flood control. These issues concerning 
costs and the risk of future floods were key to planning the Upper Hillsborough 
Reservoir.324  
At a progress meeting between Corps of Engineers planners and SWFWMD 
executives in July, 1968, Executive Director Dale Twachtmann brought up the 
observation that recent visits to the Upper Hillsborough Reservoir site after summer 
storms had shown there was only two feet of water where they were planning for 80 feet 
to be in the event of a 100-year flood. “It does not appear possible that 100-year plus 
elevations would be in the area at this time”, Twachtmann observed.325 He asked if a 
lower level of protection could be evaluated for some reservoirs in the system, assuming 
projected development in the region, so the SWFWMD would not have to acquire as 
much land. Angelo Tabita, Assistant Chief for Project Planning at the Jacksonville 
District, claimed that surveys in the area had been poorly executed and new analysis 
would allow for better planning. The Corps refused to back away from the size of the 
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reservoir, and thus the degree of protection that should be provided by the flood control 
system. 
By the 1970s, environmental concerns and budget constraints were transforming 
areas of civil engineering practice. Structural flood control – which depended on man-
made works such as levees, dams, and canals – was less in favor than solutions that 
utilized features of the natural floodplain to reduce flooding from the start. This change in 
paradigm, largely based on the work of Geographer Gilbert White, meant strictly limiting 
development in key natural areas that could help dissipate floodwaters.326 For the Tampa 
Bay Area it meant creating nature parks for flood control.  
State institutions responsible for flood control, such as the SWFWMD, had tried 
unsuccessfully in the 1960s to get developers to stop building in floodplains, but they did 
not have the legal authority to deny permits. That type of regulation remained on the 
county level. Former SWFWMD chair Derrill McAteer remembered trying to educate 
“desperate” local county commissioners about putting zoning in floodplains that would 
limit development. “At that point they had more authority than we [Swiftmud] did,” he 
recalled, “I said, let’s have some flood plains zoning. [They said] Oh, no, we can’t do 
that. I said, well, then, don’t complain to me. If you’re not willing to have flood plains 
zoning in your county.”327  
The impact of the Water Resources Act of 1972 on the strategies used by the 
SWFWMD cannot be overstated. Before 1972, the Southwest Florida Water Management 
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District had “water management” power only in name. Its primary purpose had been as 
the local coordinating agency on the Four River Basins flood control projects. Now it 
would have legal authority to regulate groundwater usage and funds to acquire land that 
was not going to become part of a federal canal or reservoir. Derrill McAteer noted that 
these new powers changed the District’s strategy. “Flood control is a phase of water 
management, of course,” he recalled. “But we began to look and see, what do we have, 
like the Upper Hillsborough Reservoir, other places that we had already planned to 
acquire for flood control purposes, now could become municipal water supply purposes, 
which I melded them together. That’s what really happened at that point.”328 
Further down the Hillsborough River, closer to the outskirts of Tampa, 
SWFWMD demonstrated its new intention to prioritize water quality and environmental 
protection along with flood control in the 1970s. Starting in 1973, SWFWMD began to 
purchase an area that amounted to more than fifteen thousand acres of pine forest and 
wetlands just northeast of Tampa.329 This purchase was an example of a primarily 
nonstructural approach to flood control in action, as the Four River Basins Project was 
starved for cash from the Federal Government.  
The land was officially called the Lower Hillsborough Flood Detention Area, but 
SWFWMD publically managed the lands it acquired as a “wilderness park”. Recreational 
uses of the park were, in fact, a primary fundraising tool. Much of the land was purchased 
using recreation bonds, in partnership with Hillsborough County. The Lower 
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Hillsborough Flood Detention Area was a critical buffer zone for works connected with 
the Four River Basins project.330 The area included a small levee and control structure to 
block floods on the Hillsborough River from entering the Tampa suburb of Temple 
Terrace and eventually the city itself. If enough water accumulated in the detention area, 
it overflowed into the Tampa Bypass Canal which then shunted the excess to Tampa Bay. 
By maintaining much of the Flood Detention Area as parklands free from intensive 
development, the SWFWMD helped reduce runoff and preserve some 13 miles of the 
Hillsborough River in its original floodplain. Critically, purchase of the Flood Detention 
Area lands also protected the Morris Bridge Wellfield that was an important source of 
municipal water supplies.  
Chapter summary  
Tampa’s flood control projects were inspired by repeated regional floods in the 
summer of 1960. At the time, the success of the C&SF Projects in Miami and the 
completion of large civil works around the country made it seem like a regional flood 
control system on the Gulf Coast of Florida was inevitable. But Tampa’s local politics 
were very different from Houston and Miami’s. The region was still largely rural, and 
developing cities on both sides of Tampa Bay competed for resources with farmers and 
ranchers. From the beginning the SWFWMD was put in an awkward role of trying to 
champion large federal flood control projects while also trying to manage fresh water 
supplies with almost no regulatory power.  
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But the timing of flood control in Southwest Florida, along with the rise of 
environmental activism, was particularly critical. Unlike the rapid pace of the 
development of the water management system around Miami in the 1950s, the design and 
planning phases of the Four River Basins Project were carried out slowly during a decade 
when concerns about the quality of natural resources and impacts to wildlife were gaining 
widespread popular support. Meanwhile, Congressional appropriations aimed to start 
construction ran into tight, wartime budgets and economic downturns in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s. The SWFWMD was thus forced to use a variety of seemingly forward-
thinking, non-structural approaches to protect critical water sources and restrict 
development in flood prone areas. In retrospect, Water Management District leaders 
recalled their environmental enlightenment, along with the frustrations that allowed only 
minimal progress on the Four River Basins Project.  
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CHAPTER 5  
ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIVISM AND FLOOD CONTROL IN 




Houston, Miami and Tampa are all cases of explosive, postwar sunbelt population 
growth. The exact timing of that development is different in each case, but all three cities 
entered the 1970s as centers of sprawling metropolitan regions. This was a period when 
questions about resources, population and the “limits to growth” were part of a national 
intellectual conversation.331 Locally, however, concerns about suburban development 
were more focused on quality of life and essential services, such as reliable fresh water 
supplies, smog, and the preservation of areas of natural beauty that were quickly 
disappearing.332  
One of the commonalities between the narratives of flood control in Miami, 
Houston, and Tampa is that these kinds of concerns became prominent in each city in the 
late 1960s, and local grassroots organizations were then able to mobilize around these 
issues to build significant political pressure for reassessments of flood control projects in 
the 1970s.  Combined with budget shortfalls, these reassessments sometimes led to the 
redesign, and more often than not, the cancellation, of components of the protective 
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infrastructure. The following chapter compares the impacts of environmental awareness 
and activism on the plans for flood control in each city.  
Houston and the campaign to save the bayous, 1966-1971 
As in many parts of the country, the environmental movement in Houston 
combined quality of life issues, such as pollution control, with concerns for suburban, 
natural aesthetics.333 Early attempts to “beautify” and transform Houston’s bayous into 
park-like areas started just as the first round of federal flood control projects were nearing 
completion in the late 1940s. Now that there was less urgency to control damaging floods 
on Buffalo Bayou downtown, it was possible to consider the condition of the waterway 
itself. In the late 1940’s Buffalo Bayou was full of debris and sewage. Its banks were 
eroding, steep and inaccessible.  
Starting in 1948, the city of Houston and Harris County shared the $400,000 cost 
of shoring up the banks, removing debris and fallen trees, and deepening the streambed 
over three miles of the bayou near downtown.334 Memorial Drive and Buffalo Parkway 
ran along the either side of the bayou. These efforts were characterized as 
“beautification”, and they did make the bayou more visible and accessible from the road, 
but they were, in fact, a form of channelization used commonly to improve urban 
drainage.  
Channelization projects continued on Houston’s bayous during the 1950s and 60s. 
Despite the challenge of convincing voters to authorize funding for flood control bonds to 
carry out more extensive work, the Harris County Flood Control District continued to 
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remove obstructions, clear trees, and to cover the banks of some bayous with sod to hold 
them in place. When the second phase of the Buffalo Bayou and Tributaries Project was 
finally approved, federal funds appropriated, and local bonds issued in 1957, more 
extensive channel rectification – straightening, deepening, and concrete lining – 
commenced in some areas. While these improvements were supposed to allow the bayous 
to carry water faster through the city, and thus prevent the backups that caused suburban 
flooding, the higher-speed channels also contributed to more sudden flash floods in some 
neighborhoods.  
In 1966, the Buffalo Bayou Preservation Association was formed by upset 
residents of the upper middle-class Memorial neighborhood in order to stop Corps of 
Engineers channel-clearing efforts on a nearby section of Buffalo Bayou.335 One of those 
residents, Terry Hershey, arguably became Houston’s greatest environmentalist. Hershey 
had settled in the Memorial area with her husband, Jacob Hershey, then CEO of 
American Commercial Barge Lines, a few years earlier. She had a key role in organizing 
local efforts to preserve the natural beauty of neighborhood waterways and to stop the 
continued channelization of Houston’s bayous.336  
A young Congressman George H.W. Bush called for hearings where local 
activists could testify to damages in their neighborhoods. In 1967, the Corps of Engineers 
agreed to yet another restudy of the Buffalo Bayou project, this time giving some 
consideration to non-structural alternatives to rectification, and after a few attempts to 
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maintain their former approach, ultimately transformed their designs for the bayou from a 
straightened, concrete ditch to a wetland recreation area and chain of city parks.  
In the 1950s and early 1960s, civic and business leaders across the sunbelt had 
been trying to just anticipate development, let alone regulate it.337 In Houston, the 
Chamber of Commerce did propose several administrative solutions, such as mandating 
developers provide rights-of-way for future drainage needs.338 The “Master Flood 
Control Plan” advocated for by the Houston Chamber of Commerce Flood Control 
Committee and the Harris County Flood Control District “would allow for the provision 
of drainage right-of-way in subdivision plats, even when development of the land is far in 
advance of drainage construction.” Meanwhile, the city of Houston had been planning for 
the “beautification” of parts of Buffalo Bayou near downtown along the Buffalo 
Parkway. Designed “to relieve the monotony of a city”, plans for clearing undergrowth, 
putting down sod, and stabilizing eroding banks would enhance the car-oriented parkway 
running along the bayou, and it would meet “a definite need for these open green 
spaces.”339 
 The forceful grassroots environmental response to bayou rectification a decade 
later was unexpected by Harris County leaders who had been patiently focused on 
completing drainage projects that had been beset by delays. In contrast to the business-led 
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efforts of the 1950s to improve drainage and control pollution, the aesthetic demand of 
Houston’s grassroots groups to preserve the bayous in their natural state was clearly a 
new perspective brought into the discussion by the activists. Grassroots groups even 
argued that rectified, concrete channels were not really effective for flood control. 
In her dissertation on the “Save Buffalo Bayou Campaign”, Teresa Tomkins-
Walsh focuses very closely on the coalition of civic organizations and upper-middle class 
social networks involved in the campaign. She gives a detailed organizational history of 
the campaign and its legacy in the 1970s and argues that it demonstrated the changing 
demographics of activists in the late 1960s. As she writes, upper middle class residents 
represented an “expansion of twentieth-century volunteer conservation to postwar 
environmental activism.”340 Tomkins-Walsh describes how they turned a “Not-In-My-
Backyard” (NIMBY) response to tree-clearing on the banks of Buffalo Bayou into a 
national example for changing the politics of flood control. They also created a 
“community" of local environmental organizations that would work on land conservation, 
air, and water quality issues throughout the 1970s.  
The Save our Bayou campaign worked through local representatives to stall the 
completion of a federal project that the activists thought was not responsive to local 
needs, at least at the time. The campaign often brought the activists into conflict with 
Harris County Commissioners and Flood Control District officials, who were still trying 
to complete the drainage program they had started in the late 1940s. The Save our Bayou 
campaign, which eventually evolved into the Bayou Preservation Association, achieved 
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its goal after the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) was passed in late 1969. As 
a result, the Corps of Engineers was required to solicit public comments on one of its first 
Environmental Impact Statements in 1970, and subsequently, the rectification project for 
Upper Buffalo Bayou was cancelled in 1971. Local efforts at beautification, long 
proposed, successfully followed in the late 1970s.   
My research on flood control in Houston in the 1950s responds to Tomkins-
Walsh’s study by showing that concerns about over-development, pollution control, and 
conservation of natural areas started among local officials and business leaders. They 
recognized these issues and did try to put in place regulations at the local level. In fact, 
civic and business-led pollution control efforts were widespread during this period. For 
example, Sarah Elkind writes about the response to choking smog in Los Angeles in the 
late 1940s.341 The local Chamber of Commerce represented a coalition of business 
interests, and it sought to impose voluntary thresholds on local industry. Despite 
grassroots protests that the Los Angeles Chamber was not doing enough, Elkind argues 
that it became the representative of local concern as Los Angeles County tried to regulate 
pollution and respond to growing state efforts to do the same.  
In Tomkins-Walsh’s Houston narrative, the Corps of Engineers and Harris 
County commissioners were inflexibly tied to the plans for channelizing the bayous that 
were part of the approved Definite Project Report of 1940. In fact, County 
Commissioners had to be incredibly persistent in their efforts to modify the Buffalo 
Bayou Project in the 1950s to include flood control on the county’s other bayous. 
                                               
341 Elkind, How Local Politics Shape Federal Policy, 203. 
 181 
Rectification, it turned out, was actually the fallback position once it was clear that the 
north and south canals around the city were too expensive to build. Straightening, 
clearing, and lining the bayou channels through the city was the only obvious solution 
after the original system could not be completed and suburban flooding continued.  
It was this 1954 flood control plan, mostly focused on improving suburban 
drainage, that the advocates of “conservation” were fighting in the mid-1960s, and the 
activists likely did not know how much pressure county officials had been under to make 
improved drainage a reality a little more than a decade earlier. The Save Our Bayou 
activists thus targeted a flood control project that had been mired in a lengthy federal 
appropriations process and resistance to local fundraising efforts. It was always on the 
edge of non-completion, despite the persistence of county commissioners, the Houston 
Chamber of Commerce, and Corps of Engineers 
The cancellation of the Upper Buffalo Bayou Project, 1966-1971 
When the “Save Buffalo Bayou” campaign began in 1966 it had been a decade 
since the first federal appropriations were made, and local bonds approved, to finance 
rectification on Houston’s bayous. Several miles of Brays and White Oak Bayous had 
been cleared and lined with concrete. Some localized flooding had been prevented 
through this improved drainage. Now an additional 12 miles of Buffalo Bayou, from 
Shepard Drive through growing white, middle-class neighborhoods along Memorial 
Drive all the way to Addicks Dam, would also be cleared by the Corps of Engineers. It 
was residents of those neighborhoods, seeing trees uprooted and the banks of the bayou 
carved away to increase the size of the channel, that first spoke out against the project’s 
destruction of the area’s natural beauty.  
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Figure 5.1. Completed rectification on section of Brays Bayou, Houston Post, 1968. Records of the Bayou 
Preservation Association, University of Houston Libraries.  
 Taking action after community meetings organized by Terry Hershey, letters from 
people living near Memorial Park started pouring into the mayor’s office and city 
planners. Many were from professionals who had recently moved to the Houston area for 
engineering and medical jobs. They spoke about their perception of Houston as offering 
beautiful waterways and parks, not a city “riddled with concrete ditches.”342 
Some of the tactics used by the Save Buffalo Bayou campaign were developed by 
national environmental organizations to fight major civil works projects a decade earlier, 
such as the Echo Park Dam in Dinosaur National Monument in Colorado. The Sierra 
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Club, for instance, which had built resistance to the Echo Park Dam and was 
campaigning hard against the Corps’ flood control projects in the Florida Everglades, 
sent out material sponsored by the Fisher-Pierce Co (maker of Boston Whaler boats) on 
how to oppose “wasteful and damaging” civil works projects. Taking cues from a 
growing intellectual shift against structural flood control, largely associated with the 
Geographer Gilbert White, these organizations championed land-use restrictions and the 
preservation of floodplains as natural forms of flood control.   
Through the leadership of key activists such as Terry Hershey, the Save Buffalo 
Bayou campaign had been organized into the Buffalo Bayou Preservation Association 
(BBPA) by late 1966. Its first director was George P. Mitchell, a petroleum engineer, 
businessman, and early pioneer in hydraulic fracturing techniques. Mitchell and the 
BBPA leadership wanted the Corps to again restudy the Buffalo Bayou project to 
consider if rectification was the only reasonable means of preventing floods. Mitchell 
also brought BBPA’s concerns to Harris County Commissioners. “I am convinced that 
members of the Commissioners’ Court realize the necessity of considering the aesthetic 
approach in all such projects,” Mitchell wrote. “These officials have, I believe, come to 
realize that we cannot continue just to grow as a big city, paying attention only to the 
purely utilitarian aspects of our needs and desires.”  
Mitchell and Hershey’s networks in the Houston energy industry increased their 
political leverage. This was especially true after a new Republican Representative for the 
west side of Houston, George H.W. Bush, was elected in November, 1966. With the help 
of Congressman Bush, Terry Hershey appeared before the Public Works sub-committee 
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on Appropriations in May, 1967. She spoke out against “irreparable damage which would 
be done to Houston” if the Buffalo Bayou Project continued in its present form.343  
In a remarkable response, the Public Works sub-committee blocked 
appropriations to continue work on the bayou clearing for that fiscal year. Perhaps it was 
recognition of the growing grassroots environmental movement, but more likely 
competing priorities for other public works funding and a political gesture to 
Representative Bush were the main reasons for the temporary suspension of funding. 
Tomkins-Walsh argues that this was a moment of good luck for a freshman 
representative, from a newly-created district, who knew the right pressure point to hit. It 
was a tactical victory, not a permanent win. Harris County Commissioners were by now 
used to the fickle whims of Congress and local voters when it came to supporting flood 
control. They immediately approved a resolution asking for the funds to be restored.344 
The BBPA’s next move was to lobby the Harris County Commissioners’ Court as 
the primary local supporter of bayou rectification. In letters to county commissioners, 
BBPA leadership, members, and other concerned citizens would question every 
assumption the second phase of the Buffalo Bayou project was built on. For example, if 
improved drainage was designed to carry something greater than the 100-year flood 
through Memorial neighborhoods, perhaps the risk was too small to warrant the current 
environmentally destructive plan?  The primary message to commissioners was that the 
project needed to be paused and restudied, but if that was impossible, officials must 
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consider “several possible alternate solutions which would take care of flood control on a 
reasonable basis, and also leave most of the natural beauty of the Bayou banks relatively 
untouched.”345   
Funding the project really became a critical concern for local officials in January, 
1968, when another bond referendum failed. Now both federal and local financing was 
temporarily lacking. The BBPA had won their temporary halt to construction on the 
bayou. Meanwhile, Representative Bush wrote to the Corps of Engineers about 
“alternative solutions” that the BBPA had been pushing for. The Corps responded that 
they were considering techniques such as gabions – basically mesh boxes filled with 
rocks – to prevent erosion instead of concrete channel-lining.  
In July, 1968, yet another bond referendum failed to win voter approval. This one 
was for $61 million – about half for roads and half for flood control. After two decades of 
local fundraising through repeated bond initiatives, Harris County voters were growing 
increasingly unwilling to support long-term infrastructure efforts, especially ones that 
could lead to increased property taxes. Without local contributions to purchasing rights-
of-way, there was no use for further federal appropriations for construction. The project 
on Buffalo Bayou would be suspended for another year. And, critically, this vote also 
directly impacted the HCFCD’s operating budget. “We’ll exist in name only now, 
because we won’t be able to accomplish anything,” said Tom Langford, the county flood 
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control engineer. “We now have a free balance available for expenditure of around 
$50,000 which isn’t enough to spit across the street with.”346 
A full year later, in July, 1969, a referendum on flood control bonds finally 
passed, but this funding for rights-of-way did not allow construction to get much further. 
Six months later, in January 1970, the National Environmental Policy Act was signed 
into law by President Nixon. NEPA required federal agencies involved in public works 
projects to produce Environmental Impact Statements (EIS’s) that would publicly assess 
damages to ecosystems, wildlife, and human well-being. NEPA required government 
engineers to gather a lot of new data and consult with a range of experts beyond their 
own community. Around the country, civil works projects slowed down as the new 
regulations were integrated into the Corps’, and other federal agencies’, design and 
review process. One of the first impact statements produced by the Corps would be on the 
Buffalo Bayou Project. 
Meanwhile, in Houston, grassroots environmental groups were organizing around 
numerous local issues and building coalitions. For example, the group Citizens Who Care 
sponsored a community education program on air quality issues. Attendees later formed 
the Citizens’ Environmental Coalition with twenty-seven member groups. The spring of 
1970 was clearly the environmentalists’ moment, as a national movement celebrated the 
first Earth Day in April.  
In October, 1970, the Corps published an early EIS on the drainage work for 
upper Buffalo Bayou. The BBPA was quick to challenge it, along with a range of other 
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local and national environmental organizations who saw the threat of litigation as a new 
frontier in preventing the reckless destruction of natural resources. It would take several 
years before the Corps could refine the process of preparing these statements and 
including environmental organizations so that the EIS’s were not openly challenged.347  
In January, 1971, in large part due to the negative response to the Buffalo Bayou 
EIS, continuing funding shortfalls, and pressure from local representatives in Congress, 
the Corps of Engineers officially gave public notice that the Upper Buffalo Bayou Project 
had been cancelled. In February the Corps held a public hearing on the current overall 
flood control plan for Houston bayous. There were over 200 attendees, thanks to strong 
turnout by the supporters of preserving the bayous in a more natural state.348   
The battle for the natural bayou was won, but despite this victory, the war for 
non-structural flood control in Houston was lost. For example, in the fall of 1970, while 
the Corps was drafting the EIS, the Citizens Environmental Coalition land-use 
subcommittee, chaired by Leo Theiss and Terry Hershey, proposed adapting national 
environmental groups’ land-use policy goals to Houston’s suburban fringe. The land-use 
subcommittee also tried to arrange meetings with local government representatives and 
developers about these goals. These efforts were not particularly successful.  
Tomkins-Walsh argues that this policy failure represents the mixed legacy of 
grassroots environmental action in Houston: they successfully modified the Buffalo 
Bayou Project, preserving some natural areas and creating parks where only concrete 
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ditches were planned, but they also lost the wider policy fight to control development in 
bayou floodplains. 
Miami and the campaign to save the Everglades, 1960-1972 
While grassroots groups campaigned to preserve the natural beauty of Houston’s 
bayous, the national environmental movement took up the cause of Florida’s Everglades. 
During the 1960s, the last preserved natural areas of the Everglades would become a site 
of increasing contention between a growing environmental movement, the C&SF Flood 
Control District, and federal agencies. With the Central and Southern Florida Project well 
into its second phase of construction, flood control had evolved into the institutional 
management of the hydrology of the entire Okeechobee watershed.  
After the floods of 1960, South Florida’s cyclical weather patterns shifted 
drastically, and a severe drought started in 1961. It would last for the next four years. The 
environmental consequences of the prolonged dry spell were very clear in Everglades 
National Park where dry ponds and desiccated wetlands were littered with the bodies of 
dead birds, alligators and deer. Shrimp nurseries in the Bay of Florida were decimated.349 
There was no guaranteed allotment of water for the National Park in the Corps’ plan, and 
the C&SF District would not commit to providing any water ration either. The C&SF 
District justified this position by claiming that its first priorities were for steady water 
supplies to the Okeechobee agricultural area, now increasingly dominated by large sugar 
producers, and the still-growing coastal cities.350 In July 1961 Secretary of the Interior 
                                               
349 Joan A. Browder, “Relationship between Pink Shrimp Production on the Tortugas Grounds and 
Water Flow Patterns in the Florida Everglades,” Bulletin of Marine Science 37, no. 3 (1985): 839–56.   
350 Godfrey and Catton, River of Interests, 50.   Sugar production in the former Everglades had 
exploded after the Cuban Revolution of 1959 displaced the island’s industry and exports.  
 189 
Stewart Udall wrote a letter to the Corps of Engineers requesting a minimum 
commitment of water for the National Park from the water conservation areas managed 
by the C&SF District, but the Corps again refused to make that commitment, claiming 
that all water rights were held by the Flood Control District.  
By 1965, with the C&SF project only a little more than half complete, most of the 
water that fell as rain on the Kissimmee River, Lake Okeechobee, and the Everglades was 
channeled, stored, and released by systems administered by the C&SF Flood Control 
District. Flood control had now completely altered the South Florida landscape. In 1966 
the water-cycle reversed, and flooding once again became a problem in South Florida. 
This time, however, the C&SF District was able to fully protect the Okeechobee farms 
and coastal suburbs. But by pumping water “uphill” into the Everglades, and filling up 
the water conservation areas to capacity, the Flood Control District stranded huge deer 
populations and other wildlife in the remaining dry areas behind the levees.351 
Conservationists were able to get the Governor to order a halt to pumping, but the C&SF 
District insisted that pumping was necessary to prevent flooding in the agricultural areas. 
As the Jacksonville District Corps of Engineers chief told a reporter, “If the large 
volumes of excess floodwater had not been pumped to the lake and conservation areas the 
deer situation would have been far overshadowed by headlines citing a disastrous flood in 
both urban and agricultural areas of south Florida.”352 As tensions between these 
competing priorities increased, pressure mounted for a modification to the C&SF project 
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that would control floods, ensure fresh water supplies, and also protect the natural 
resources of the Everglades.  
In 1968 the Corps of Engineers completed a restudy of the original C&SF project, 
now 19 years old. The restudy emphasized restoring water supplies to Everglades 
National Park, but it required conveyance canals and additional pumping stations to 
pump excess water from the remaining coastal agricultural areas westward into the 
Everglades. Planning around the needs of the National Park was a significant change in 
the Corps of Engineer’s priorities in response to growing environmental awareness. 
Activist groups at the state level, particularly the Florida Audubon Society, were pushing 
the issue of Saving the Everglades into the national conversation. The image of dead 
birds in South Florida echoed with stories of wildlife harmed by pollution in other coastal 
states.353 The restudy of the C&SF project still did not mandate a definite amount of 
water to the park, but “this reiteration of the promise in the C&SF Project plan, although 
somewhat vague, showed that the drought of the 1960s and the work of park proponents 
was having some effect on the Corps’ perception of how the project should be operated,” 
Godfrey and Catton write in River of Interests. “It was a small step, but it set the stage for 
congressional leaders, such as Senators Gaylord Nelson and Edmund Muskie, to resolve 
the situation.”354  
The Flood Control Act of 1968 authorized the modifications recommended by the 
Corps’ restudy of the C&SF Project. These modifications alone would cost an additional 
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$70 million. There was still no formal commitment from the Corps of Engineers for how 
much water would be delivered to the National Park, but there was an understanding 
between the Department of the Interior and the Department of the Army that the Corps 
would provide at least 315,000 acre-feet of water to the park annually. The State of 
Florida and the C&SF District still refused to guarantee a specific supply of water.  
Environmental concerns were forefront on the national stage by 1970. The 
National Environmental Policy Act was signed in January and the first Earth Day was 
celebrated in April. Gaylord Nelson, a senator from Wisconsin and sponsor of NEPA and 
the Earth Day demonstrations, remained interested in the drama of the Everglades, and he 
held hearings that year on the modifications to the C&SF Project. Nelson expedited a 
more formal agreement by withholding Congressional appropriations for the C&SF 
project until the National Park Service, the State of Florida, and the Corps of Engineers 
could finalize their negotiations about exactly how much water the park would get. 
By the early 1970s, however, the drama of saving Everglades National Park was 
equaled by concerns about the impacts of over-population along the Southeast coast of 
Florida. In the 1950’s South Florida’s population had more than doubled. In 1960 Dade 
County’s population was approaching a million people, and planners optimistically 
projected that the population of the Miami area would double again by 1970. It was 
projected to eventually reach 4 million by 1980. While Dade County did not grow quite 
as expected, the Southeast Florida region as a whole did experience nearly 50 percent 
growth during the 1960s, and the population reached 2.3 million people by 1970 and 3.3 
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million by 1980, creating a regional megacity from the northern keys to the Palm 
Beaches.355  
The demographics of Miami were changing rapidly as well during this period. 
Waves of immigration from Latin America, and especially from Cuba after the 
communist takeover in 1959, created more diverse inner city neighborhoods while white 
suburbs sprawled further south and west into former agricultural lands.356 Dade County 
officials had stopped acting so surprised at the speed of suburban development. The 
region had been under a metropolitan Miami-Dade government for more than 12 years, 
and the bureaucratic infrastructure was in place to begin thinking about how to manage 
the scale of South Florida’s growth. With the dramatic increases in population, the 
unintended consequences of the flood control projects started to become clearer.  
The Environmentalists’ moment, 1972 
Another severe drought started in 1970 and lasted for the next 18 months. The 
large population of Dade and Broward counties drew down groundwater supplies to 
critical levels, and county managers had to ask the C&SF District to pump surface water 
from the conservation areas to prevent salt-water intrusion into the county’s well fields. 
The Greater Miami Chamber of Commerce called on communities across the region to 
start making plans to limit water usage in anticipation of the next drought.357  Meanwhile 
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in Lake Okeechobee farms drained away so much water that portions of the muddy 
bottom of the lake were exposed and started to dry out.358  
Water shortages were followed by another environmental crisis in Lake 
Okeechobee as fertilizer runoff from farms in the Kissimmee River watershed increased 
phosphorous pollution in the remnants of the lake. Lack of water meant that there was no 
easy way to dilute the runoff. Algae thrived on this missing element, which was normally 
in short supply, and bloomed spectacularly, using up most of the available oxygen in the 
lake and producing toxic effects. Lake Okeechobee, Indian River, and St. Lucie River 
recreation and fishing collapsed. Beaches near outlet canals stank from dead algae and 
fish. This disaster was partly due to the third phase of the C&SF project which had 
straightened out the Kissimmee River, drained wetlands, and allowed more runoff to 
move more quickly into Lake Okeechobee. Flooding of ranches in the Kissimmee Valley 
was under control, but the downstream consequences were just beginning.  
In response, newly-elected Democratic Governor Reubin Askew called for a 
Conference on Water Management in South Florida.359 Although he had been a state 
senator from Pensacola since 1962, Askew appealed to a South Florida electorate no 
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longer closely tied to the state’s rural past. Askew was the first Florida governor to really 
benefit from the new political order in Florida after years of northern counties controlling 
politics through the malapportioned state legislature. Although the state legislature had 
been reapportioned after 1962 to reflect the massive population shift to South Florida, it 
took nearly a decade for those demographic changes to be reflected in the political 
orientation of the state’s leaders. Askew was a steady, consistent public servant where the 
former Governor, Claude Kirk, had been an entirely unpredictable one. Askew vowed to 
end the last vestiges of the Pork Chop Gang’s influence on state politics by instituting 
ethics reforms.360  
In 1971, Governor Askew came into office in a moment of critical environmental 
concern.361 In his view, the problems in the Everglades that got the most public attention, 
the “drowning wildlife and muck fires” were really “only symptoms of the larger, long 
range problems we face.” Chief among those were projected chronic water shortages and 
saltwater contamination of the groundwater supplies.  
The Governor’s Conference on Water Management in South Florida included 
journalists, such as Jeanne Bellamy, and civic leaders who had originally championed the 
C&SF projects and now were concerned about the transformations that rapid population 
growth had caused in South Florida. The Governor’s Conference also included several 
prominent conservation activists, such as ecologist Arthur Marshall, who felt that the 
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natural Everglades had never been given a strong enough priority in the Corps of 
Engineers’ original designs.  
The final statement from the conference was a dramatic change in rhetoric about 
the state’s development. “There is a limit to the number of people which the South 
Florida basin can support and at the same time maintain a quality environment,” the 
statement declared.362 Only with more regulation over the location and pace of 
development, as well as the management of water resources, would Florida be able to 
continue to grow.363   
Following the conference, Governor Askew championed a Water Resources Act 
for Florida.364 It called for new Water Management Districts to broadly regulate all of the 
State’s watersheds. The Water Management Districts would have the power to issue 
permits for large water users in their jurisdictions.365 Most importantly, the act setup a 
$240 million fund for local governments to use to purchase environmentally-sensitive 
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lands. By 1977, the C&SF Flood Control District was renamed the South Florida Water 
Management District (SFWMD).  
The Corps of Engineers had wanted to use Lake Okeechobee itself as a source of 
fresh water, both to maintain supplies and to keep salt water out of the aquifers. In order 
to transform Lake Okeechobee into a better reservoir, the Corps needed to increase the 
water level in the lake. But where was the water going to come from? The Corps came up 
with a system that could pump water back into the lake from agricultural and water 
conservation areas to the south. This pumped water was full of fertilizer and other 
pesticides. Additional polluted water continued to flow into Lake Okeechobee from 
Kissimmee River which had lost most of its wetland capacity to filter that runoff.  
Environmentalists were determined to save Lake Okeechobee and insisted the 
back-pumping from agricultural areas be stopped, even if a higher lake level helped better 
insure the supply of fresh water. Meanwhile sport fishing and recreation groups resisted 
the SFWMD’s attempts to dump excess fresh water from the polluted lake using the 
northern outlet canals on the East Coast. Only during periods of severe flooding would it 
be necessary to drain off excess water in the lake. Meanwhile it was clear that nobody 
wanted the polluted water, and the filtering value of the marshes of the Kissimmee and 
Northern Everglades had been greatly underestimated.  
Water Supply Woes, 1975-1981 
In the 1980’s President Reagan began a policy of weakening the environmental 
regulations of the 1970s, while simultaneously putting states in greater charge of civil 
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works projects.366 In 1982, the General Accounting Office harshly reviewed the 
remainder of the C&SF Project which seemed stuck between trying to complete its 
original 1954 designs and planning for environmental modifications that had been 
proposed in the 1970s.367 Meanwhile environmentalists in South Florida had another 
advocate in Governor Bob Graham, who had come into office in 1979 after years of 
campaigning to “Save the Everglades” in the State Senate.  
Local environmental concerns combined with federal spending constraints 
produced a greater focus on “non-structural” solutions to flood control and water supply 
that worked with natural conditions instead of trying to fundamentally alter them. These 
kinds of solutions were particularly championed by the new St. Johns River Water 
Management District that had one of the most limited property tax bases to draw from.368 
Approaches such as buying land in floodplains and restricting development around them 
were also used by the Southwest Florida Water Management District when funding dried 
up for the Four River Basins Project. 
Most critical to Miami-Dade County managers was assuring the supply of high 
quality drinking water as the region’s population grew. Miami drew from wells in the 
Biscayne Aquifer which pooled underneath the eastern half of the former Everglades. 
Water from much of the Lake Okeechobee watershed slowly trickled through limestone 
to recharge the aquifer. As the Corps and SFWMD channeled, ponded, and shunted water 
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to the Atlantic Ocean, the aquifer could not recharge, and the demand for fresh water 
from Miami and Fort Lauderdale drew it down much faster than it could have recharged 
under the best natural conditions before the flood control projects.369 As the Biscayne 
aquifer was drained of fresh water, salty brackish water from adjacent aquifers nearer the 
coastline began to infiltrate the municipal water supply. Miami’s drinking water was also 
being polluted by heavy organic loads from algae and “muck” that thrived on runoff from 
sugar fields and farms in the agricultural reserve near Lake Okeechobee.  
Fort Lauderdale in neighboring Broward county also drew water from the 
Biscayne Aquifer, and its water supply challenges were even more acute. In 1981 the 
Environmental Coalition of Broward County and the Friends of the Everglades held three 
forums on drinking water quality and its relationship to water conservation. At one of 
those forums ecologist Arthur Marshall, after stepping down from the Governing Board 
of the SFWMD, spoke passionately about the unintended impacts of the flood control 
projects on drinking water supplies in Southeast Florida. For Marshall, the ecological 
problems in the Everglades and the water supply problems on the southeast coast were 
inherently connected.370 At the forum Marshall described his own “Marshall Plan” to 
restore the natural flow of water through the Everglades, and thus secure a more reliable 
supply of fresh water for the cities on the southeast coast. In the decades since then, the 
Corps of Engineers has implemented many elements of the “Marshall Plan” – at a 
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significantly greater cost than achieving flood control in the first place. These restoration 
projects were essentially a “re-plumbing” of the entire drainage system.371  
Tampa and the deactivation of the Four River Basins Project, 1965-1981 
During the same period in which grassroots environment groups were fighting the 
rectification of Houston’s bayous and trying to protect the remaining Everglades in the 
Miami area, progress on Tampa’s flood control system was becoming increasingly 
difficult. The national environmental movement that had gained momentum in the late 
1960’s resulted in transformative legislation at the federal level that changed the process 
through which the Corps of Engineers designed projects.372 NEPA’s mandatory 
Environmental Impact Statements became required of state agencies as well. At agencies 
like the Southwest Florida Water Management District, NEPA opened the door for 
greater input from environmental advocacy groups that could demand measures be put in 
place to safeguard natural resources and reduce ecosystem damages from some projects. 
These groups could even sue states and government agencies over the thoroughness of 
EIS’s. Legal action became a powerful tool to stall many federal projects for years.373 
Interestingly, the SWFWMD started working with ecologists at USF to prepare EIS’s in 
1969, before they were required by the federal government, on projects such as the 
Tampa Bypass Canal.374 
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In 1971, Tampa was also feeling the effects of South Florida’s prolonged drought. 
All the growth of the 1960s had put considerable pressure on water resources. Meeting 
the demands of uninhibited population growth, while reducing the pollution of Florida’s 
recreational areas, was central to voters. Governor Askew’s response, and his lasting 
environmental legacy, was the Water Resources Act of 1972 that led to the creation of 
regional Water Management Districts for the entire state following the model of the 
SWFWMD.  
The past success and failures of flood control in the Miami and Tampa areas 
influenced the new water management districts of the 1970s. As former SWFWMD Chair 
Derrill McAteer noted, in the early 1970s the new water management districts were 
trying to distance themselves from the old, expensive, infrastructure-dependent model of 
the C&SF Flood Control District, a model that had initially been tried at the SWFWMD 
for the Four River Basins. “…the kind of things that they would do were the old way,” 
McAteer recalled. “We were trying to go to a new way. So there was not a whole lot of 
compatibility in our positions in Tallahassee and elsewhere.”375 Without support for large 
federal projects, water management worked under very different principles in other parts 
of the state. For example, the sparsely populated, hilly Suwanee River District in north 
Florida has never built any works on their namesake river.376 
The 1970’s would see the shelving of most of the structural components of the 
Four River Basins. Over the next decade, the Cross-Florida Barge Canal, and many of the 
other flood control and water storage components still planned for the C&SF Project, 
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were also cancelled. By the mid-1980s, the change in engineering paradigm, 
environmental resistance, and finally economic limitations, had severely curtailed the 
designs for the flood control system that had been envisioned two decades earlier. By 
1985, the South Atlantic Division Engineer in Atlanta had listed most of the reservoirs 
and canals to be moved to “inactive” status, although they were not decommissioned.377 
With most federal projects completely stalled, the Water Management Districts 
would use many strategies to carry out their expanding missions, and they would become 
more deeply involved in ensuring the stability and quality of fresh water supplies. The 
Corps of Engineers did not put projects such as the Barge Canal on the “inactive list” 
lightly. There were years of restudies and testimony before Congress. But the 
Jacksonville District had many other projects in Florida that had more urgency and local 
support: deepening channels and harbors, completing the intracoastal waterway, and 
restoring eroded beaches.  
The following sections detail key campaigns for grassroots environmental groups 
in the Tampa Area and northern Florida.  
Defeating the Tampa Bay fresh water lake plan (1965 - 1968) 
During the drought of the early 1960’s one of the most controversial ideas to 
prevent salt water intrusion into the Floridian aquifer had been to impound part of Tampa 
Bay and turn it into a fresh water lake. As water managers began to understand how 
quickly aquifer levels were being drawn down as St. Petersburg’s usage increased, there 
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was increasing urgency to prevent contamination of the regional water supply. As former 
SWFWMD Executive Director Dale Twachtmann recalled, “First of all, hydrology had 
shown up, because I thought we should protect those wells that were up in northwest 
Hillsborough County. By holding all the fresh water possible on the land, that would help 
those wells. Help, not necessarily the wells, but help the whole situation.”378 
Engineers working for Hillsborough and Pinellas counties proposed building a 
dike across the northern end of Old Tampa Bay and refilling that area with fresh water. In 
theory, the higher level of fresh water near the coast would provide enough pressure to 
prevent salt water from getting into the region’s water supply. The large, $4.5 million 
project was going to be financed entirely locally, without federal support. As the plan 
came closer to execution in the summer of 1965, an array of groups, led by scientists 
from the University of South Florida, organized to prevent catastrophic environmental 
damage to the bay. Organizations such as the Save Our Bays Committee passionately 
argued that all marine life in that section of the bay would be killed and a critical 
breeding ground for shrimp and fish would be ruined. As fresh water increased in the 
bay, the stink of rotting algae would ruin the aesthetics and recreational value of the bay 
front. Furthermore, these groups painted the plan as taxpayer dollars serving developers 
who would try to build on newly-reclaimed land dredged from the former bay area.  
William Taft, a geologist from USF who led the Save our Bays Committee, went 
on local TV to argue that even the main justification for the project was wrong because 
the level of the lake could not be maintained high enough to prevent saltwater from 
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getting into the aquifer. “If salt water intrusion is the argument - you are being taken,” he 
claimed. “If you taxpayers feel the way we do – that the smell from these arrangements is 
stronger than that from the mud flats of upper Tampa Bay – will you please help us?”379 
The defeat of the freshwater lake plan was one of the first major environmental successes 
in the region and started a trend towards questioning the motives of large water projects, 
including ones sponsored by local authorities.  
In his first years at the district, Dale Twachtmann had spent a lot of time fighting 
with environmentalists over plans for the Four River Basins, but on the fresh water lake 
issue, he ended up changing his mind after numerous meetings with conservationists such 
as USF’s William Taft. “One day I just decided, I think they’re right,” He recalled. “I had 
been arguing with them, and I got to just really dislike them because they were so nasty, 
and [their implying] that we were stupid and they were smart. The attitude was awful. 
But I came to believe they were correct.”380  
Although the fresh water lake plan may have failed, pollution in Tampa Bay 
continued to be problem in the 1960s. The same political transformations that supported 
the nonstructural, floodplain management approach to flood control in Southwest Florida 
also brought concerns about heavy pollution in Tampa Bay. In 1969, the federal 
government ordered Tampa to “clean up its act.” As director of Tampa’s Public Works, 
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Twachtmann sought to develop a new water treatment plant at Hookers Point on the 
Hillsborough River. It would be a $170 million facility capable of cleaning sewage to the 
point where it could be released in Tampa Bay without causing nitrogen contamination. 
Twachtmann was widely praised by environmentalists for his role in restoring the health 
of Tampa Bay in the 1970s. He eventually became Secretary of the Florida Department 
of Environmental Regulation in 1987.381 
The defeat of the Cross-Florida Barge Canal (1974-1981) 
Perhaps the greatest environmentalist victory of the 1970s in Florida was the 
demise of the Cross-Florida Barge Canal, a project with direct implications for the 
remnants of the Four River Basins system. The dream of a bulk shipping short-cut across 
the Florida peninsula had morphed into an active project during the 1930s. Congress 
approved funding for the project during World War Two, but major construction on the 
185-mile long system of canals, locks, and dams did not start until 1964. President 
Johnson, following on promises made by John F. Kennedy to build the canal, presided 
over the groundbreaking ceremony.382 When completed it would connect the Atlantic 
Intracoastal waterway from southern Georgia to the Gulf of Mexico on the Florida 
panhandle. Its supporters, who included most of Florida’s elected officials in the early 
1960’s, promoted the project as “Main street, U.S.A.”383  
In 1966 the Corps of Engineers started work on the first major dam on the 
Oklawaha River outside of Gainesville, Florida, which inundated wetlands and forests to 
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create Lake Oklawaha.384 The new lake soon began to fill up with water hyacinths and 
choking algae blooms as the natural flow of fresh water was impeded by the dam. 
Environmentalists, led by Marjorie Carr, the wife of a University of Florida zoologist, 
and the Florida Audobon Society, were dismayed at the appearance of these first 
environmental damages, and vowed to stop the completion of other segments of the barge 
canal. 
In 1969 they formed Florida Defenders of the Environment. Working with 
national environmental organizations such as Environmental Defense Fund, the group 
used a new tactic to stop civil works projects and major polluters: they sued the Corps of 
Engineers for destroying the natural resources of the Oklawaha River without having 
fully studied the social costs and benefits of their project. Years of litigation and political 
maneuvering followed. During this period, large environmental organizations were 
learning the power of litigation to delay civil works projects around the country.385 
Meanwhile, the grassroots campaign against the barge canal gained statewide, and 
eventually, national attention. It was a period of exceptional environmental awareness 
and high-profile events such as the fire on the Cuyahoga River and the Santa Barbara oil 
spill. In January, 1971, President Nixon ordered a stop to construction on the canal. It is 
likely that political considerations for his re-election campaign were at least part of the 
decision, but his statement reflected the change in the calculation of costs and benefits. 
The Cross-Florida Barge Canal “was conceived and designed at a time when the focus of 
Federal concern in such matters was still almost completely on maximizing economic 
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return,” Nixon’s statement read. “In calculating that return, the destruction of natural, 
ecological values was not counted as a cost, nor was a credit allowed for actions 
preserving the environment.”386 
By 1977 the State of Florida withdrew its support from the Barge Canal. Even the 
Corps of Engineers own environmental impact study did not recommend completion of 
the waterway. It was a huge success for coalitions of environmental organizations in 
Florida, a demonstration of how greatly state politics had changed, and a profound 
transformation of public opinion for a project that had enjoyed widespread support only 
ten years earlier. 
The decade that led to the demise of the Cross-Florida Barge Canal also witnessed 
the cancellation of most of the structural components of the Four River Basins Project. In 
1961 initial planning for the Four River Basins had assumed the Barge Canal would be 
under construction in the next few years and operational by the 1970s. Flood control on 
two of the Four Basin’s rivers, the Withlacoochee and Oklawaha, depended on the barge 
canal system as an outlet.387 Former SWFWMD Director Dale Twachtmann recalled 
testifying before Congress to at least preserve that function of the system. “I…said, 
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you want me to bring you the stacks of stuff that's coming in that this is awful, it's going nowhere, so I 
stopped it.  That's what he said he said.  And the president said, well, okay, and it stayed stopped.  I 
didn't know all that until twenty years later.”   
387 US Army Engineer District, Jacksonville, “Conference Summary on Four River Basins Survey.” 
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please let this much of it continue on the east end and this much of it continue on the west 
end because we are planning the whole Four River Basins Project to let the flood out of 
the Oklawaha and the Withlacoochee Rivers. And if you stop it, the flood control project 
won't work and we won't have channels to let the water out.”388   
“Water wars”: The consequences of the failure of the Four River Basins project (1974-
1985) 
Since the 1930s, the city of St. Petersburg, trapped on its peninsula between the 
Gulf of Mexico and brackish Tampa Bay, depended entirely on wells in Hillsborough 
county and a long pipeline to bring fresh water across the bay to the city. As the water 
table receded in drought years, and salt water moved in from the bay, concerns about 
water quality increased. The city of Tampa, however, still relied on the Hillsborough 
River as its primary water source, and during minor flood conditions, a lot of that surface 
water still ended up going into Tampa Bay.389 Tampa, St. Petersburg, and Clearwater 
were all old urban centers that had seen nearly a doubling of their population between 
1950 and 1960, with much of that growth immediately outside of the urban core.  
As St. Petersburg’s need for water increased, the city began to pump groundwater 
that was now needed in suburban Hillsborough County. Dale Twachtmann recalled 
consulting with hydrologists to really understand the stocks and flows through the 
limestone aquifer. This outside expertise helped the SWFWMD intervene in the usage 
                                               
388 Twachtmann, Interview with Dale Twachtmann on Water Management, 29. The outlet for the 
Oklawaha was never completed, but the bypass channel for the Withlacoochee was finished and 
operated in Citrus County using federal appropriations. It’s now part of the Cross-Florida Greenway.  
389 Harold Tyler, “Florida’s Water: How Long Will We Have Enough?,” Tampa Tribune, May 14, 
1967, Box 2, Accession No. 077-02-0045, RG 77, National Archives at Atlanta. 
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disputes between counties. “…then we joined in battle with the city of St. Petersburg and 
Pinellas County about their wells in northwest Hillsborough County,” Twachtmann 
recalled, “because we as a district were saying, look, you can say it's drought, and we 
agree it isn't raining like it used to, but you are causing effects on the surface... Like, 
cypress trees would just fall over. Lakes would go dry. They didn't want to believe 
that.  They always fought it.  They continue to fight it.  They were afraid of losing their 
wells, and they didn't have any other water supply.”390 
Suburban growth in rural areas of the Southwest coast of Florida had been 
relatively sedate compared to the rapid development in the Miami area on the other side 
of the peninsula. During prolonged droughts in the early 1960s, and again in the 1970s, 
more wellfields had been developed to supply irrigation for citrus farmers and newer 
subdivisions. At first, the SWFWMD just collected information from private well drillers 
– how many wells they had dug and the dimensions of the pipes they were using. Water 
Managers did not have any regulatory authority, and they needed data on usage before 
they could push for that authority. “Those numbers were startling,” Dale Twachtmann 
recalled. “I think that helped, in the long run, for the laws that came later, which did put 
the water management districts in the consumptive-use permitting business.”391 
Even without state authority, SWFWMD began attempting to regulate 
withdrawals from wellfields in Hillsborough county in 1968, and almost immediately 
there was resounding opposition from St. Petersburg and Pinellas County. The Water 
Management District was accused of “shutting down the growth in Pinellas County and 
                                               
390 Twachtmann, Interview with Dale Twachtmann on Water Management, 19. 
391 Twachtmann, 28. 
 209 
trying to move it to Pasco and Hillsborough,” former Chairman Derrill McAteer recalled. 
“Which is a basic lie. We had no thoughts at that point of shutting down Pinellas 
County.”392 But they did campaign heavily for authority from the state to legally regulate 
groundwater withdrawals from the aquifer.  
McAteer further recalled that St. Petersburg and Pinellas County were “pumping 
the guts out of” the aquifer, and county commissioners were coming in to Governing 
Board meetings and demanding that the SWFWMD take some regulatory action.393 The 
State of Florida Water Resources Act of 1972 gave the SWFWMD the official power to 
control how much water was being drawn out of the Floridian Aquifer.394 
In 1972 Dale Twachtmann was hired away from SWFWMD by Tampa mayor 
Dick Greco to run the city’s public works. It was regarded as a “major coup” by 
environmentalists since Twachtmann was now a “statewide expert on water problems”.395 
Surprisingly, Twachtmann’s first move was to secure more reliable water supplies for the 
city than its historic source, the Hillsborough River, by developing a new wellfield in 
areas that the Water Management District was trying to protect for water conservation 
purposes. This was exactly the kind of pressure on groundwater supplies that he had tried 
to regulate at SWFWMD. But the drought of the early 1970s was dire; Twachtmann 
recalled that on his first day on the job, Mayor Greco told him that the shortage was so 
acute that Tampa General Hospital had lost water pressure on the upper floors. “The city 
                                               
392 McAteer, Interview with Derrill McAteer, 6. 
393 McAteer, 6. 
394 Southwest Florida Water Management District, “The 1960s — The District’s Beginning.”   
395 Abby Kaighin, “Twachtmann Gets Water and Sewer Post,” Tampa Times, October 4, 1972, 
University of Florida Libraries.   
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was drinking the whole Hillsborough River, and the dam was letting nothing through,” 
Twachtmann said. “So we had to have another place to go.  So…I got going the concept 
to build that well field in the SWFWMD lands, which a year or two earlier I had 
suggested to the city of Tampa, that they could have that land for a well field.  So the 
irony was that I had to live with my own rules.” 
Obviously the Water Management District’s power to issue permits, and thus 
partially regulate groundwater withdrawals, did not solve the intercounty water supply 
disputes in the early 1970s. One idea that was floated at the time was for SWFWMD to 
become an overarching public utility for the entire Tampa Bay Area. Derrill McAteer felt 
it was going to be an impossible situation for the Water Management District to become a 
water supplier as well as the state-mandated regulator of groundwater usage. “Nobody 
would have trusted us,” he said. “Everybody thought we were favoring somebody else…I 
did not want the District to be both the regulator and the supplier. My God, what would 
we have been? We’d have been a monster of all monsters.” 
Demand for water increased dramatically in the 1980s because of rapid 
population growth in the Tampa Bay Area. Tampa took off in the 1980s just as Miami 
was reaching its own limits to growth, ones defined by its own flood control system that 
separated dry land from water conservation areas. After decades of expansion, the Miami 
area had limited remaining land for cheap development. Between the ocean and the 
remaining Everglades there were few rural areas left for the suburbs to expand. Waves of 
immigrants from the Caribbean reshaped Miami’s older neighborhoods, and the 
perception of rampant crime, drug trafficking, and the aging of Miami Beach greatly 
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reduced the attraction of the southeastern Gold Coast.396 But on the other side of the state 
rural areas around Tampa seemed untouched by these forces. 
Developers again began building large retirement communities along the newly-
completed interstates: south of Tampa on I-75 and northeast towards Orlando on I-4. 
Between 1970 and 1980, the population of the Tampa-St-Petersburg-Clearwater MSA 
increased by 50 percent to more than 1.6 million residents.397 Pasco County, immediately 
north of Tampa’s Hillsborough County, which had only a little more than 36,000 
residents in 1960 during the floods, had a population of nearly 200,000 by 1980. One of 
the biggest challenges for these new population centers was bringing in enough fresh 
water.  
Another solution to Tampa Bay Area water competition had been to combine 
municipal utilities into a new, regional organization. In the summer of 1974 - the same 
summer that the Green Swamp was designated a state area of critical concern - 
SWFWMD Executive Director Don Feaster presented plans for an interconnected water 
system to local politicians at a Tampa Bay Regional Planning Council meeting. At the 
time he admitted that the plan was still a “massive pipe dream”.398 A few months later, 
however, the State of Florida authorized an amendment to the Water Resources Act that 
would allow local government to create “regional water supply authorities” to 
cooperatively manage water supplies. The West Coast Regional Water Supply Authority 
                                               
396 Allman, “The City of the Future: Despite Its Problems, Miami Is the New York and Los Angeles of 
Tomorrow”; Mohl, “Miami: The Ethnic Cauldron.” 
397 US Census Bureau, “Census of Population and Housing.”   
398 “Water Boards Draw up Regional System,” St. Petersburg Times, July 20, 1974, Sam Gibbons 
Papers, University of South Florida Libraries.   
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(WCRWSA) was the first intergovernmental agency organized to help solve conflicts in 
the Tampa Bay area.  
The WCRWSA involved five parties: the city of St. Petersburg; Hillsborough, 
Pinellas, and Pasco counties; and the SWFWMD. It was a “Water Authority” without the 
legal authority to be a utility or regulator. It was merely a coordinating agency. The 
WCRWSA could not settle disputes such as which of these parties got water first, and at 
what rate.399 The SWFWMD still had the authority to issue pumping and drilling permits 
for access to groundwater.  
Meanwhile, one of the justifications for the reservoirs that had been planned for 
the Four River Basins Project was to prevent salt water intrusion by keeping a “cap” of 
fresh water on top of the Floridian aquifer.400 Now that the reservoirs were unlikely to 
ever be built, and the severe drought that had started in 1970 showed no signs to abating, 
the SWFWMD became more aggressive in its efforts to limit pumping from the aquifer to 
levels it felt were safe to prevent salt water intrusion. The Water Authority wanted to 
pump more water than its permits from the District allowed. Thus followed decades of 
litigation.  
Dale Twachtmann recalled recognizing this dilemma when he later became 
Secretary of the State of Florida’s Department of Environmental Regulation. “I could see 
that the water management districts thought that they were in the water supply business, 
and the cities and counties thought that they were in the water resource business,” he 
remembered, “and I said, we’d be way better off if we understand who’s supposed to be 
                                               
399 Swihart, Florida’s Water: A Fragile Resource in a Vulnerable State.   
400 Tyler, “Florida’s Water: How Long Will We Have Enough?”   
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doing what….Well, they get it crossed up, but it did help once it got defined, and we put 
it in the law.”401  
In 1980, at the request of SWFWMD, the Corps of Engineers completed a water 
management study on the Four River Basins system. This study highlighted alternative 
strategies for how excess water could be transported from the less developed outlying 
areas of SWFWMD to the southern counties with higher demand. For this study, the 
Corps modelled future water usage in different areas – projecting what areas would have 
extra water in the future and what areas would have deficits. In the 16-county area there 
were 2.2 million people in 1975. By 2035 it was projected to reach 5.5 million people (In 
2016 it’s about 4.7 million already). Most of the population concentrated in five counties 
around Tampa.402  
The city of Tampa had already constructed a water pipeline north to Pasco county 
to augment municipal water systems from the Hillsborough River and wellfields in 
Hillsborough County. The Corps of Engineers proposed opening new wellfields in the 
Floridian aquifer rather than building more pipelines. New reservoir construction, given 
the struggles of the SWFWMD with this issue in the previous decade, was off the table. 
Nevertheless, the Corps’ water management study immediately stoked renewed rural 
fears of water “stealing” – concerns that the water table would be reduced, sinking lakes 
and killing citrus trees.403  
                                               
401 Twachtmann, Interview with Dale Twachtmann on Water Management, 32. 
402 “Water Becoming a Top Issue,” Ocala Star-Banner, January 7, 1980, Box 2, Accession No. 077-
98-0046, RG 77, National Archives at Atlanta. 
403 Norm Swetman, “Engineers Reveal Plans to ‘steal’ Area Water,” Suncoast Sentinel, October 24, 
1980, Box 2, Accession No. 077-98-0046, RG 77, National Archives at Atlanta. 
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These conflicts set the stage for another intense period of litigation in the 1990s 
known locally as “the water wars”. It involved jurisdictional conflicts between the 
WCRWSA, the SWFWMD, and county governments in the Tampa Bay Area. The result 
is that today Tampa Bay Water, a single institution, is the sole water utility for Tampa, St. 
Petersburg, and their surrounding counties. It continues to work with the SWFWMD to 
find alternatives to ground water. With the failure of most of the structural components of 
the Four River Basins Project, it is an interesting speculation to wonder if natural 
watershed protection and floodplain management is adequate to the region’s needs. Could 
the unfinished reservoirs still be built? How much would they cost now?  
Chapter summary 
Over a 15-year period, from the late 1960s into the early 1980s, flood control 
projects in Houston, Miami and Tampa saw reassessments, delays, and a few outright 
cancellations due to grassroots environmental activism and tightening budgets. Each 
project entered this period under different conditions: In Houston, grassroots 
organizations were fighting a drainage plan that already had been slowed down by 
financial headaches for a decade. Activists’ concerted efforts led to the cancellation of the 
Upper Buffalo Bayou Project and a reassessment of channelization efforts throughout 
Harris County. In Miami, the water management system had developed considerable 
institutional “momentum”, and despite national attention focused on saving the remaining 
Everglades, only peripheral extensions of the C&SF project were truly cancelled by the 
early 1980s.404 In Tampa, planning for the Four River Basins Project was still underway 
                                               
404 Hughes, American Genesis.   Of the three cases I studied, I think Miami has the most in common 
with the TVA. Although power generation and industrial development were not hallmarks of flood 
control in South Florida, regional land development was. By 1960, the C&SF District and the Corps  
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when it became clear that most construction was not going to be supported or funded. 
Water management in that region thus became more technically administrative and flood 
control was pared down to the most essential infrastructure.  
Environmental activism in the Southeast was part of a national movement that 
eventually led to sweeping regulatory reform. Certainly there were cases, such as the 
Cross-Florida Barge Canal, where grassroots groups succeeded in blocking large projects 
that might have been completed otherwise. But their impact in Houston, Miami and 
Tampa was only decisive over very limited components: channelizing a section of 
Buffalo Bayou, or building a reservoir out of a section of Tampa Bay. The greater legacy 
of environmental activism in these cities was that the quality of natural resources, and the 
ecological consequences of growth, would have to be accounted for as the regions 
continued to develop. In perfect hindsight, this was perhaps also the activists’ greatest 
failure: Their intervention temporarily made the development of Houston, Miami and 
Tampa less ugly, but regional growth inexorably continued and vulnerability to future 
storms was exacerbated.
                                               
had developed bureaucratic power over water in South Florida in a way that never happened in 
Houston, and only later in Tampa.  
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CHAPTER 6  




What do the three cases have in common?   
 All three flood control projects have been highly “successful” – in the sense that 
they prevented a recurrence of the same floods that motivated the construction of 
protective works. There have been other floods in each region, but they have not 
impacted the same areas to the same extent. Downtown Houston has never flooded as it 
did in 1935. Hialeah and the sugar plantations of the Everglades have never been under a 
sheet of water for weeks at a time like they were in 1947. And Temple Terrace, home to 
the University of South Florida, has never seen a repeat of the 1960 floods. Perhaps 
larger storms caused by climate change will yet overcome the risk thresholds of the 
projects that were designed to contain an event surpassing the hundred-year flood, but it 
is more likely the water will go somewhere else; to newly-developed areas where there is 
no infrastructure in place. Furthermore, the suburban and rural systems in Houston, 
Miami, and Tampa were not designed to protect low-lying areas near the Gulf and 
Atlantic from higher tides. That is a different kind of coastal flooding for future systems, 
such as the one Miami Beach is building today.  
The flood control projects in Southeast Texas and South Florida were less 
successful at anticipating the scale of future development and the unintended 
consequences caused by that development. Flood control helped stabilize a trajectory of 
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rapid growth that was already underway in each city. By managing a natural hazard, it 
helped each city fulfill its destiny as a regional center. But that destiny had the unforeseen 
effect of making it much harder to complete the flood control projects as originally 
designed. As suburbs expanded, land values in rural areas increased in all three cities, 
forcing modifications to earlier plans for large-scale infrastructure. This process unfolded 
over about 15 years in each city. The most effective, comprehensive, sometimes over-
confident, design could not be fully implemented because it became too expensive to 
acquire rights-of-way.  
In Houston, there was no “emergency bypass” of the city, and the two main 
reservoirs on Buffalo Bayou became the primary flood control system. Of the three sites, 
the flood control and water storage projects in Miami were the largest and most 
expensive, but they could have been even more sprawling. The most northern and 
southern parts of the Central & Southern Florida project were never completed. In 
Tampa, of course, most of the projects were shelved by the late 1970s. It is ironic that 
flood control projects gained momentum at critical points in each city’s development, 
when political will was strong enough to take forward-looking, preventative action to 
solve the flooding problem, but the region’s subsequent success also made it much more 
expensive to finish the planned infrastructure.  
In other words, there was a feedback between regional development and 
increasing land values that made it harder to protect each area with structural flood 
control. Each city has responded differently to this vicious circle. Houston’s unregulated 
sprawl has meant that the flooding problem recurs again and again, often in the most 
recently-developed areas on the fringes of the metropolitan area. Miami created a hard 
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line between wet and dry, filling all the available space between the levee and the coast 
with single-family homes, and with nowhere else to go, has increasingly turned to 
building higher density in the urban core. Tampa solved the problem, at least temporarily, 
by purchasing sensitive lands.405 
What is different about each city in its time?  
Each flood control project was influenced by its own time and place. Houston was 
modeled on other New Deal-era projects in the South. It was designed before postwar 
sprawl was even imagined. Houston was a case of an urban flood control system that 
could not keep up with suburban development despite decades-long struggles to improve 
drainage. As the city has grown across formerly rural lands, the Harris County Flood 
Control District has been caught in a cycle of reactionary flood mitigation, only 
sometimes with federal help. New areas are developed, increasing runoff and putting 
homes in the path of floods that had not been previously imagined. New regulations, such 
as requiring the construction of drainage ditches and retention ponds, have not broken the 
cycle.  
In Miami, flood control, ironically, became the greatest constraint on 
development. This constraint, along with the vast scale of the water management system, 
makes Miami a truly unique case. Cities along the Southeast coast of Florida are bound 
by a Central & Southern Florida Project levee to the west, and the ocean to the east. In 
                                               
405 In light of Hurricanes Harvey and Irma (2017), it should be noted that exceptional funding is made 
available today for disaster recovery, not prevention. That is a big change in the political reality from 
the mid-20th century where the strongest response to shocking floods was to come up with a way of 
making sure they did not happen again. For many, the impact of the major storms of 2017 will make 
past infrastructure look inadequate, even if the flooding is occurring in areas that were never supposed 
to be protected. But will we one day tire of spending tens of billions of dollars on recovery efforts?  
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the 1950s this division of land and water was a triumph that made a place in the sun 
available for hundreds of thousands of middle-class families and retirees. It created a 
regional megacity over a hundred miles long but, at most, 25 miles wide. Today Miami is 
a city of tall towers, in part because it serves people who are used to living in 50-story 
buildings in Latin American cities, but also because after 60 years of development, land 
is limited. Comprehensive flood control in Miami achieved affordable suburbs in the 
short run but created a densely-populated area that is now more susceptible to flooding 
from the ocean instead of the Everglades.  
Where Miami was a comprehensive success, largely mitigating both flooding and 
water supply headaches for decades, Tampa’s projects solved neither problem. Instead 
the case of Tampa represented administrative “water management”; it was a story that 
began with flood control but quickly became mired in water-supply issues. Flood control 
in the most densely-populated areas of Tampa turned out to be relatively easy to achieve. 
Supplying an alternative to overly-exploited groundwater resources in the larger Tampa 
Bay Area turned out to be a persistent challenge, one full of compromises between the 
needs of farmers, cities, and environmentalists. These compromises were creative, and 
largely effective in balancing many interests. It is a story that is still playing out, 
however, because regional development has been so delayed. Large parts of the region of 
the Four River Basins are still rural today. Some critical lands are protected and 
groundwater withdrawals are highly regulated. The suburbs of Tampa, St. Petersburg, 
Clearwater, and Sarasota are all still growing. The solutions water managers reached in 
the 1980s and 1990s may yet unravel.  
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The Corps and Risk Assessment  
Officials in Houston, Miami and Tampa all campaigned to have infrastructure that 
would protect core areas from the kind of storm that launched those campaigns. In all 
three cases, the US Army Corps of Engineers designed infrastructure that was even more 
robust and extensive than what was needed to protect the cities from those storms. In 
Florida they also designed systems that would store water in potentially severe drought 
scenarios. In the cases of Houston and Tampa, the Corps was at times at odds with local 
authorities who worried about how to finance their share of the project costs. In Houston, 
the plan for flood protection had to be redesigned multiple times to keep the cost of local 
contributions down. In Tampa, concerns about costs became intertwined with 
environmental concerns, and activists, property owners, and even water managers, took 
action to block the construction of reservoirs and replace them with protected natural 
areas. 
Despite the Corps’ insistence on focusing on the high risk events – the 100 plus-
year storm, the multi-year drought – and building works that local authorities thought 
more extensive than necessary, they also underestimated the impacts of suburban growth. 
The Corps always tried to predict future population growth and land development. In 
their later projects they conducted formal development forecasting studies in partnership 
with social scientists, but even those studies did not anticipate the scale of population 
growth that would occur in the sunbelt into the 1980s. Flood control was supposed to 
reduce natural hazards and increase confidence in regional development, but the postwar 
economics that transformed many Sunbelt cities brought persistent, and often 
unregulated, development to these regions. By the early 1980s, the Flood Control 
Districts and the Corps of Engineers had become locked in a vicious cycle of having 
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encouraged development, which then expanded into new areas, and needed to be 
protected. 
By the mid-twentieth century, Corps practice was responding to a larger, data-
driven turn in civil engineering.406 As Army Engineers and local water managers 
gathered data from past floods, one of the key tasks of the Corps was to model the impact 
of hypothetical flooding scenarios in order to establish minimum design standards for 
flood control infrastructure. In the 1950’s standardized scenarios such as the “standard 
project storm”, the 100-year flood, and 40-year flood became critical parts of the cost-
benefit calculations to justify Corps’ projects.407  
In Houston, the Corps used a project storm, or “design storm”, much larger than 
had impacted the city in 1935.408 They would have built large, expensive works to 
contain and divert that water away from the city. Only when local interests pushed back 
and declared the required state contributions too much of a political challenge to secure 
did the Corps revise their plans for a more cost-effective, but less protective, solution.  
In Miami, design storms based on previous hurricanes were used to plan the 
height of the levee that would hold back Lake Okeechobee from flooding the farming 
towns to the immediate south, and the rainfall estimates from the 1947 storm were also 
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used to design Water Conservation Areas in the Everglades.409 This same modeling was 
used to better understand how much water was being lost to evapotranspiration across the 
Water Conservation Areas and the wet prairies of the Everglades. But the C&SF Projects 
were not intended to simply reduce the risk of flooding in areas that were already 
developed. They were a comprehensive project, meant to completely alter the way water 
moved in South Florida. It was about transforming natural cycles of drought and 
inundation across an entire landscape. The C&SF Projects thus created areas that could 
be developed and areas that could never be developed. With near-total control over the 
water in the region, there were few storms that the C&SF Flood Control District could 
envision that would flood the suburbs of Miami and Fort Lauderdale the way they had in 
1947.410    
In Tampa the designs for the Four River Basins were based on modelling the 
functioning of the reservoir system against the paths and strengths of potential storms.411 
With computer models, there were multiple possibilities to design around instead of just 
the conditions of the previous major flood. Such modeling allowed the Corps to test 
different designs for reservoir systems and estimate how much protection they would 
provide in different storm scenarios. In theory, it also let the Corps compare different 
regimes for regulating the amount of water flowing through the river basins for purposes 
other than flood control like water supply, recreation, and protecting natural systems.  
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By the early 1960s when the Four River Basins project in Tampa was being 
planned, the Corps’ Jacksonville District had become very confident about their 
experience designing these kinds of water management systems. This was a stark contrast 
to the open conversations about alternative designs held in Houston between the 
Galveston District Engineer and a consulting engineer working for Harris County in the 
1930s. By the early 1960s, the Jacksonville District Engineer proclaimed that knowledge 
gained in South Florida over 15 years made the Corps more adept than any consulting 
engineer that could be hired by local communities to second-guess elements of the 
project. 412 
Flood Control in Houston Today 
After 70 years Barker and Addicks dams are still the primary flood control for the 
city of Houston and its suburbs which have encompassed, and then sprawled beyond, the 
limits of Harris County. The dams need significant repairs and have been categorized as 
some of the least safe in the country by the Corps of Engineers.413 A current project 
expects to spend $72 million shoring up the earthen and concrete structures that have 
been cracked and eroded away by decades of intermittent floods. Meanwhile, Harris 
County monitors an extensive network of drainage channels throughout Metropolitan 
Houston, nearly all of which have seen flooding in the past three years.414 
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Figure 6.1 Comprehensive drainage mapping in Harris County. HCFCD, 2016 
In April, 2016, Houston experienced widespread flooding from spring storms. 
The “Tax Day” storm dropped 17 inches of rain in parts of the city and over 700 homes 
were flooded.415 The runoff nearly pushed the Addicks and Barker reservoirs to their 
absolute holding capacity, and it took nearly two months for the water to drain through 
controlled discharges into Buffalo Bayou.416 The 2016 Tax Day storms were an example 
of the 500-year flood that had repeated again only 15 years after Tropical Storm Allison 
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caused similarly extensive damage in the area around the Texas Medical Center.417 In this 
recent, “unprecedented” case, far flung suburban areas flooded along with areas closer to 
town where drainage had supposedly been improved. The conclusion was that years of 
re-development had increased the extent of impermeable surfaces beyond what the 
capacity of existing drainage system.418 The Tax Day storm was greater than the 
“superflood” that Port Director Russell Wait had so easily dismissed in the late 1930s. 
Although many areas of Houston were flooded, the primary system worked as it was 
designed to protect most of the downtown and Ship Channel, even without the 
“emergency bypass” or north and south canals Colonel Besson had designed in 1939.  
A year later, hurricane Harvey pushed the limits of the system even further. With 
an unprecedented 50 inches of rain falling in parts of the Buffalo Bayou watershed, 
Hurricane Harvey pushed the reservoirs past their capacity and caused spilling around the 
northern edge of Addicks reservoir, flooding recently-built neighborhoods in the dams’ 
own floodplains.419 Downtown and the Ship Channel remained largely dry, but clearly 
the scale of suburban flooding was beyond anything that had been envisioned in the 
past.420  
                                               
417 Neena Satija et al., “Hell and High Water: Why Isn’t Texas Ready for the Next Big Hurricane?,” 
ProPublica/Texas Tribune, March 3, 2016, https://projects.propublica.org/houston/. While data is still 
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except for the People Who Bought Homes inside Them,” ProPublica/Texas Tribune, October 12, 
2017, https://projects.propublica.org/graphics/harvey-reservoirs. 
420 Please see Appendix B for my personal reaction to the impact of Hurricane Harvey.  
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 Climate change will cause increased flooding in Southeast Texas. Large 
precipitation events are increasing in frequency over the region.421 In Houston, there is 
also growing fear of a “Super Ike” – a major hurricane following close to the path of 
2008’s Hurricane Ike.422 In this scenario, a monster storm passes Galveston Island and 
heads straight up the Ship Channel. It knocks out refinery production for weeks and sends 
massive storm surge through chemical plants and the facilities of the Port of Houston. 
Economic and environmental impacts linger for years. To prevent this nightmare, 
research into large-scale infrastructure solutions continues, including storm surge gates at 
the mouth of the Houston Ship Channel.423  
Flood Control in Miami Today 
 Whether or not the epic, estimated to surpass $16 billion, project to restore part of 
the Everglades ecosystem and ensure continued fresh water quality in South Florida will 
be effective remains controversial today.424 But the less-disputed success of flood control 
in the region has recently encountered unforeseen setbacks as flooding along Miami’s 
coastline becomes more frequent. Even though most residents in the Miami area live 
miles from the ocean, tourism at Miami’s beaches has remained a huge part of the 
region’s economy. The images of the waters of Biscayne Bay and the Atlantic beaches 
are essential to Miami’s identity. Cycles of beachfront condo development have 
                                               
421 Baddour, “The Trouble with Living in a Swamp.”   
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continued for decades, with ever taller towers and more luxurious apartments. Now these 
coastal areas are experiencing more frequent flooding due to climate-change driven 
increases in sea level.425 The city of Miami Beach is currently spending $400 million on 
systems of embankments, culverts, and pumping stations to keep the barrier island dry.426 
The Central and Southern Florida Project was designed in 1949 to control surface 
flooding that originated in the Everglades. Flooding came from the land, not the sea. 
While at the time there was little concern for coastal tides or hurricane storm surge, salt-
water intrusion into the aquifers that supplied fresh water was a constant headache for 
water managers. Atlantic hurricanes that made landfall in the Miami area much later in 
the postwar era, such as Hurricane Andrew in 1992, caused extensive wind damage, but 
they astoundingly did not bring flooding to Miami or its beaches.427 Occasionally a very 
high seasonal tide combined with a cloudburst could flood streets on Miami Beach, but 
these events were not frequent enough to start a process towards constructing major 
infrastructure to protect the coast.  
In the late 1960s, Miami’s beach was rebuilt by the Corps of Engineers after years 
of erosion and hotel over-development.428 This project was justified based on the Corps’ 
expanded cost-benefit calculations to value recreational benefits of the coast. Miami 
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Beach was still a key symbol of postwar Florida. Environmental Historian Ted Steinberg 
notes that even this massive project was not designed to protect Miami Beach from the 
kind of storm surge that damaged the city in the 1926 hurricane. Rather, the model of the 
70-year storm was used for beach slope elevations and dune cover.429  
Starting in the early 2000’s, however, Miami Beach and suburbs close to 
Biscayne Bay began to flood more frequently. Global average sea levels rose almost a 
foot during the twentieth century, and the relative impact of that increase was more 
dramatic in some areas rather than others due to development, local tidal patterns, and the 
slope of the sea floor.430 Miami Beach has now taken serious steps to prepare for these 
impacts of climate change, even during a period when Florida politics still borders on 
denial of the threat to the state.431 Today the city of Miami Beach is spending almost 
$500 million to raise waterfront streets and install pumping systems to mitigate flooding 
from higher tides.432 
The future: adapting to the impacts of climate change 
Today climate change is causing oceans around the world to rise. Flooding from 
higher tides and tropical storms increasingly threaten major coastal cities like Houston, 
Miami and Tampa. In the twentieth century flood control helped these cities successfully 
develop on low-lying coastal plains. It created space for the low density suburban growth 
                                               
429 Steinberg, Acts of God the Unnatural History of Natural Disaster in America.    
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that was a defining feature of the mid-century sunbelt. The Atlantic Ocean and the Gulf 
of Mexico were a more distant threat than floods pouring down the bayous, Everglades 
wetlands, and Hillsborough River.  
In the future, however, flooding may increasingly be a threat from both local 
watersheds and the coastline. Because of their particular geography, Houston, Miami and 
Tampa are vulnerable to pincer-like inundation from nearby rivers, the Everglades, the 
Gulf of Mexico, and the Atlantic Ocean. As the impacts of climate change become more 
pronounced, each city faces the “bowl” scenario that has long been the unsolvable 
problem for New Orleans. Adapting to these conditions will be the work of coastal 
engineers and flood control specialists in the future. 
Historical case study analysis is a powerful tool for identifying factors that are 
often overlooked in a current policy debate.433 It also helps reveal assumptions that may 
be restricting a fuller discussion of the issue. The most glaring, widely-held public 
assumption about adaptation to climate change in the Southeastern United States is that 
the challenge of flooding in low-lying, coastal areas is new. This dissertation has 
endeavored to show that flooding was a common and persistent challenge in major cities 
on the Gulf and Southern Atlantic coasts since the mid-1930s. In fact, Metropolitan 
development in these regions was fundamentally not adapted to the scale of local hazards 
because those hazards had been extensively mitigated by decades of federal investment. 
Flood control systems had become largely invisible through their own success, until 
recently. The vulnerability of these cities to the impacts of climate change, and the public 
                                               
433 Richard F. Hirsh, “Historians of Technology in the Real World: Reflections on the Pursuit of 
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decisions that must be made to protect some areas over others, demands a greater 
awareness of how these decisions were made in the past.  
As recurrent flooding concerns have returned to Houston, Miami, and Tampa, 
local media has served these communities well by recovering the history of flood control 
projects.434 Of the three cities, Tampa has been the most lucky when it comes to severe 
storms.435 But, as in Houston, there exists a nightmare scenario in Tampa  – a repeat of 
The Great Gale of 1848 that pushed an estimated 15-25 foot wall of water over much of 
the area that is the most densely populated today. Climate change only increases the 
likelihood of this rare, worst-case disaster, and there are few defenses against it.436  
A critical perspective would argue that local officials, chamber of commerce, 
newspapers, and state representatives were so focused on securing the potential of their 
cities that they insisted on plans that modified natural systems to permanently allow 
forms of settlement that should not have been there in the first place. Surely the 
developers were the greatest beneficiaries of this reduction of natural hazards. From that 
perspective, the Corps of Engineers, as the nation’s contractor tasked with designing and 
manifesting this transformation, was arrogant in trying to engineer landscapes that could 
accommodate development that was poorly adapted to the original conditions. Even 
worse, flood control projects created a feedback loop between denial of the risks, rapid 
development, and the need to protect newly-developed areas from flooding. Given the 
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increasing risks associated with climate change, these choices seem particularly short-
sighted in retrospect.  
A less critical, and I believe better historically-situated, perspective, however, 
frames flood control as a purposeful choice, one that allowed these coastal towns to 
become major cities in their regions, and those regions to develop national significance. 
Local boosters worked through state representatives and Congress to direct the Corps to 
implement infrastructure that helped these cities grow beyond their geographic 
limitations, in a style that reflected the postwar suburban pattern of the nation as a whole. 
The success of these cities, as economic drivers in their regions, justified the financial 
investment.  
The questions of whether or not this was the optimal way to develop a low-lying 
area, or if flood control created a false confidence in the stability of these vulnerable 
sites, are important, but they cannot be answered here. Instead, we must start by 
recognizing the reality of heavily developed, coastal cities that now must be further 
protected because millions of people live there and they are important to the country. 
Instead let us ask: If we were willing to make significant, repeated investments on 
infrastructure to protect growing cities in vulnerable areas in the past, should we not 








I wrote this personal response soon after Hurricane Harvey caused catastrophic 
flooding in Houston in late August, 2017. Through the archives, I had relived many of the 
city’s most devastating floods, and I knew well that Harvey’s nearly 50 inches of rain 
were completely unprecedented in Southeast Texas. I feared for friends and family in 
Houston. I couldn’t sleep. This dissertation is about the past, and I know historians are 
famously bad at predicting the future, but it was traumatic to watch one of the worst-case 
scenarios for Houston playing out in front of me. Predicting the future was no longer a 
throw-away phrase about “stronger storms one day impacting coastal areas” – it was 
praying for the rain to stop, now. I wanted to say something about climate change, before 
we even knew the role of climate change in the storm, and I wanted to say something 
about the history I had studied that might address the powerlessness I felt.  
Houston’s original flood control system was never completed. Could that have 
prevented this disaster?  
Downtown Houston was underwater. Over the last three days more than 20 inches 
of rain had fallen in Harris County, and Buffalo Bayou had risen 45 feet. As the sluggish 
bayou transformed into a swollen river, lives were lost, and damage to the city was 
widespread. People drowned as flash flooding tore them from downtown bridges. 
Warehouses and commercial buildings near Buffalo Bayou were completely destroyed, 
and over 100 residential blocks were flooded. Fires broke out in some of the damaged 
buildings. The Port of Houston was closed entirely for ten days, and the US Army Corps 
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of Engineers spent the next eight months clearing silt, mud, and debris from the Ship 
Channel. Calls to prevent a similar catastrophe from occurring again came as swiftly as 
the rushing currents.  
 
Figure 0.1 Newspaper clipping from the 1935 flood. Bob Eckles Scrapbooks, Harris County Archives 
This may sound familiar. But I’m not talking about the history-making rainfall 
that caused devastating flooding in Houston over the past week. I’m referring to another 
historic moment in the Bayou City: the flood of 1935 — an event I’ve explored in my 
dissertation research, which compares the history of flood control in Houston, Miami, 
and Tampa.437 There have been several articles covering that historic flood that hit 
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Houston and the federally-sponsored efforts to prevent recurrences of it that followed.438 
But there’s a key detail that hasn't been emphasized enough: Houston’s original flood-
control system was never finished.   
From my historical research, I want to first explain why I think the original plans 
for flood control in Houston were not finished and then speculate on how well it would 
have protected the city if it had been fully in place.   
After the flood of 1935, the Master Project Plan for Houston’s flood control 
system, designed and built by the US Army Corps of Engineers, included two large dams, 
two long canals, and several other smaller structures.439 By 1948, the two dams were built 
in rural land between the fairly compact city of Houston and the nearby country town of 
Katy.440 At that time, the dams cost around $11 million, and about $3 million of that total 
was paid by Harris County.441 During the days of relentless rain produced Hurricane 
Harvey, those two dams, Barker and Addicks, functioned as they were designed to do: 
their pools filled to hold back Harvey’s floodwaters (although there was leakage around 
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the edges as they went beyond their designed capacity).442 Some of the flanking overflow 
was safely let out into Buffalo Bayou, but neighborhoods nearby did experience 
extensive flooding.443 So far, however, the dams have worked to prevent the most serious 
flooding downtown. All the city’s other bayous faced unprecedented flooding, inundating 
surrounding neighborhoods.444  
 
Figure 0.2 Master Plan for the Buffalo Bayou Project, 1940. Harris County Flood Control District, Harris 
County Archives.  
 
Some of those same neighborhoods in Southwest Houston also experienced 
repeated flooding in the late 1940s and 1950s soon after many of those suburban areas 
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were first developed.445 The south canal was planned as an outlet to Galveston Bay for 
floodwaters on Buffalo Bayou, and the north canal would shunt floods on White Oak 
Bayou to the San Jacinto River. But critically, the canals would also have provided some 
relief for floods on Brays, Sims, Greens, and Halls Bayous.  
When the canals were planned in 1940, the land through which they would flow, 
such as the Northside area and the current route of Beltway 8 on the south side, was 
mostly rural prairie. It was relatively cheap land to acquire. But after World War II, that 
land became much more expensive as developers looked to build affordable housing for 
young families moving to the Houston area.446 For example, the population of close-in 
suburban areas such as the town of Bellaire and the neighborhoods of South Houston, 
both near to Brays Bayou, doubled between 1940 and 1950.  
During the war, the importance of key defense industries located along the 
Houston Ship Channel had been used as a justification to expedite the completion of the 
two dams protecting Buffalo Bayou and the Port of Houston. The wartime necessity of 
the port was key to getting large parts of a civil works project completed when many 
other military projects vied for scarce resources. With Barker Dam in place in 1945 (and 
Addicks in 1948), the primary goal of the Buffalo Bayou Project was complete.  
But after the war, as the country stumbled into a sharp recession in late 1945, 
completing the original plan for the Buffalo Bayou Project that would have better 
protected the city’s growing suburbs was less of a priority. The cost of completing the 
canals rose dramatically as land values increased. As the suburbs grew, and land values 
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continued to rise, flood control became more prohibitively expensive, and this cycle 
continued to exacerbate the newly-developed areas’ vulnerability.   
Because suburban flooding was so persistent, in 1949 the Corps began a resurvey 
of the project they had just (partially) completed.447 It was clear that new neighborhoods 
needed to be protected, but the high costs were harder to justify since the city’s key 
infrastructure was not in the suburban areas. A new plan began to emerge. Instead of the 
expensive canals, perhaps floodwaters could just be channeled more quickly through the 
city. For example, Brays Bayou, which had repeatedly flooded neighborhoods like West 
University Place, the Texas Medical Center, and Bellaire would need to be cleared of 
brush, deepened, straightened, and eventually lined with concrete. The Flood Control Act 
of 1954 authorized these modifications to Houston’s flood control system so that more of 
the city’s bayous could be “rectified.”  
As late as 1956, however, business and civic leaders involved in a committee on 
flood control organized by the Houston Chamber of Commerce still held out hope that 
one of the north and south canals could somehow be built.448 At the committee’s monthly 
meeting in April that year, Kenneth Heagy, the Chief Engineer of the Corps’ Galveston 
District, had to remind attendees that both canals in the original 1940 Flood Control 
Master Project Plan had to be abandoned due to rapid development in the Houston area. 
The remaining option was to improve existing drainage through the city, and Harris 
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County would still need to come up with nearly half the money (almost $20 million in 
1956).  
The difficulty with raising money through county bonds was the other big 
problem with local flood control efforts in the 1950s. Voters’ reluctance to approve any 
new debt that would potentially raise taxes made it hard for the Harris County Flood 
Control District to meet its obligations to contribute to the federal projects. In the early 
1950s, voters easily approved bonds that would pay for expanded county roads, flood 
control, and improvements to the Port of Houston.449 But by 1956, it took repeated 
elections, and aggressive campaigning on behalf of the county, business leaders, and 
newspapers to get those bonds approved.450 Raising money this way was a challenge not 
only in Houston but also in rapidly-sprawling cities across the sunbelt, as suburban 
residents became more distrustful of local government projects and services.  
Over the next few decades, federal and local officials expanded and significantly 
improved Harris County’s drainage system. In the 1970s, there was some shift away from 
the idea of concrete-lined waterways towards the concept of preserving land for natural 
(also called non-structural) flood control. Today flood-control projects in Houston, such 
as $480 million Project Brays, which includes channel widening and detention basins, are 
still on-going.451 But in general terms, the system is the same as the one that was 
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envisioned in the Flood Control Act of 1954.452 There are two major dams and no canals. 
Floods drain via a complicated network of waterways through the city and out into 
Galveston Bay. A storm like Harvey utterly overwhelms this system.453  
While it is still early days to make sweeping statements, I think it is unlikely that 
even if the original Master Project Plan had been completed the system could have dealt 
with the unbelievable amount of water unleashed by Harvey. Flood control systems are 
designed to handle a certain amount of water passing through them at a certain rate. In 
order to design a system with enough capacity to contain a major flood, engineers build a 
model of a hypothetical storm and calculate how much rain it will produce, how quickly 
that rain will fall, and where it will fall. Often a scenario even more extreme than the 
worst storm to hit an area in the past is used to create the model storm.  
In both the 1930s and 1950s, during both design phases of the Buffalo Bayou 
Project, there were disagreements between consulting engineers, local officials, and the 
Corps of Engineers over just how bad a storm could hit the Houston area.454 Often the 
Corps was pushing to design a more robust system with greater capacity, based on a 
larger “project storm” than Harris County officials wanted to ask voters to pay for. In 
county and university archives, I saw a lot of different scenarios from those decades, 
from both the Corps and local flood control engineers, but none of them came anywhere 
close to anticipating the 50 inches of rain from a single storm that Harvey produced (a 
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26-inch peak was discussed as the upper limit in 1956).455 Canals or no canals, there was 
no design for a Harvey.  
But for a moment let’s imagine history playing out differently. Let’s imagine a 
city that might have better weathered the most extreme rain event in the history of the 
continental US:456  
By 1950, Houston’s flood control system was complete. There were two 
dams on Buffalo Bayou and one on White Oak Bayou. A levee along Cypress 
Creek prevented floods flowing south into the city. A northern canal helped divert 
water away from Greens Bayou. In the south, Brays Bayou had another outlet to a 
canal.  
Land around the canals remained rural and provided some natural areas 
for flooding overflow. In a stunning break with the policies of other sunbelt cities 
(with the exception of Tulsa, OK457), Harris County authorities strictly limited 
development to well outside of the 100-year floodplain. Neighborhoods were 
narrowly constrained on the high ground between the bayous. Because demand 
for housing was high and land outside of the floodplains was scarce, suburban 
property was even more expensive than expected. Houston’s neighborhoods 
ended up being dense — mostly townhomes and apartments — and they made 
more sense to serve with public transit. New developments had to provide for 
extensive drainage. Freeways were fewer, and those that were built were greatly 
elevated above flood zones. Over several decades, the city became much better 
adapted to its location on the coastal plain, its poorly-draining, sandy soils, and 
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its extreme rain events.  
 
Even in this alternative Houston, it’s likely that a record-shattering storm like Harvey 
would still have flooded the city, but I suspect the damage would have been far less 
extensive. More importantly, we can imagine this counterfactual city and acknowledge 
that it may not have been Houston’s past, but perhaps, it is one vision for its future.  
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APPENDIX A:  




This appendix briefly lays out a sketch of the history of coastal engineering in 
parallel with the cases of flood control I discussed in earlier chapters. My primary 
research focused on flood control infrastructure in low-lying areas of the US Southeast 
coast. Similar kinds of levees, canals, dams and pumps for water management were built 
in other parts of the United States - in places such as Phoenix, for example - but Houston, 
Miami, and Tampa had a common geography as cities of the coastal plain. While the US 
Army Corps of Engineers designed works for flood control they were simultaneously 
engaged in projects along the shoreline and in nearshore waters that clearly affected the 
development of Southeast Texas and South Florida.  
My challenge in combining coastal engineering with inland flood control is that 
the sample of records I reviewed separate the authorization and execution of coastal 
projects, on beaches and in waterways, from flood control projects in the watersheds 
around cities. But almost certainly some of the same staff did work on projects in both 
locations. For example, engineers who designed drainage systems also planned dredging 
programs to deepen channels. And in the postwar decades, local Representatives 
desperately asked Congressional appropriations committees to fund harbor deepening in 
the same statements where they tried to see flood control projects completed. Thus the 
work, and the sponsorship of that work, did overlap. The practice of coastal engineering 
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and inland flood control underwent similar changes in approach over the decades: from 
structures meant to transform unstable, natural environments to administrative actions 
meant to prioritize the functioning of local ecosystems.  
As a mid-twentieth-century discipline, coastal engineering came to study, model, 
and eventually analyze shoreline processes. Better understanding of waves, erosion, and 
storms allowed coastal engineers to design more appropriate and successful structures for 
America’s coastlines. That knowledge also steered the community of practitioners away 
from structural interventions and towards preservation of natural features.  
Introduction 
American engineers have been studying shoreline erosion processes and building 
significant coastal structures since the late 19th century.458 The advancement of the 
discipline of coastal engineering largely coincides with a sustained interest in coastal 
development in the twentieth century. The desire to vacation and live near the seashore 
drove the development of coastlines from New Jersey in the early twentieth century to 
California and Florida after World War Two. People also wanted to get out on the water, 
for sport fishing and recreational boating, and the number of marinas and harbors grew 
along with beachfront development. On average, the population of shoreline counties in 
the United States grew rapidly after the War, and these areas became increasingly densely 
populated compared to inland counties.459 In the postwar decades, offshore oil drilling 
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became another key problem domain for the newly-recognized sub-discipline of “coastal 
engineering”.460 The first conference dedicated to sharing lessons learned among the 
distinctive coastal engineering community of researchers and practitioners was organized 
in 1950 at Long Beach, California, a crossroads of shoreline and oil development.461  
Federal involvement in flood control and shoreline protection 
In the early 19th century the US Army Corps of Engineers was first in charge of 
building fortifications for key harbors, mapping access routes to the West, building 
canals, and clearing navigation channels.462 After the Civil War, the Corps and local 
authorities started working on flood control projects on the Mississippi River. Under the 
Mississippi River Commission, the Corps built levees and stabilized eroding banks with 
concrete revetments. Despite decades of levee construction, devastating flooding 
inundated communities on the Arkansas, Red, and lower Mississippi Rivers in April, 
1927. The next year Congress passed the Flood Control Act of 1928 authorizing a 
massive project on the Mississippi River and Tributaries.463 The Corps took charge of the 
project, and over the next several decades added control structures that could be opened 
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at critical moments to divert floodwaters into alternate channels, such as the Atchafalaya 
floodway in Louisiana.464  
Structural flood control on the nation’s coastlines was on a smaller scale. A large 
seawall built to protect the island resort and critical port of Galveston, Texas, after 
catastrophic damage and loss of life from the Great Hurricane of 1900, was a notable 
exception.465 In the late 19th century, railroads began connecting seaside resorts like 
Ocean City and Atlantic City to densely crowded, and increasingly polluted, urban 
centers like Philadelphia. A health-restoring weekend by the sea became accessible to an 
emerging middle class, who also had money to spend on entertainment.466 In the early 
twentieth century, public beaches and boardwalks such as New York’s Coney Island, 
only a subway ride away from the heart of the city, made the coastline accessible for 
much larger populations. Early municipal projects to prevent beach erosion focused on 
some of the most heavily utilized vacation areas along the Long Island and New Jersey 
shorelines.467 By the 1920s, the beaches of these new, barrier-island resorts had become 
thickets of stone structures - groins, jetties, and retaining walls - designed to prevent sand 
erosion. They were largely unsuccessful.  
The movement of sand – or littoral transport by longshore drift – was a process 
that was poorly understood at the time. Sand travelling down the coast was trapped on the 
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“upcoast” side of the jetty, while waves scoured ever more deeply into the downcoast 
beach. Property owners further down the beach were forced to construct their own jetties. 
Overall these structures did little to slow these forces that inevitably destroy and re-form 
barrier islands, but they gave some illusion of permanence in rapidly-developing vacation 
areas. The Army Corps of Engineers’ Beach Erosion Board (BEB) was organized in 1930 
to sponsor research on erosion, the movement of coastal sediments, and the impacts of 
storms on barrier islands.468  
One example of a research project sponsored by the Beach Erosion Board was 
Morrough O’Brien’s investigation of the unintended consequences of a breakwater at 
Santa Barbara, California in the early 1930s. O’Brien was a young mechanical 
engineering professor at UC Berkeley who had studied at MIT and then completed a 
fellowship in fluid mechanics in Germany and Sweden.469 He had also been one of the 
first researchers to investigate littoral drift, both in New Jersey and California, for the 
Corps of Engineers. According to O’Brien, who had no prior experience with shoreline 
projects, it was the first “systematic study” of coastal phenomena in the United States.470 
O’Brien’s observations first helped establish the principle that in California sand 
generally moved southward, like a river close to the coastline, parallel to the shore.471  
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At Santa Barbara, a new breakwater had been constructed in 1929 by the city to 
create an artificial harbor for small craft.472 Soon unforeseen erosion led to the 
destruction of ten miles of downcoast beaches. Several beachfront homes south of Santa 
Barbara slipped into the ocean as erosion intensified. The town began to lose the 
municipal beach at the base of its popular pier. Meanwhile, a large, new beach formed 
upcoast of the breakwater, and after a few years the new small craft harbor rapidly filled 
with sand and required extensive dredging to remain accessible.  
By 1930, O’Brien had taken over the Hydraulics Laboratory and Pump Testing 
facilities at UC Berkeley, and in their experimental tank he proceeded to build a model of 
Santa Barbara harbor to see if he could re-create the siltation problem. Several engineers 
who later worked for the Corps’ Los Angeles District remembered getting their initial 
training in coastal processes through O’Brien’s lab and his experiments on solving the 
Santa Barbara problem in the mid-1930s.473 O’Brien’s research led to the first sand-
bypassing plant at Santa Barbara, which restored sand nourishment to the downcoast 
beaches and reduced how often the harbor needed to be dredged.474 As a technique for 
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restoring eroding beaches, dredging and pumping sand would become the most common 
approach to maintaining popular, but ephemeral, shorelines after World War Two.  
The emergence of the discipline of coastal engineering in World War Two 
Morrough O’Brien’s protégés in the fields of hydraulic and coastal engineering 
remembered him as always trying to look forward to where engineering practice was 
heading. In that sense “he foresaw the coming changes in engineering from a largely 
descriptive approach to an analytical basis and proceeded to guide the Berkeley and 
national education programs in this direction.”475 In the 1940’s research in coastal 
engineering would move from empirical observation to formal, analytical methods.  
During World War Two, the critical need to successfully execute amphibious 
assaults, especially in island-hopping campaigns in the Pacific theater, led to the training 
of dozens of Navy officers in techniques for wave forecasting, and many others in 
meteorology, undersea cartography, and antisubmarine warfare. Much of this training and 
research was sponsored by the US Navy’s Bureau of Ships (BuShips). In 1936, the Navy 
Hydrographic Office first contracted with the Scripps Institution, newly under the 
direction of Norwegian oceanographer Harald Sverdrup, to develop quantitative methods 
for wave forecasting.476 As a primary research contact for BuShips, O’Brien was 
influential in organizing data to support that effort. O’Brien was later given credit for his 
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work on formally analyzing wave forces on pile structures, like those supporting oil rigs 
in deep water.477  
Equations first developed at Scripps to forecast waves running up the gently-
sloping nearshore bottom of the California coast were often inadequate to predict the 
complex patterns produced by barrier reefs in the South Pacific. As one Navy wave 
forecaster recalled after making observations for the assault on Peleliu in September, 
1944: 
“Almost immediately I made the disconcerting observation that the incoming swell did 
not behave according to the wave forecasting rules I had been taught…I handled this 
problem by using my forecasted waves only as a rough guide of what to expect, and 
relied primarily on my visual wave estimates and my judgment of the ability of 
amphibious vehicles to cross the outer reef margin and transit the reef to the beach.”478  
This example of falling back on skills of empirical observation and experience would 
continue to be a common practice for coastal engineers after the War. As Robert Wiegel, 
who continued O’Brien’s work in formal methods for wave forecasting at UC Berkeley, 
wrote, “The author has been on hundreds of ocean beaches and rocky shores, in about 55 
countries. Although coastal processes are general, their mix and environmental conditions 
are site specific.”479 Because local conditions at coastlines were so complex, no matter 
how formalized analytical approaches became, there was no substitute for spending time 
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observing waves.  
Research for the offshore oil industry on wave forecasting and construction 
materials also played a significant role in the development of coastal engineering as a 
community of practitioners. Long, wooden piers built to extend drilling into the nearshore 
portions of oil fields had been common since the 1890s. By the 1920s, forests of derricks 
covered the bluffs above beaches in Southern California, Caddo Lake on the Texas-
Louisiana border, and lined the shores of the Caspian Sea near Baku.480 These structures 
were often damaged by coastal storms, and so drilling further out into unprotected water, 
away from the sight of land, was not possible.  
In the 1930s, American engineers who had worked in Southern California and 
Louisiana helped develop techniques for building concrete and steel platforms far out in 
Venezuela’s Lake Maracaibo where a marine parasite had been destroying wooden 
structures. Lake Maracaibo is actually a large, tidal bay of the Gulf of Mexico. Because 
of its size and salinity, Lake Maracaibo became a “training ground” for marine 
construction and pipelining contractors. In October 1947, Kerr-McGee’s exploratory rig 
struck oil 12 miles off the Louisiana Coast. It was the first truly offshore platform, 
beyond sight of land in the open waters of the Gulf of Mexico.481 In that first case a 
surplus Navy barge was used as a “tender” to hold equipment and provide living quarters 
for workers. As the offshore industry learned to operate further off the coasts of 
Louisiana and California, former Navy equipment from the war would prove 
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indispensable.  
In 1950, the University of California Extension, along with the Council on Wave 
Research,482 sponsored the first coastal engineering conference in Long Beach, 
California. It was a location that connected the centers for research on nearshore 
dynamics – UC Berkeley and Scripps Institute of Oceanography – with the emerging 
offshore oil industry. Joseph Johnson, a mechanical engineering professor at Berkeley 
who had worked with Morrough O’Brien on equipment for amphibious assaults during 
the War, edited the proceedings. Johnson would organize the next sixteen coastal 
engineering conferences as it developed into an international community.483 The 
following year 1951, Texas A&M University sponsored the second coastal engineering 
conference in Houston, Texas; another site that could connect civil engineers with 
pioneering offshore oil companies.  
In the preface to the proceedings of the first conference at Long Beach, Morrough 
O’Brien wrote that coastal engineering was “not a new or separate branch of 
engineering,” but warned that “the design of coastal works does involve many criteria 
which are foreign to other phases of civil engineering and the novices in this field should 
proceed with caution.” O’Brien noted the unintended consequences of short-sighted 
interventions in dynamic, coastal processes: 
“Along the coastlines of the world, numerous engineering works in various stage of 
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disintegration testify to the futility and wastefulness of disregarding the tremendous 
destructive forces of the sea. Far worse than the destruction of insubstantial coastal works 
has been the damage to adjacent shorelines caused by structures planned in ignorance of, 
and occasionally in disregard of, the shoreline processes operative in the area.”484  
From O’Brien’s view, the purpose of organizing a community of researchers and 
practitioners in specifically coastal engineering was to share the hard lessons learned 
from past failures and to design more skillful forms of infrastructure as coastal 
development accelerated.  
Increasing federal involvement in coastal protection and oil leasing in the 1950s 
In the postwar era, the federal role in protecting coastlines increased dramatically. 
Locally-sponsored projects, such as municipal seawalls, breakwaters, and beach 
nourishment projects, became less common. Large federal projects carried out by the 
Army Corps of Engineers, in partnership with local governments, however, became far 
more common. The Corps’ mission expanded from improving navigation and flood 
control to shoreline protection, regardless of the specific shoreline’s connection with 
nearby harbors. And most projects to protect shorelines were really meant to protect the 
recreational value of a beach.  
Infrastructure to protect harbors, however, remained critical. The very damaging 
1954 hurricane season brought three powerful and destructive storms to the mid-Atlantic 
and New England. Hurricane Carol was especially devastating for communities along the 
coasts of Long Island, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts. In response, the 
Corps of Engineers initiated a program to design and build protective works for New 
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England harbors.485 Some of the most ambitious works that were proposed included a 
long series of dikes across Narragansett Bay. The Corps’ Waterways Experiment Station 
in Vicksburg, Mississippi, built a scale model of the bay in an old aircraft hanger, and ran 
storm surge experiments in it for four years before the plan was abandoned for a system 
of smaller-scale gates and pumping stations closer to the city of Providence.486 Similar 
systems were built over the next two decades in the Charles River at Boston, New 
Bedford, Massachusetts, and New London, Connecticut.  
Projects to protect coastal areas from intense storms were not limited to New 
England. For example, in the early 1960s new projects on the Gulf Coast, like a system of 
pump stations and levees at Texas City, TX, responded to high-risk areas where large-
scale industrial infrastructure had recently been developed.487 Texas City, located at the 
entrance to the Houston Ship Channel on Galveston Bay, was home to several refineries 
and oil storage areas that had been damaged by Hurricane Carla in 1961. 
Each of these projects managed risk based on the data from previous storms, as 
well as “model storms” that simulated conditions that would surpass the 100-year flood. 
These were design practices; there was no mandated standard of protection or 
minimum threshold. For example, the project managers for the Texas City levees based 
their calculations to protect against a storm surge fifteen-foot storm surge, based on the 
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model hundred-year storm, and the actual recorded surge from the devastating 1900 
Galveston storm.  
In addition to the modeling studies for protective infrastructure first authorized by 
the Flood Control Act of 1954, Congress also began funding research that could lead to 
reducing the impacts of hurricanes. Congress directed the Corps of Engineers and the 
Weather Bureau to gather information on past hurricane impacts in order to better protect 
coastlines and provide more accurate storm warnings.488 The Weather Bureau started a 
National Hurricane Research Project in 1955. This program launched the first Air Force 
research flights into hurricanes to better understand the storm’s structure and 
development. The Corps of Engineers also had very good wind and wave data from 
gauges they had setup on Lake Okeechobee to measure the effects of a hurricane that 
passed through South Florida in the summer of 1949. Weather Bureau and Corps of 
Engineers investigators were active early participants in the coastal engineering research 
community.489 During this time, the Office of Naval Research also sponsored research 
into the kinds of waves generated by large storms.490 Federal sponsorship, in partnership 
with a growing number of universities, helped expand the community of coastal 
engineers. Berkeley’s Robert Wiegel remembered that it was still a pretty small group in 
the 1950s. “We knew each other,” he recalled. “we were colleagues who often 
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collaborated, and often attended the same technical meetings. We crossed back and forth 
between engineering and science, between theory and practice, and between laboratory 
and field work.”491  
The offshore oil industry was perhaps the greatest beneficiary of research into 
better understanding the kinds of waves produced by hurricanes. Because of earlier 
analytical work, companies had a better sense of what forces waves would put on pile 
structures supporting rigs in deep water. Mobile floating rigs, or “submersibles”, were 
another innovation of the 1950s.492 There were still concerns about how big a storm could 
come through the Gulf of Mexico drilling sites and the maximum height of waves in open 
water.  
The construction firm Brown & Root first demonstrated the value of their higher 
platform designs during the hurricane season of 1956.493 They specifically built around 
the potential winds and waves generated by the level of a 25-year storm, which Hurricane 
Flossie proved to be that year. Brown & Root’s Executive Vice President, George Brown, 
recalled, “We had studied tides, currents, waves, and winds, and we knew that it wasn’t 
the winds that hurt, even hurricane force winds; it was the waves. The waves can batter 
the hell out of a platform. So we built our platforms high off the water so the waves 
couldn’t get to them. Our platforms were higher than the others, and we rode out the 
storms.”  
When a series of much larger, “100-year” storms destroyed many rigs in the Gulf 
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in the late 1960s, engineers redesigned their platforms from the joints up to account for 
greater wave heights and wind speeds. Because many earlier platforms had been built in 
the relatively calm decades after World War Two, Joseph Pratt points out that much of 
the knowledge about the destructive potential of storms in the open Gulf was “earned the 
hard way.”494 Engineers developing offshore technology were able to share these hard 
lessons learned and improve their designs.  
The growing success of deep water drilling led to years of jurisdictional disputes 
between the federal government and coastal states over who owned the undersea lands on 
the outer continental shelf. The “tidelands” dispute started in the late 1940’s and was not 
fully resolved until the early 1960s.495 Texas and Florida claimed that they were entitled 
to lease drilling sites up to ten miles from land. The federal government wanted to 
enforce its claim to national territorial waters beyond only three miles controlled by the 
states. The Supreme Court initially upheld the federal government’s claim.  
For Republicans in California and Texas, the politics of supporting state control 
of offshore drilling sites was clear. Retired General Dwight Eisenhower made a point of 
arguing for “states’ rights” to control the tidelands during his 1952 campaign for 
President, and this position helped him win the traditionally-Democratic state of Texas. 
His Vice-President, Senator Richard Nixon, had supported state control of near-shore 
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areas since his first election as a Congressman from the Los Angeles area in 1946.496 
Environmental organizations such as the Sierra Club opposed state control of the 
tidelands on the basis that cash-hungry states would move rapidly to exploit offshore oil 
fields without considering environmental consequences to fisheries and recreational 
areas. Ultimately, a deal was reached where only Florida and Texas were granted 
ownership out to ten miles, and the other coastal states with offshore oil and gas leases, 
such as Louisiana and California, were limited to three miles. Now states could lease sites 
for offshore drilling with greater certainty. In 1969, however, a dramatic oil spill in the 
Santa Barbara Channel would become a galvanizing moment for the national 
environmental movement. 
The impacts of environmental regulation  
Coastal development, both recreationally and for offshore oil drilling, continued 
throughout the 1960s. Along with it, a national movement for environmental quality 
became focused on issues of air and water pollution. Fires on the surface of the Houston 
Ship Channel caused by petroleum product waste, and again on Cleveland’s Cuyahoga 
River in the summer of 1969, became symbolic of the consequences of unregulated 
industrial dumping in waterways. Earlier that year, the blowout at a Union Oil Company 
well in the Santa Barbara Channel - which resulted in tar washing up on miles of beaches 
for several months, and front page pictures of dying, oil-covered wildlife - also became a 
symbol for the environmental movement. President Richard Nixon’s inauguration was 
only eight days before the Santa Barabara spill, and his administration at first moved 
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sluggishly to respond to the crisis.497 With Democrats like Maine Senator Edmund 
Muskie taking a lead in calling for a suspension of drilling in the Santa Barbara Channel 
and sweeping national environmental legislation, Nixon sought to promote his own 
environmental leadership.  
A year after the Santa Barbara spill, Nixon reluctantly signed the National 
Environmental Policy Act which would dramatically change the practice of coastal 
engineering in the United States. NEPA required the publication of an Environmental 
Impact Statement during the planning stage of any new, federal civil works project as 
well as for extensive modifications of existing infrastructure. EIS’s had to consider how a 
project would affect ecosystems, livelihoods, and human health. Plans to mitigate 
potential environmental impacts had to be included in the EIS. Other federal agencies, 
such as the US Fish and Wildlife Service and the Environmental Protection Agency, were 
part of the extended environmental review process. Engineers were now forced to consult 
a wider range of experts than they had previously, and grassroots environmental groups 
could begin challenging projects in court even before they started. While NEPA may 
have been designed to prevent unintended consequences of interventions in natural 
systems, it also ended up dramatically increasing the cost and duration of everything from 
seawall construction to maintenance dredging.498  
By the early 1970s, Port Authorities and the Army Corps of Engineers were more 
frequently involved in environmental regulatory cases. Many of these cases involved 
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dredging projects to deepen harbors for larger ships that were part of an expansion of 
international trade.499 While the goal of protecting coastal areas from flooding continued 
to be a negotiated process between developers and local, state, and federal sponsors, new 
environmental regulations instituted lengthy, formalized processes and minimum legal 
thresholds for managing waterborne pollution. Grassroots environmental organizations 
like the Sierra Club, National Audubon Society, and Environmental Defense Fund sued 
to block projects that would harm coastal wildlife, fisheries, and recreation. Sometimes 
these cases could delay port expansion projects for decades.500  
For example, Federal regulation under NEPA conflicted with management by 
local authorities who had long been active agents of business expansion along the 
Houston Ship Channel. While pollution around downtown Houston’s waterfront had been 
a Progressive cause in the early twentieth century, concerns about industrial and urban 
pollution were renewed in the late 1960s and early 1970s as oil and chemical spills 
intensified in the Ship Channel.501 The perennial dredging of the Ship Channel to clear 
built-up silt brought concerns about where the Army Corps of Engineers should discharge 
the toxic sludge they removed.502 Other environmental concerns included wastewater 
contamination from sprawling urban development and air pollution from refineries. By 
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the early 1980s, a coalition of environmentalists, fisherman, and recreational boating 
interests successfully stalled plans to increase the depth of the Houston Ship Channel 
from 40 to 50 feet.503 It would be another two decades before the dredging could be 
completed.504  
These regulatory concerns pushed coastal engineers to consider a more holistic 
approach to management of the “coastal zone”.505 The combination of industry, 
conservation, recreation and real estate interests in these areas created a need for more 
careful planning and management of beaches, wetlands, and navigation channels.  The 
1971 National Shoreline Study, conducted by the Corps of Engineers, first identified the 
coastal zone as a special space for integrated navigation, recreational, and conservation 
management.  
“Shores and beaches are probably the most critical and valuable parts of the coastal zone. 
Shoreline land forms — rocky headlands, stable beaches, unspoiled salt marshes, bold 
shorelines — must strongly influence long range planning for land use in the coastal 
zone…The coastal zone is a uniquely valuable national asset. It is a magnet to living 
things. Nearly half of our population lives in counties that touch the sea or Great 
                                               
503 Kiah Collier, “Port Authority Gets Green Light for Major Dredging Projects,” Houston Chronicle, 
accessed March 29, 2017, http://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/transportation/article/Port-
Authority-gets-green-light-for-major-5484906.php.   
504 Marine Board, National Research Council, Dredging Coastal Ports.   The delay in harbor dredging 
in the 1970s was not only because of environmental litigation. It was also because of the same 
constraints on the federal budget that were curtailing flood control projects. As the economy slowed 
and Congress tried to reduce budget deficits, annual appropriations for “maintenance” dredging 
projects continued while funds for “new construction” were easily blocked. Deepening harbors and 
channels was considered discretionary, “new construction”. In the 1970s, projects that had been 
authorized in the previous two decades did not get any new money in annual appropriations, no matter 
how hard local representatives pleaded for their ports to become more competitive globally. As the 
NRC’s Marine Board pointed out, “one of the characteristics of these public works expenditures is 
that all it takes to contain such expenditures is inaction. The annual funding approach reflected in the 
rivers and harbors legislation, therefore, required on the part of those congressmen opposing public 
works expenditures only that they refuse to join a consensus in funding authorized projects.” 
505 Armando I. Perez et al., “Environmental Protection Program for the Expansion of the Port of 
Miami, Florida,” in Coastal Zone ’83: Proceedings of the 3rd Symposium on Coastal and Ocean 
Management., vol. II, Coastal Zone: Proceedings of the Symposium on Coastal and Ocean 
Management (ASCE, 1983), 1090–1104.   
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Lakes…Shoreline management problems tend to be interwoven with coastal zone 
problems.”  
This new understanding of the coastal zone was enshrined in the 1972 Coastal Zone 
Management Act which required states “to develop and implement management 
programs to achieve wise use of the land and water resources in the coastal zone, giving 
full consideration to ecological, cultural, historic and esthetic values, as well as 
compatible economic development.”506 
The shift to nonstructural approaches and the regulation of coastal development 
In parallel with the rise of national and state-level environmental regulation, a 
paradigm shift was underway in how coastal engineers approached coastal protection. 
Decades of building concrete structures along coastlines had prevented some kinds of 
erosion and lessened the impacts of storm surge, but over time, relentless wave action and 
sediment transport carved deep pockets into jetty-reinforced beaches and undermined 
seawalls. Recognizing the long-run impermanence of hard, structural solutions led to new 
engineering approaches that emphasized the importance of working with natural 
processes instead of trying to overcome them. Coastal engineers recognized that “natural 
defenses” were often more effective at reducing the impacts of coastal storms than 
building structures like seawalls, groins, and rubble-hardened shorelines.507 Supporting 
natural defenses meant taking a “non-structural” approach. Non-structural approaches 
emphasized projects like restoring dunes, dredging sand for beach nourishment, and 
                                               
506 Hillyer, “The Corps of Engineers and Shore Protection,” 8.   
507 Hillyer, “The Corps of Engineers and Shore Protection”; Wiegel and Saville, “History of Coastal 
Engineering in the USA.”   
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protecting wetlands.508  
As early as 1953, the Army Corps of Engineers had studied structural 
interventions along the coast of Southern California and declared in a report to Congress 
that “where conditions permit, probably the best means of protecting a beach or shoreline 
against erosion of any type is to introduce a sandfill between the shoreline to be protected 
and the ocean and then to maintain that protective fill against long-term erosion.”509 This 
kind of on-going beach nourishment project became common in both California and 
Florida by the late 1960s. The prioritization of non-structural approaches also led to a 
wider diffusion of technologies like sand bypassing pumps to mitigate the side effects of 
earlier works.510 Beach nourishment was meant to be a form of intermittent maintenance 
rather than a permanent solution that vainly attempted to hold an arbitrary edge in a 
dynamic environment.  
As the development of coastal areas vulnerable to storms and erosion continued, 
the federal government became a more active sponsor of shoreline maintenance. By the 
late 1950s, Congress gave approval for the federal government to cover the majority of 
the costs of beach restoration and hurricane protection works, in partnership with local 
                                               
508 Dornhelm, “The Coney Island Public Beach and Boardwalk Improvement of 1923.”   Coney Island 
actually exemplifies an early case of a consulting engineer recognizing the need for continual beach 
nourishment. Coney Island’s large artificial beach had been constructed on top of groins from dredged 
sand in 1923. Philip Farley, consulting engineer for the Borough of Brooklyn who had designed the 
artificial beach, recommended nourishment by pumped sand every three years. The Borough did not 
follow through on this maintenance schedule. With its boardwalk, Coney Island became an iconic 
weekend destination for New Yorkers, but by 1930 the beach had eroded considerably.  
509 US Army Corps of Engineers, “Beach Erosion Control Report on Cooperative Study of Pacific 
Coast Line of the State of California” (US Congress, November 3, 1953), 
https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/009676869.   
510 PM Bruun, “By-Passing and Backpassing with Special Reference to Conditions in Florida,” in 
Proceedings of the ASCE Conference on Coastal Engineering, Santa Barbara Specialty Conference 
(ASCE, 1965), 561–626.   
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authorities. A number of local authorities took advantage of the opportunity to secure 
significant federal funding for infrastructure that would reduce flooding from coastal 
storms. The Flood Control Act of 1962 increased federal cost-sharing to fifty-percent of 
projects that would protect public beaches, and it required the Corps of Engineers to 
entirely cover the costs of shoreline erosion studies.511 In 1965, Congress enshrined 
recreational uses of the coast as worthy of considering in the Corps of Engineers’ cost-
benefit calculations for shoreline protection. This official widening of the scope of cost-
benefit calculations recognized the massive development of resort beaches, islands, and 
estuaries that intensified after World War Two, especially along the Southeast Atlantic 
and Gulf Coasts. Recreational uses of waterfronts now drove economic development in 
coastal areas across the sunbelt.  
Ted Steinberg cites the example of the Corps of Engineers’ huge, multi-decade 
project to restore Miami Beach’s namesake feature with dredged sand from shallow areas 
off the coast.512 Starting in the 1920s, hotels began building pool decks directly on top of 
the dunes and shoreline. Hotels and the city also sponsored the construction of jetties to 
stabilize erosion. Each hotel’s “private beach” was demarcated by a jetty. By the early 
1960s, however, the beach at Miami Beach had eroded almost completely away in some 
sections. At many hotels, beachgoers had to use a ladder to descend seawalls directly into 
the ocean at high tide. Citing both recreational benefits as well as storm protection, the 
city of Miami Beach and the State of Florida were able to lobby the federal government 
to pay for most of the cost of rebuilding the beach. But in return for this national 
                                               
511 Hillyer, “The Corps of Engineers and Shore Protection.”   
512 Steinberg, Acts of God: The Unnatural History of Natural Disaster in America, 87. 
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investment, the hotels had to give up their claims to ownership of sections of the beach. 
The shoreline at Miami Beach became a public park, and the first defense against a direct 
hit by a hurricane.513  
 By the mid-1980’s another policy change was underway. Non-structural 
approaches could be used to protect property developed in ignorance of the fragility of 
the shoreline, but it would be even better to leave barrier islands in their natural state. 
Regular beach nourishment and wetlands restoration projects had become a form of 
subsidy for developers and coastal states.514 The Coastal Barrier Resources Act of 1982 
restricted most Federal funding for largely-undeveloped shorelines, islands, and estuaries. 
These remaining, mostly-natural areas were put into a system of reserves mapped and 
enforced by the US Fish and Wildlife Service. The system, re-named after Rhode Island 
Senator John Chafee in 1999, now includes 1.3 million acres of barrier islands and 
aquatic areas. States were encouraged to protect their own coastal lands from 
development as recreational and natural areas. Since 1982, another 1.9 million acres of 
the coastline has become part of a state park.515  
 The Corps of Engineers also began to emphasize environmental protection as a 
key mission, alongside flood control and coastal defense. Starting in 1970, the Corps’ 
Environmental Advisory Board began to review on-going projects for their 
                                               
513 Steinberg notes, however, that even this massive project was not designed to protect Miami Beach 
from the kind of storm surge that devastated the city in the 1926 hurricane. Rather, the model of the 
70-year storm was used for beach slope elevations and dune cover.   
514 Hillyer, “The Corps of Engineers and Shore Protection.”   
515 “Coastal Barrier Resources System,” US Fish and Wildlife Service, June 8, 2015, 
https://www.fws.gov/ecological-services/habitat-conservation/cbra/Act/index.html#CBRS.   
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environmental impact.516 The Water Resources Development Act (WRDA) of 1986 
legislated this new set of priorities.517 Along with the first large-scale dam started since 
the late 1960s, WRDA 1986 authorized dozens of new shoreline protection and water 
resources conservation projects specifically designed to protect or restore sensitive 
coastal ecosystems. For example, it authorized more than $140 million for the protection 
and restoration of barrier islands around Florida that would become part of the John H. 
Chaffee Coastal Barrier Reserves System. It also authorized modifications to many 
existing projects, such as the unfinished Cross-Florida Barge Canal, to prioritize 
environmental restoration. WRDA 1986 also shifted some of the costs back onto the 
states, local port authorities, and users of inland waterways through new taxes on cargo, 
barge fuel, and mandatory state contributions to construction costs.  
Conclusion 
 During the twentieth century, coastal engineering moved from local, civic 
“experiments” to protect seaside resorts to a discipline that could scientifically design 
offshore platforms to withstand some of the most intense conditions on earth. At the same 
time, coastal engineers came to accept the dynamic nature of the coastal zone and 
promote preservation of natural coastlines as the best protection against storms.  
In the twenty-first century, adaptation to the impacts of climate change will 
inevitably be the main focus of engineers who work in the coastal zone. The need to 
protect the massive investment in coastal property may well bring a return to hard, 
structural approaches, such as the seawall that protected Galveston Island for a little more 
                                               
516 Reuss, “Shaping Environmental Awareness.”   
517 Reuss, “Reshaping National Water Politics.”   
 266 
than a hundred years.518 Miami Beach is only one example where flood control systems, 
such as raised streets, culverts, and pumping stations, are being designed to protect the 
island from higher tides. As climate change brings higher tides, combined with stronger 
storms, these efforts will be perpetual undertakings to protect our most vulnerable 
coastlines.  
  
                                               
518 Davis, “History of the Galveston Sea Wall”; “Hurricane Harvey Is a Seawall Moment for 
Houston,” Houston Chronicle, August 31, 2017, 
http://www.houstonchronicle.com/opinion/editorials/article/Hurricane-Harvey-is-a-seawall-moment-
for-Houston-12165697.php.    The 10-mile long Galveston Sea Wall, completed in segments between 
1904 and 1963, protected the island from hurricane storm surge until Hurricane Ike in September, 
2008. The Sea Wall blocked the 17-foot surge on the Gulf side of the island, but water from the 
intracoastal side quickly flooded downtown areas. High winds damaged houses throughout the island. 
In many ways, it was a reprisal of the terrifying 1900 storm that first created awareness of the region’s 
vulnerability. On the other hand, a hundred years of protection is a pretty good track record for a 
primary flood control system. If public policy and market forces cannot push people away from the 








Documents on flood control in Houston can be found in several local archives. 
The main Houston source for this dissertation is the Harris County Archives. The 
collection of County Auditor’s Papers from 1936-1960 is particularly valuable to 
understanding the development of the Harris County Flood Control District and its 
relationship to the federal Buffalo Bayou and Tributaries Project. The Auditor’s Papers 
also contain minutes of the Houston Chamber of Commerce, Flood Control Committee, 
that was particularly influential in advocating for expanded flood control in the late 1940s 
and early 1950s. The Harris County Archives also feature unusually comprehensive 
scrapbooks of local newspaper articles collected by long time county commissioner E. A. 
“Squatty” Lyons. Better than any search engine, Squatty Lyon’s collections are a 
comprehensive database of news on county projects, especially roads and flood control, 
during the 1940s and 1950s.  
 For a better understanding of the role of the Port of Houston in planning flood 
control projects in the late 1930s, the J. Russell Wait Port of Houston Collection at the 
Woodson Research Center at Rice University libraries is highly valuable. Also pertinent 
to the early years of the project are the Albert Thomas Papers, from Houston’s 
Congressman during the New Deal and World War Two.  
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 The work of grassroots environmental organizations to oppose flood control in 
Houston the late 1960s and early 1970s is discussed extensively by Teresa Tomkins-
Walsh in her unpublished 2009 dissertation A Concrete River Had to Be Wrong: 
Environmental Action on Houston’s Bayous, 1935–1980 (University of Houston, 2009). 
The collections Tomkins-Walsh has put together as a historian and archivist for the 
University of Houston libraries are essential for understanding the environmental 
movement in Houston. These include the Terry Hershey Papers from one of the city’s 
greatest environmental activists, and the Bayou Preservation Association Collection, the 
organization Terry Hershey founded. 
 Records of the US Army Corps of Engineers, Galveston District, are supposedly 
available through the National Archives in Fort Worth. The Civil Works Project files 
cover the period when the Buffalo Bayou Project was being planned and constructed 
(1937-1948), but they were not included in this research due to time constraints. The 
most thorough overview of the history of the Corps of Engineers’ work in water 
resources management is Two centuries of experience in water resources management: A 
Dutch-U.S. retrospective (Alexandria, VA, 2014) edited by John Lonnquest, Bert 
Toussaint, Joe Manous and Maurits Ertsen. This extraordinary international comparison 
was published by the Corps’ Institute for Water Resources and the Dutch Ministry of 
Infrastructure and Environment, Rijkswaterstaat.  
Miami 
 The Central and Southern Florida (C&SF) Project to control flooding in the 
Everglades after the floods of 1947 has been widely studied. This dissertation relies 
extensively on two narratives, The Swamp: the Everglades, Florida, and the politics of 
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paradise (New York, 2007) by Michael Grunwald and River of interests: water 
management in south Florida and the Everglades, 1948-2010 (Washington, DC, 2011) 
by Matthew Godfrey and Theodore Catton, for Historical Research Associates and the 
Jacksonville District, US Army Corps of Engineers.  
I supplemented these thorough accounts with documents from the HistoryMiami 
Research Center. The Jeanne Bellamy Water Resources Collection documents the origins 
of the C&SF Project in the late 1940s and its evolution over the next three decades. 
Jeanne Bellamy was a reporter for the Miami Herald and served on several state-level 
Citizen’s Committees on flood control and environmental protection during those years. 
A thorough collection of government documents on the C&SF project is available at 
Florida International University’s libraries.  
 Beginning in the mid-1990s, records on the C&SF Project, as well as the Four 
River Basins Project in the Tampa area, were transferred from the US Army Corps of 
Engineers, Jacksonville District, to the National Archives at Atlanta (located in Morrow, 
GA). Many of these records became publicly available as late as 2015. Due to deadlines 
and the incredible volume of these materials, few of them were analyzed for this 
dissertation. The Records of the Office of the Chief of Engineers, Jacksonville District, 
Civil Works Project Files (Record Group 77) from 1945-1985, remain an essential source 
for future scholarship on flood control in Florida.  
Tampa 
 Some of the best sources on the history of the Southwest Florida Water 
Management District are oral history interviews with some of its founders and longtime 
leaders. Interviews with former Chairman Derrill McAteer (1967-1980) and former 
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Executive Director Dale Twachtmann (1962-1972) are available online from the Samuel 
Proctor Oral History Program Digital Collection at the University of Florida Digital 
Collections. The Florida Water Management Oral History Collection at UF includes 
many other interviews with water managers and influential politicians in Florida’s 1970s 
environmental transformation. 
Several collections at the University of South Florida Libraries also cover water 
management issues in the Tampa Bay Area. These include the Sam Gibbons Papers, the 
Jan K. Platt Papers, and the Terrell Sessums Collection. These collections touch on the 
perspective of government on multiple levels: Gibbons represented the Tampa area in 
Congress beginning in the 1960s, Platt held city and Hillsborough County commission 
offices in the 1970s, and Sessums was a Florida State representative during the 1960s.  
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